

## 15: CONSTANTINE AND THE NORTHERN BARBARIANS

*Michael Kulikowski*



Rome's northern frontiers, running the length of the Rhine and Danube rivers from the North Sea to the Black Sea, faced outwards towards a world filled with peoples not subject to Roman government. In the century that separated the reign of Gallienus from the reign of Julian, we hear of more than a dozen barbarian groups along the Rhine-Danube line: Iuthungi, Franci, Alamanni, Iazyges, Vandali, Carpi, Sarmatians, Goths, Tervingi, Taifali, and so on. Collectively we may refer to them as "barbarians," a term of art that, despite its pejorative connotation in Greek, Latin, and English, has the signal advantage of making no assumptions about ethnicity. This is important, because the nature of barbarian ethnicity is nowadays a matter of considerable controversy, and the relationship of different barbarian groups to one another is often unclear. The one thing that unites third- and fourth-century barbarians, both as an object of study and as a historical phenomenon, is their collective designation in the sources by the Graeco-Roman idea of the barbarian – the uncivilized "other" outside the borders of the civil world of the empire, the *externae gentes* (external peoples), who were to be subdued and turned from savagery to gentleness, or harried from imperial territory like wild beasts.<sup>1</sup>

The barbarians we meet in our texts provided the rhetorical alterity that was defined by a sense of Hellenic or Roman identity and against which that latter identity could be defined. We know nothing of the barbarians' identity or sense of self, nothing of their own sense of ethnicity. The barbarians are accessible to us only through the prism of an *interpretatio romana*, because the literary sources are exclusively

Graeco-Roman in their perspective, and no alternative sources can make up that deficit.<sup>2</sup> Our sources were concerned with the *externae gentes* only insofar as they impinged upon imperial horizons as threats or annoyances. The interest of Greek and Roman commentators in barbarians was always closely circumscribed, which in turn closely circumscribes the perspectives open to us.

## BARBARIAN IDENTITY AND BARBARIAN ARCHAEOLOGY

That assessment may seem pessimistic given the current scholarly enthusiasm for studying barbarians in light of their ethnicity. Barbarian “ethnogenesis,” a neologism for the coming into being of a barbarian ethnic group, dominates recent textbooks and reference works.<sup>3</sup> Proponents of ethnogenesis theory locate barbarian ethnicity not in communities of descent but rather in what they call *Traditionskerne* (nuclei of tradition), small groups of aristocratic warriors who carry ethnic traditions with them from place to place and transmit them from generation to generation; then larger ethnic groups go on to coalesce and dissolve around these nuclei of tradition in a process of continuous becoming or ethnic reinvention. Barbarian ethnic identities were not, therefore, expressions of genuine kinship but evanescent and freely available for adoption by those who wanted to participate in them.<sup>4</sup>

Little of this is actually new, and ethnogenesis theory in fact dresses up old, and often discredited, approaches to the barbarians in a new vocabulary drawn from anthropology and literary theory.<sup>5</sup> The biological heterogeneity of the barbarian groups named in our sources was already generally acknowledged even in the 1930s. The rest of ethnogenesis theory transfers old ideas of ethnic migration from broad-based free populations to small aristocratic groups. It relies, in nineteenth-century fashion, on speculative philological reconstructions to identify pure barbarian ideas about themselves and to trace barbarian ethnic ideas back to an ancient past, before contact with Rome.<sup>6</sup> In other words, ethnogenesis theory and its correlative approaches to the barbarians are a new formulation of a very old project: creating a Germanic past independent from Rome and tracing an ancient Germanic identity through the late Roman period into the Middle Ages and thence to modern Germany. Treasured topoi of nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century *germanische Altertumskunde* are thus salvaged, among them a Scandinavian *Urheimat* (proto-homeland) of barbarian identity

and heroic Germanic migrations, plotted on arrow-strewn maps. The project is the same, but the descriptive vocabulary has changed, marketing old ideas in a postmodern guise.<sup>7</sup> Yet all this fails at the most basic methodological level to respect what little evidence for the barbarians survives from antiquity, and it also ignores the most basic limitation of our sources – none of them tells us what the barbarians believed about themselves. They merely report to us what Roman observers saw or heard, and then thought worth recording, about the neighbours who confronted them.

The material remains of the frontier regions, for their part, are an invaluable source for social change beyond the Roman frontier, but they are as useless as the extant literary sources when it comes to questions of ethnicity. For the better part of the twentieth century, it was generally assumed that material artefacts themselves carry ethnicity: that one particular form of brooch is Gothic, another Vandalic, and that wherever we find such brooches we can locate Goths and Vandals; or that artefacts can distinguish the habits of one ethnic group from another, so that Gepids were farmers, Ostrogoths aristocratic horsemen.<sup>8</sup> Despite the ubiquity of this ethnic ascription, it has now been definitively shown that artefacts do not carry ethnicity in such a fashion and that we can almost never match archaeological cultures to ancient ethnic divisions.<sup>9</sup> Whether it is the cemeteries whence most of our artefacts come or the remains of barbarian settlements, material evidence tells us far more about vertical social relationships – those between different status levels within a society – than it does about horizontal relationships between ethnic or linguistic groups with separate identities. The difficulty is inherent in the way we define an archaeological culture: even if our selection of defining characteristics successfully isolates those that are not actually quite widely diffused (and that is not always the case), we are still making the assumption that the characteristics we select as definitive are those that contemporaries would have recognized as defining a sense of identity and, conversely, a sense of alterity.<sup>10</sup> That assumption is in fact never possible in purely archaeological terms – we need the human voice of the past to communicate a sense of identity. In the case of the barbarians, that voice does not exist apart from the *interpretatio romana*.

Nevertheless, there do exist cases in which we can legitimately draw connections between certain sets of artefacts and historically attested peoples. If a well-dated material assemblage is widely present in a region where our sources locate a named ethnic group over a substantial period of time, then we can say with some certainty that the named ethnic group participated in that material culture. But that fact

has no follow-on consequences. We cannot say that the material culture in question was exclusive to the particular named ethnic group, nor that elements of the material culture that appear outside the region necessarily represent the presence of that ethnic group. The concrete example of the Goths is instructive. There can be no doubt that, in the later third century and the fourth century, groups of people collectively described as Goths in our literary sources dwelt in the large swathe of modern Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania within which was located the archaeological culture that we call *Sîntana-de-Mureş* or *Černjachov* (see Map 2). This relatively homogeneous material culture, defined by its artefacts and its burial practices, was clearly common to the entire population of the region. But the literary sources make it equally clear that the region's entire population was not Gothic. To call the *Černjachov* culture "Gothic," as many do, is to make a statement instantly falsified by the evidence.<sup>11</sup> The literary sources allow us to say that people known as Goths were politically dominant in the territory encompassed by the *Černjachov* culture during the fourth century; they do not allow us to state that the brooches, antler combs, or pots of that archaeological culture communicate the distinctive attributes of Goths. Thus a geographical expansion of the material culture might as easily reflect the migration of Gothic subjects as the extension of Gothic hegemony. Similarly, a *Černjachov* artefact found outside the culture's chief distribution zone – in Italy, for instance, or in Pannonia – need not represent the presence of a Goth.

Yet if the material evidence has a very limited role in the study of barbarian ethnicity, it is quite informative about barbarian society in broader terms, precisely because of its capacity to reveal vertical relationships within an archaeological assemblage and changes among those relationships over time. Here we can do little more than sketch general observations that seem to be borne out at many sites excavated in central and northern Europe. A relatively stable archaeological culture reaching back to the Neolithic era existed all across this region, but changes in settlement patterns and technology become evident in the second century AD. In general terms, barbarian society became increasingly stratified from that point onwards. The most famous illustration of the trend is probably the site of Feddersen Wierde on the Weser estuary, much rebuilt after AD 100; it contains a clearly visible chieftain's house inside its own enclosure, a house much larger than the fifty or more smaller houses that occupy the site.<sup>12</sup> Other examples of planned villages centered on a chieftain's house can be multiplied, particularly from the Rhine and Weser regions, but the evidence is sufficiently similar across

barbarian Europe for us to postulate increasingly hierarchical societies both close to the frontiers and in the central European interior. That this trend towards a more stratified society probably corresponds to the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few disproportionately powerful leaders is suggested by the increasing prominence of isolated, lavish burials in various parts of barbarian Europe, not least in territory close to the Roman frontiers. These so-called princely graves (*Fürstengräber*) contain an abundance of both native material and rich Roman imports and demonstrate substantial contacts with the imperial Roman world even in parts of central Europe, like Moravia or the Elbe River valley, that are almost invisible in the Graeco-Roman literary tradition.

Although archaeology cannot confirm the existence of such typically “Germanic” institutions as the chieftain’s retinue (*Gefolgschaft*, *comitatus*), there can be little doubt that the barbarian elites laid to rest in the *Fürstengräber* were responsible for much redistribution of wealth throughout barbarian society.<sup>13</sup> The rural and agricultural society over which they ruled was not only becoming wealthier, it was becoming more populous: throughout barbarian Europe, settlements grew in size between the second and fourth centuries, even as larger tracts of marginal land came to be exploited. In the Černjachov regions, a new and increasingly homogeneous archaeological culture came into being during the third century, oriented towards the harvesting, storage, and redistribution of agricultural products. Along the Rhine and Upper Danube, by contrast, there is no visible break in the archaeological culture of the third century, when such new ethnic names as those of the Franks and Alamanni begin to dominate our sources. On the other hand, the excavation of cemeteries and settlements in ever greater numbers seems to confirm the same picture of growing social differentiation, while fortifications within the abandoned Roman *limes* of Upper Germany and Raetia (e.g., the Glauberg and the Gelbe Burg) were definitely turned into barbarian strongholds during the third century.

The picture of barbarian Europe that develops without reference to the literary evidence is remarkably consistent: across the continent, almost certainly beginning in those regions closest to the *limes*, settlements were growing larger and more differentiated in terms of wealth and status. At the same time, more and more portable wealth circulated among the barbarian populations of the continent. These changes correspond roughly to the period in which Roman authority faced real challenges from beyond the northern frontiers. We are practically compelled to infer that profound social changes in barbarian Europe made it possible, for the first time, for barbarians to contemplate the Roman

empire as an entity capable of being challenged. Any attempt to explain the precise nature of these changes in terms of kingship theories or ethnic change founders for lack of evidence, and we may be certain that there were impulses to change within the *barbaricum* that remain wholly invisible to us.

On the other hand, the one overwhelming fact of barbarian Europe in the later second century and third century is the Roman empire itself. The barbarians who raided or invaded the Roman provinces between the 170s and the 330s had dwelt beside a prosperous, stable, and powerful empire for three, or five, or seven generations. The wealth of that empire and the example of rulership it offered through the mere fact of its existence, not to mention the deliberate political interventionism in which emperors and their legates might dabble, spurred the great changes that overtook the barbarian world in the second and third centuries and that we can witness in the archaeological record without the Roman sources interposing themselves.<sup>14</sup> How we explain the conflicts between Rome and its barbarian neighbours in the reigns of Constantine's predecessors is in some ways immaterial – Romans had always fought their neighbours, whoever they happened to be. What had changed was the ability of the barbarians to pose a sustained challenge to Roman armies and to mount successful, if transitory, campaigns deep inside imperial territory. That they could do this was probably a result of the social changes that decades of contact with the empire had wrought on barbarian society. Unfortunately, we lack any record of the barbarian perspective on ensuing events, which we can reconstruct only on the basis of Roman sources.

## ROMAN EMPERORS AND THE NORTHERN BARBARIANS IN THE THIRD CENTURY

From the perspective of observers within the empire, the Rhine and Danube frontiers were an increasingly important focus of attention from the reign of Marcus Aurelius onwards. However, the patterns of frontier conflict that still dominated the age of Constantine were only established in the middle of the third century. The reign of Gallienus (253–68) in particular was remembered as a time of devastation when “many enemies invaded the Roman empire.”<sup>15</sup> In fact, all four decades after 240 brought with them barbarian raids on a scale unprecedented in imperial history. Although the increased potency of barbarian leaders no doubt played a part in this, the sheer number of military challenges

that third-century emperors had simultaneously to confront was of far greater consequence. Much the most dangerous challenge was usurpation, and during the third and fourth centuries, conflict with barbarian neighbours is almost never separable from conflict among contenders for the imperial throne.<sup>16</sup> Save in the brief interlude of Constantine's sole reign, the intensity of barbarian aggression along the Rhine and Danube ebbed and flowed as Roman civil conflict provided greater or lesser opportunity. In the same way, the determination of emperors to campaign on the Rhine and Danube frontiers nearly always coincided with a lapse in civil conflict. It was precisely this vicious cycle of foreign invasion and consequent usurpation out of which the Tetrarchy emerged – and that it was designed, in large part, to redress.

Our miserable sources for the third century record nearly annual fighting, although they do not record line upon line of barbarian migrants toppling one another like dominoes into the Roman *limes*. A rhetoric of tidal invasions sustains many modern narratives, but it ignores the relative consistency of the warfare along the Rhine and Danube frontiers and their consequent stability.<sup>17</sup> Emperors themselves never made this mistake, as we can see from the consistent priority they gave to the eastern frontier. The prestige of the Persian front never lessened, no matter how severe a particular crisis on the Rhine or Danube frontier became.<sup>18</sup> The reason for this was the same under Gallienus as it was to be under Constantine – however violent or devastating a barbarian invasion might be, the barbarians were on their own quite incapable of seizing a Roman province and keeping it. They could do so only if the imperial government allowed them to. This happened in the third century when the Agri Decumates (see Map 1), the stretch of land between the sources of the Rhine and Danube, ceased to be garrisoned and was gradually occupied by Alamanni; it happened again when Aurelian removed the garrison of trans-Danubian Dacia.

At other times, barbarian invasion presented a secondary threat because it was believed, rightly, that the invaders could always be destroyed or driven out after more pressing concerns abated.<sup>19</sup> A concentrated Roman army could nearly always overmaster its barbarian enemies by weight of arms alone – as Ammianus puts it, Roman armies “thought that the most difficult portion of their work had been done once the enemy was discovered.”<sup>20</sup> By the time of Constantine, the disparity between Roman and barbarian arms and tactics was less dramatic than it had once been, both because of the imitation of Roman techniques by barbarians and also because of the increasing employment of barbarians in imperial armies.<sup>21</sup> Even in the fourth century,

however, the discipline and, particularly, the generalship of Roman armies were usually decisive. It is, for instance, not clear that any Tetrarchic or Constantinian army suffered a defeat at the hands of a barbarian army. The military superiority, regardless of whether it lay in armament or in command and control, was usually overwhelming. The difficulty was bringing it to bear, and on that point Constantine and his immediate predecessors learned the lessons of the third century.

The third- and fourth-century barbarians about whom we hear the most are the Alamanni and the Goths, while the Franks are increasingly prominent from the Tetrarchic period onwards.<sup>22</sup> The Franks and the Alamanni may represent new political groupings brought into being by centuries of contact with Romans and made up of older, smaller barbarian groups.<sup>23</sup> We are told as much explicitly of the Franks, though the evidence for the Alamanni is less clear-cut.<sup>24</sup> It is harder to fit the Goths into the same sort of evolutionary conception, but historical models that explain the Gothic Danubian polities by migration from either north or east must rely on highly doubtful ethnic-ascriptive archaeology.<sup>25</sup> Regardless of origins, these barbarians were formidable. It was a Gothic army, after all, that killed the emperor Decius (r. 249–51) and sacked Philippopolis in 251.<sup>26</sup> Raids by Goths and others penetrated into the Balkans in 252 and later into Asia Minor. Having defeated one such group of raiders in 253, the governor of Moesia, Aemilianus, was acclaimed emperor by his troops (r. 253), establishing the iron link between invasion and usurpation that plagued the remainder of the third century.<sup>27</sup>

The phenomenon is constant: the murder of Aemilian precipitated invasions in the reign of his successor, Valerian (r. 253–60) and the latter's son and coemperor Gallienus (r. 253–68).<sup>28</sup> Barbarian piracy into Asia Minor and Achaëa from the Black Sea coast was a major feature of the reign, yet though such raids could be devastating, they were not coordinated military campaigns any more than were those of the Marcomanni and various Rhineland barbarians during the 250s.<sup>29</sup> Rather, opportunistic invasions went hand in hand with civil strife, as with the Iuthungian raid into Italy that inspired the usurpation of Postumus: his success against the Iuthungi in April 260, freeing many Italian captives, allowed him to inaugurate a separate imperial succession that lasted in Gaul for over a decade, from 260 to 274.<sup>30</sup> Postumus may briefly have held the Raetian *limes* intact, but his subsequent withdrawal to the line of the Rhine left the Agri Decumates ungarrisoned and open to a gradual occupation by the Alamanni. The rest of Gallienus's reign appears in the sources as a catalogue of disasters: Alamannic raids into Italy as far as



Rome; Roxolani, Iazyges, Sarmatians, and Quadi in Pannonia; *Germani* penetrating as far as Tarraco in northeastern Spain.<sup>31</sup> Gallienus's military reforms, particularly the creation of a mobile cavalry force, were probably inspired by his need to move swiftly between looming threats as quickly as they arose, but while he was fighting Goths in the Balkans, one of his generals revolted in Italy, and Gallienus was murdered in the course of the campaign to suppress him.

The revolt against Gallienus in Italy had inspired a massive invasion of the Balkans by "Scythians" (named variously as Heruli, Peuci, and Goths). His successor Claudius (r. 268–70) defeated them twice, winning the victory title *Gothicus* by which he is generally known before succumbing to the plague.<sup>32</sup> Claudius died at Sirmium in August 270, and his successor Aurelian's proclamation faced opposition in Italy, perpetuating the now familiar pattern: Vandals invaded Pannonia, Alamanni and Iuthungi Italy.<sup>33</sup> For that reason we find Aurelian (r. 270–5) entering his first consulship at Siscia on January 1, 271, in the midst of a rare winter campaign against the Vandals. When this proved successful, the emperor marched immediately to Italy, where the Iuthungi and Alamanni initially routed his exhausted army but were later turned back from their march on Rome at Fanum. Despite their defeat, the barbarians refused to make any act of submission, leaving the iron-willed Aurelian to harry their march out of Italy and eventually annihilate them in pitched battle outside Ticinum. Aurelian now took the title *Germanicus Maximus* and, with renewed confidence, marched his army beyond the Danube – the first time an emperor had done so in decades – on a massive punitive expedition in 271. Aurelian may possibly have killed a Gothic king named Cannobaudes, and he certainly took the title *Gothicus Maximus* for a campaign whose success was still remembered more than a hundred years later.<sup>34</sup> Success against the Goths kept the Danube quiescent during Aurelian's Palmyrene campaign, and his victorious march back to Rome included a detour against the Carpi.<sup>35</sup> In 274, Aurelian suppressed his Gallic rival Tetricus, and one may suspect that the campaigns of early 275, in Gaul, Raetia, and the Balkans, were made necessary by barbarian attempts to exploit the civil war.

That fact suggests that, despite Aurelian's prodigious battlefield successes, nothing fundamental had changed in the political dynamic of the frontier. In the aftermath of Aurelian's murder (275), his successors Tacitus (r. 275–6) and Probus (r. 276–82) faced raids from across the Rhine and Danube, some reaching as far as Cilicia in Asia Minor.<sup>36</sup> Probus launched a major offensive into German territory, and it is now that Franks are first securely attested in our sources, settled by Probus

along the coastline of Gaul, where some of them rebelled, seized boats, and sailed into the Mediterranean as pirates.<sup>37</sup> A fourth-century author makes explicit the link between imperial disarray and barbarian invasion: “all the barbarians seized the opportunity to invade when they learned of the death of Probus [in 282].”<sup>38</sup> Probus’s praetorian prefect Carus became his successor (r. 282–3), left his elder son Carinus (r. 283–5) in charge of the western provinces, and led an army against the Quadi and Sarmatians on the Danube before launching the invasion of Persia during which he met his end.<sup>39</sup> The accession of Diocletian at Nicomedia in 284 prompted the inevitable civil war against Carinus. The latter had restored the Rhine frontier in the year before his defeat and death at the Margus in 285, but his march eastwards to face Diocletian seems to have allowed for new barbarian raids on the Gallic coast. In that same year, Diocletian campaigned against the Sarmatians on the Danube and appointed a new coemperor, Maximian, to counter two invading barbarian armies, composed of Burgundians, Alamanni, Chaibones, and Heruli, who had crossed the Rhine into Gaul.<sup>40</sup> The decision to place Carausius, a general of barbarian origin, in charge of a fleet to fight the Franks and Saxons was militarily sound, but his successes led, predictably enough, to his usurpation (287–93).

Thus, although the accession of Diocletian marks a symbolic turning point for the modern historian, the first years of his reign reflect the long-standing pattern of usurpation and barbarian invasion. Nevertheless, both Diocletian and Maximian manifested the renewed imperial willingness to lead armies beyond the *limes*. Barbarian raids in January of 287 provoked Maximian to campaign beyond the Rhine later in the year.<sup>41</sup> In the next year, he concentrated on Carausius while both his praetorian prefect Constantius and the senior Augustus invaded Germany. Constantius’s campaigns produced real success, for the Frankish king Gennobaudes sued for peace and was confirmed in his position and settled near Trier.<sup>42</sup> In the subsequent years, before his elevation to the rank of Caesar, Constantius continued to fight beyond the Rhine, penetrating into “Alamannia” and taking prisoner a barbarian king.<sup>43</sup> Diocletian, meanwhile, campaigned on the Danube against Tervingi and Taifali.<sup>44</sup>

After the appointment of Constantius and Galerius as Caesars in 293, the value of the Tetrarchic experiment became increasingly evident: an imperial college, made up of competent generals who would not go to war against each other, meant that Roman power could be projected beyond the frontiers with a regularity unknown since the Severan period and with little danger of usurpation supervening. Thus almost

immediately after driving Carausius out of Gaul, Constantius marched against Franks, Chamavi, and Frisii, presumably the usurper's former allies, deporting many to Gaul and settling them there as farmers.<sup>45</sup> All the emperors took the title *Germanicus Maximus* for this victory, and while Constantius consolidated this success by launching his invasion of Britain, Maximian maintained the newly imposed peace on the Rhine.<sup>46</sup> In 293 or 294, Diocletian built a fortress across the Danube in the territory of the Sarmatians, and in the following year the Carpi, who dwelt some way to the east of the Sarmatians, submitted to Roman authority.<sup>47</sup> The Marcomanni were defeated in 299 or 300.<sup>48</sup> Meanwhile, Constantius persisted with his reign of terror in the Rhineland, campaigning against the Franks in 299 or so, and then defeating a major invasion of three barbarian groups between 302 and 304.<sup>49</sup>

#### ROMAN EMPERORS AND THE NORTHERN BARBARIANS, 305–337

There appears to be some slackening of frontier warfare in the years before the abdication of the Augusti in 305. Although this might be an illusion born of the sparse evidence, it is just as likely to reflect the Tetrarchy's success in reducing the third century's endemic frontier instability. Either way, it seems likely that co-opting more and more barbarian support into imperial circles did contribute to stability. It was, after all, the Alamannic king Crocus who supposedly engineered Constantine's acclamation at York in 306, perhaps as a client of the dead Augustus Constantius.<sup>50</sup> That acclamation, however, marked the breakdown of the succession arrived at in 305 and led promptly to what we have come to expect, an outburst of frontier warfare to accompany internal discord. Thus by late 306 or 307, Constantine was already campaigning on the lower Rhine, leading a number of Frankish kings in triumph at Trier in a spectacle that made a considerable impression on his panegyrists.<sup>51</sup> By early 307, Galerius had fought a Sarmatian campaign, and in the following summer he attacked the Carpi.<sup>52</sup> In that same year, Constantine laid waste the trans-Rhenan territory of the Bructeri.<sup>53</sup> In 310, he attacked the Franks, building a bridge across the Rhine to carry the campaign to them.<sup>54</sup> This provided the opportunity for diplomatic contacts, which in turn led to substantial recruitment of Franks into Constantine's army. The evidence for this recruitment exists in later army rolls listing units of Bracchiati and Cornuti that probably date back to this period and in the reliefs of the Arch of Constantine

at Rome, which clearly distinguish the dress of Constantine's barbarian supporters.<sup>55</sup> While Constantine was occupied in the Rhineland, Licinius took over the Danube front from his patron Galerius and won a victory over the Sarmatians in 310.<sup>56</sup>

It is quite possible to read all these campaigns in terms of barbarian exploitation of Roman disunity, but other possibilities suggest themselves as well. It had always been part of the emperor's job to extend his protection to his subjects and to trample the foes of the Romans underfoot. Yet by the end of the third century, as one would expect in a period of military crisis, this aspect of imperial duties had come to embody the largest part of the imperial majesty. The emperor's very claim to hold the throne might rest on his military success. That attitude persists in the literary assessments of the fourth century: bad emperors were those, like Gallienus, who allowed barbarians to run amok in the provinces.<sup>57</sup> For Aurelius Victor, imperial decline set in when emperors worked harder to dominate their subjects than to defeat barbarians.<sup>58</sup> A pagan writer like Zosimus, virulently hostile to Constantine, could condemn that emperor's army reforms precisely for removing soldiers from the frontiers, thereby encouraging barbarians to invade.<sup>59</sup> The emperors certainly understood how important military victory was to their image, not least in the imagery of their coins (see Fig. 29 and Coins 2, 20, 24, 25, and 32).<sup>60</sup> We can see it made verbally explicit in the preface to Diocletian's Price Edict, the very first sentence of which proclaims that the emperors, having first suppressed the rapine of the barbarian nations, can now provide for the economic tranquility of the empire.<sup>61</sup> When those Christians who rejected Diocletian's order to sacrifice also mocked his claim to Gothic and Sarmatian victories, they were doing more than just defying his commands. They were also challenging the foundations of his claim to rule.<sup>62</sup>

Given this substantive element of the imperial image, many of the northern campaigns of 306–12 may represent the need of Constantine and his rivals to assert their military qualifications for rulership. Indeed, it has been suggested that, for much of the fourth century, the dangers posed by Rhine barbarians were less than fully real and instead were inflated because of the emperors' need for enemies on whom to exercise military might and thereby shore up their image.<sup>63</sup> This view, though exaggerated, is not without merit. In this light, although Constantine had many good reasons to repudiate the Herculian name that represented his connection to Maximian, his decision to substitute Claudius Gothicus as his supposed ancestor beginning in 310 is significant.<sup>64</sup> Claudius was one of the previous century's great military

heroes, and his name was satisfyingly free of Tetrarchic associations. The site of his greatest victories may likewise be significant, for they were won in the Balkans, perhaps adumbrating Constantine's own territorial ambitions, ambitions on which he soon acted. It was, after all, the exigencies of frontier warfare that eventually brought Constantine and Licinius to blows. During the uneasy truce of 312–16, both Augusti campaigned against their respective barbarian neighbours: Constantine on the lower Rhine against Franks and Alamanni, Licinius against the Goths in the Balkans.<sup>65</sup> After the first war between the two emperors, Constantine sent his Caesar Crispus to Trier in 317 to guard the Rhine frontier and campaign against the Franks and Alamanni, while he himself took over Licinius's residence at Sirmium, dividing his time between there and nearby Serdica.<sup>66</sup>

Constantine's Danubian campaigns also precipitated the final conflict with Licinius. In 323, he attacked the Sarmatians on the frontiers of Pannonia, winning one battle, over a king called Rausimod, at Campona in the Pannonian province of Valeria, and a second considerably further downstream at the confluence of the Danube and Morava in Moesia Superior.<sup>67</sup> Coins issued at Trier, Arles, Lyons, and Sirmium celebrated the success with the legend *SARMATIA DEVICTA* (Sarmatia has been subdued; Coin 2), Constantine took the title *Sarmaticus*, and the gladiatorial *ludi Sarmatici*, known epigraphically, may also have celebrated this victory.<sup>68</sup> The winning of the second victory, however, had taken Constantine on a march through parts of Licinius's territory and provoked their final break. In the ensuing civil war, Goths fought on the side of Licinius, some of them under a leader called Alica, while Constantine's army made substantial use of Franks, at least one of whom, Bonitus, had reached a position of rank.<sup>69</sup>

Although emperors had always recruited northern barbarians into the Roman *auxilia*, and later into the regular units of the army, the years before 324 may represent a new phase in the habits and scale of that recruitment. Because the *externae gentes* represented a seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of manpower, it paid to preserve as much barbarian strength as one safely could. The recruits might be used to fight other barbarians – *Germanorum auxilia contra Germanos* (units of Germans against Germans).<sup>70</sup> Alternatively, they might be used in foreign adventures, as in the case of the Sarmatians and Goths employed by Galerius against Persia. But barbarian soldiers were even more useful in civil wars, and their recruitment for that end was already well entrenched by the middle of the third century, when Trebonianus Gallus first used “Scythians” against Decius and then concluded a pact with them in the

expectation of their future utility.<sup>71</sup> On the other hand, it is generally assumed that the Constantinian period formed a decisive stage in the use of barbarian soldiers by Roman generals.<sup>72</sup> The years between 312 and 324 were the first period since the onset of military crisis in the third century during which rival emperors had really ample leisure in which to recruit troops for themselves. In his campaign against Maxentius in 312, Constantine had already made great use of Frankish auxiliaries, recruited both from beyond the Rhine and from barbarian prisoners of war settled by his father and Maximian in Gaul.<sup>73</sup> Julian's *Caesares* is scathing on Constantine's recruitment and subsidy of barbarians, Licinius seems to have relied systematically on Danubian recruits, and the recruitment of barbarians grew steadily in the course of the fourth century.<sup>74</sup> That being the case, it seems likely that the precedent set by Constantine and Licinius was validated by its very success: Constantine routed Licinius in 324.

That victory allowed Constantine a free hand in the Balkans, which he used partly for grandiose construction schemes. Some of these were eminently practical, but they were also symbolic, not least the bridge over the Danube from Oescus to Sucidava, which in 328 established an actual, as well as an ideological, bridgehead onto what one source now calls the *ripa Gothica*.<sup>75</sup> The campaigns that followed on these ventures, including an unsuccessful attack on an invading force of Taifali in 330,<sup>76</sup> ended in 332 with a Gothic peace that has become one of the most controverted events of Constantine's reign. The war against the Goths began in support of certain Sarmatians who had beseeched the emperor's aid and was won "in the lands of the Sarmatians," thus beyond the Pannonian section of the Danube frontier.<sup>77</sup> The Caesar Constantine II led the imperial armies, driving many Goths – the sources speak improbably of a hundred thousand – to die of hunger and cold and demanding hostages, amongst them the son of a Gothic king called Ariaric.<sup>78</sup> That, in full, is what the sources tell us of the 332 campaign.

That it was a major and lasting victory need not be doubted – it remained worthy of note two decades later when, in 355, Constantine's nephew Julian delivered his panegyric to the emperor Constantius.<sup>79</sup> Likewise, some Goths clearly developed a special loyalty to the Constantinian dynasty, as evidenced by their support of the usurper Procopius – who claimed connections to the Constantinian dynasty – against Valens in the 360s.<sup>80</sup> Perhaps because the war of 332 and the peace are so obscure, they have permitted highly speculative reconstruction, much of it ideologically inspired. It is actually very difficult to find evidence

for continuity between the Goths of 332 and groups attested later, like the Tervingi, or to fit Ariaric into a continuous stream of Gothic royal history.<sup>81</sup> The early evidence says nothing more than that Ariaric held a royal title and ruled over many Goths, but by no means necessarily all the Danubian Goths.<sup>82</sup> Discussion of the terms of the peace is similarly complicated. It is clear that the emperor dictated the treaty's terms: "the Goths finally learned to serve the Romans," as Eusebius put it a few years after 332.<sup>83</sup> Goths likewise continued to serve in Roman armies after 332, just as they had done before that year, but we have no evidence that the treaty of 332 provided a new framework for their doing so.<sup>84</sup> There is little point in attempting to eke out our understanding of 332 by appeal to general models of Roman diplomacy, for instance, by postulating a formal *deditio* (full surrender) unattested by the sources or by deriving its terms from Romano-Gothic relations attested later in the fourth or even the fifth and sixth centuries.<sup>85</sup> Nor do we get very far following those who invent precise technical connotations for the generic Latin noun *foedus*, which simply means "formal treaty."<sup>86</sup> Many hypotheses based on such approaches have found their way, as fact, into the modern literature; some have even claimed that the whole late Roman concept of *foederati* stems from Constantine's treaty of 332.<sup>87</sup> None is implicit in the evidence for 332.<sup>88</sup> Viewed without preconceptions, the peace of 332 seems rather ordinary, important because it was militarily decisive, not because it represents a new phase in Gothic history and Gothic kingship or introduces new principles into imperial policies towards the barbarians.

After 332, Goths continued to be employed by the emperors as they had been before, as military recruits in times of specific need, while the Danube frontier remained generally peaceful until 367, when Valens launched his first Gothic war.<sup>89</sup> Thirty-five years of frontier stability was no small matter, but a still more lasting consequence was less demonstrably intentional, Christianisation. It is sometimes argued that Constantine deliberately imposed Christianity on those Goths with whom he made peace, but the evidence for that is not good.<sup>90</sup> It is, however, quite likely that Constantine's victory, his dictating of its terms, and his subsequent regular interventions in the trans-Danubian territories made it easier for Christianity to take hold there.<sup>91</sup> The years after Constantine's victory of 332 were far more significant in this respect, especially because they led to the consecration and mission of the Gothic bishop Ulfila. Our information on the life of Ulfila is limited.<sup>92</sup> He was descended from Cappadocians taken captive in the Gothic raids of

Gallienus's reign, but he himself bore a Gothic name. He came on an embassy to the emperor – perhaps Constantine, perhaps Constantius II – and was consecrated in either 336 or 341 by Eusebius of Nicomedia and other bishops in order to minister to Christians in Gothic lands.<sup>93</sup>

We do not know what percentage of the population of Gothic lands was already Christian in 332, but it was perhaps large enough to worry Gothic leaders. For reasons more or less obscure to us, they began a persecution against the Christians of Gothia in 347 or 348 during which Ulfila and his followers were driven out and granted lands in Moesia.<sup>94</sup> In this period, Ulfila created an alphabet with which to write Gothic and translated into that language the text of the Bible. Ulfila was theologically inclined towards the semi-Arian (homoian) views of his consecrator, Eusebius of Nicomedia, but it seems most likely that the main part of his theological activity dates from after his settlement inside the empire.<sup>95</sup> On the other hand, it is unclear whether or not the Christian Gothic community of Moesia maintained close connections with coreligionists beyond the Danube, though reliable sources make it clear that such coreligionists existed. For that matter, the possibility of Ulfila's continued involvement in diplomacy between emperors and Goths up to and including the fateful year 376, when a large group of Goths entered the empire never to be fully subdued, rests on very uncertain ground, though it is not altogether unlikely.<sup>96</sup>

In some ways a product of Constantine's Gothic peace, Ulfila's mission would only gain dramatic significance in retrospect with the entry of a substantial Gothic population into the empire and their use of his Gothic literary language as one important marker of their political identity. The short-term political consequences of Constantine's victory merely shifted the focus of confrontation to a new set of barbarian enemies, this time in a Sarmatian campaign of 334.<sup>97</sup> It appears that the Sarmatians' slaves rebelled against them and that many Sarmatians – thirty thousand, according to one source – fled into Roman service on Roman territory, being divided among the Balkan and Italian provinces.<sup>98</sup> Constantine again took the title *Sarmaticus Maximus*, and he appears to have campaigned extensively beyond the Danube thereafter, leading to his assumption of the title *Dacicus Maximus*, perhaps as part of an effort to claim a restoration of Trajan's province of Dacia. Though the old Dacia was certainly not reannexed and subjected to Roman administration, the claim may make reference to small conquests or bridgeheads established north of the Danube.<sup>99</sup> These proved ephemeral, but Constantine could clearly exercise control beyond the *limes*, as is illustrated



by the large number of barbarian ambassadors present at the celebration of his *tricennalia* in 335.<sup>100</sup> The diplomatic front was stable enough that the emperor's death two years later brought few major changes to the relationship between the northern barbarians and the three sons who succeeded Constantine, although before 340 both Constantius and Constans had taken the title *Sarmaticus*, implying either a joint campaign or two consecutive ones.<sup>101</sup>

## ROMAN EMPERORS AND THE NORTHERN BARBARIANS, 337–363

The strife that eventually broke out among the imperial siblings swiftly revived old patterns in which civil war triggered hostile opportunism on the frontiers. Thus in both 341 and 342 Constans launched campaigns against the Franks, the second a clear imperial victory, commemorated on a recently discovered silver dish from Kaiseraugst.<sup>102</sup> The history of the 340s is notoriously obscure, but the aftermath of Magnentius's usurpation (350–3), which is described in the earliest portion of Ammianus still extant, fits squarely into the pattern just described. Ammianus, in fact, makes the link between usurpation and barbarian invasion explicit in the speech that he puts in the mouth of Constantius II before his appointment of Julian as Caesar.<sup>103</sup> The murder of Constans and the accession of the usurper had precipitated major wars in the Rhineland, supposedly encouraged by Constantius: the barbarians “were like wild beasts who have acquired the habit of stealing their prey through the negligence of the shepherds.”<sup>104</sup> As a result, once Magnentius was suppressed, the Rhine and the Upper Danube frontiers became a serious source of concern to Constantius. In 354, Constantius himself took up summer quarters at Valence, planning to campaign against the Alamannic royal brothers Gundomar and Vadomar.<sup>105</sup> Peace was made without fighting, but the following year brought further campaigns.<sup>106</sup> In 355, Silvanus was sent to the Rhineland to deal with the raids there but was accused of rebellion and was murdered.<sup>107</sup> In the immediate aftermath of this upheaval, Cologne was taken by Franks, supposedly the first news Julian received after his appointment as Caesar to cope with the barbarian threat.<sup>108</sup> Stabilizing the Rhine frontier would occupy Julian continuously until his acclamation as Augustus.

In spring 356, hearing of an attack on Autun, Julian determined to chastise the barbarians while they were scattered about the countryside plundering. After relieving Troyes and winning a series of skirmishes,

Julian cleared the countryside and recovered Cologne.<sup>109</sup> His mere presence in the Rhineland sufficed to extract better terms from the Franks along the lower reaches of the river, and in 356/7 he overwintered in Sens, defeating an Alamannic attempt to besiege him there. Julian then spent the whole of 357 on campaign. The culmination was the famous battle of Strasbourg (Argentoratum), described with great circumstantial detail by Ammianus.<sup>110</sup> There, Julian defeated a coalition of seven Alamannic kings with an army of thirty-five thousand men, testimony to the sheer scale of the manpower they could muster. Between six thousand and eight thousand of these were killed in the battle with Julian's army, and after his stunning victory, Julian threw a bridge across the Rhine and implemented a series of punitive attacks and security measures against the Alamanni.<sup>111</sup> The summer of 358 was spent in a new campaign against the Franks, who had used the Alamannic wars as an excuse to penetrate the Roman province of lower Germany, and another against the Alamanni, still smarting from the disaster of Strasbourg.<sup>112</sup> Later in 358, Julian carefully prepared another large campaign in Germany aimed at deliberately sowing terror in the hope of preventing further attacks.<sup>113</sup>

Meanwhile, Constantius's victorious sojourn in Rome was cut short in 357 by news of Suebic attacks on Raetia, Quadic attacks on Pannonia, and Sarmatian attacks on Pannonia and Moesia.<sup>114</sup> In 358, before the start of the summer campaigning season, when an invasion would not yet be expected, Constantius crossed the Danube against the Sarmatians and Quadi. He forced the Sarmatians to restore their Roman prisoners, sat in judgment over the petty kings of the whole region, and forced the Limigantes, who had previously been subject to the Sarmatians, to relocate beyond the Tisza (Parthiscus) River in order to prevent them from posing a further threat to the empire.<sup>115</sup> By the next year, however, the subdued Limigantes had abandoned the territory into which Constantius had hoped to confine them, instead seeking settlement inside the empire. As this was being contemplated, the Limigantes rose up and were subject to wholesale slaughter.<sup>116</sup>

When Julian became Augustus, he quite correctly feared his cousin's opposition. It therefore became more important than ever for him to look the part of emperor. In 360 he attacked the Frankish Attuarii down towards the mouth of the Rhine, where imperial armies rarely appeared, and destroyed large numbers of them before granting them peace and accepting them into the empire as settlers.<sup>117</sup> It was perhaps then that he took the title *Francicus maximus*.<sup>118</sup> Meanwhile, the

Alamannic king Vadomar, with whom Julian had been at peace for several years, decided that 361 was an opportune moment to exploit the brewing hostilities between Constantius and Julian. Rumour suggested that Vadomar was acting on orders of Constantius, who hoped to detain his rebellious Caesar with an Alamannic invasion. Julian, at any rate, intercepted correspondence from Vadomar to Constantius, on which grounds he exiled the king to Spain before marching against Constantius.<sup>119</sup> The northern frontiers seem to have remained quiet during Julian's brief sole reign. When that ended in the disaster of the Persian war, Valentinian and Valens were confronted with long years of renewed conflict.<sup>120</sup> That, however, lies beyond the scope this chapter, though one might usefully point out that, until the Goths' Danube crossing was botched in 376, the basic dynamic of imperial relations with the northern barbarians remains largely what it had been since the later days of Constantine.

#### TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN ROMAN-BARBARIAN RELATIONS

Two trends with roots in the Constantinian empire grow ever more visible as the fourth century progresses. The first is the impact of Christianity on the barbarians, at which we have already briefly looked. During the reign of Valentinian and Valens, Christianity became widespread enough among the Danubian Goths that Gothic leaders felt it necessary to launch a persecution of Gothic Christians, who may have been viewed as a sort of fifth column. The Gothic martyr Saba died in these persecutions, and the account of his martyrdom offers our best insight into Gothic social life beyond the *limes*.<sup>121</sup> Conversion to the imperial version of Christianity may have been encouraged by Valens early in the 370s, while others of the Tervingi may have been converted upon their mass admission to the empire in 376.<sup>122</sup> Either way, those Goths who converted did so to Valens's favoured brand of Arian Christianity, which would come to be an important badge of barbarian identity within the increasingly heterogeneous population of the fifth-century empire.

A phenomenon with much deeper roots in the Constantinian period is the presence of northern barbarians in the highest reaches of the Roman military. As we have seen, the use of barbarian recruits in imperial armies may have grown in scale under Constantine and Licinius. It certainly continued under Constantine's sons, as when

Constantius took Goths on his eastern campaigns of 356–8 and then requested Gothic recruits to fight Julian.<sup>123</sup> In 358 he employed Taifali to fight the Quadi and Sarmatians.<sup>124</sup> To the same period may date the many Alamannic units noted in the *Notitia Dignitatum* as stationed in the provinces of Egypt and Syria, although other Rhine barbarians objected to service beyond the Alps and made exemption from such service a condition of their enlistment.<sup>125</sup> And though Julian could express contempt for the power of the Goths, famously leaving them to the Galatian slave traders while he turned to the weightier problem of Persia, this did not stop him recruiting Goths for precisely that campaign.<sup>126</sup> All of these examples conform to practices of very long standing. On the other hand, the ascent of Rhine and Danubian barbarians to the highest ranks of the officer corps was a newer development, at least on the scale that emerges under Constantius and Julian. This impression is no doubt partly exaggerated by our sudden access to the detail of Ammianus after 353, but it does seem that many more barbarian officers reached the apex of a Roman military career from the middle of the fourth century on. Since many of their careers will have begun in the ranks well before we meet them, their recruitment and first promotions probably belong to the reign of Constantine. Of the *magistri militum* attested between the death of Constantine and the death of Theodosius, more than half were barbarians; if one adds the various barbarian *tribuni* of the palatine *scholae* and the *comites stabuli*, the barbarian dominance of military commands looks even more pronounced.<sup>127</sup>

Under Constantius, Alamanni are particularly prominent – for instance, that Agilo who rose from *tribunus stabuli*, to Tribune of the Gentiles and Scutarii, to *magister peditum* after the emperor had cashiered Ursicinus.<sup>128</sup> Another Alamannic officer, Scudilo, was entrusted with luring Gallus away from the safety of Antioch.<sup>129</sup> Franks, who dominate the reigns of Valentinian, Valens, and Theodosius, are under Constantius very nearly as prominent as Alamanni: Silvanus's father Bonitus had served under Constantine, and it was Silvanus himself who handed Constantius the victory against Magnentius. Silvanus belongs to an older type, the second-generation barbarian. The Tetrarchic general and usurper Carausius fitted this profile, as did the usurper Magnentius.<sup>130</sup> On the other hand, alongside Silvanus we meet a host of other Frankish officers, some of whom were certainly recruited from beyond the Rhine: Malarich, Mallobaudes, Laniogaisus, and many lesser men.<sup>131</sup> Half the high command appointed by Julian before his march to the east had barbarian names.<sup>132</sup> The Sarmatian Victor was made *magister equitum*, while another officer, Nevitta, became consul in 362,

an appointment which Ammianus deplors in an emperor who had mocked Constantine for advancing barbarians to the consulship.<sup>133</sup>

The presence of so many barbarians in positions of command could lead to tension and to the open expression of suspicions. When, in 354, Constantius found the Alamanni at Augusta Raurica prepared to repel his attack, suspicion at once fell on some of his lower-ranking Alamannic officers, though in the long run their careers did not suffer as a result.<sup>134</sup> Such suspicions must have been galling, particularly because so many barbarian officers dissociated themselves entirely from their origins as they rose through the ranks. Thus when Silvanus found himself accused of plotting usurpation, he contemplated flight to the Franks, only to be forestalled by a fellow Frank's reminder that the Franks across the Rhine would either kill him or sell him back to the emperor.<sup>135</sup> Of ethnic fellow-feeling he says nothing, though it is worth noting that it was the Frankish officer corps in Italy that exposed the plot against Silvanus, and it was two Franks, Mallarich and Mallobaudes, who offered to stand surety for him.

From another vantage point, however, the suspicion that the Roman bureaucracy could manifest against the barbarian officer corps is unsurprising. It was difficult to have a visual or social assurance of loyalty because it was increasingly difficult to tell Roman from barbarian in the military context. A striking example of this comes from 356, when the Caesar Julian himself appeared before the gates of Troyes, only to find them barred by a population that believed his imperial army to be a band of marauding barbarians.<sup>136</sup> What was more, some men could pass easily between the Roman and the barbarian worlds, even if others, like Silvanus, could not. Mallobaudes, whom we have met as *tribunus Scholae Armaturarum* under Constantius, reappears as a *rex Francorum* (king of the Franks) in 378, when he is simultaneously *comes domesticorum*.<sup>137</sup> The Alamannic king Vadomar had been a frequent enemy of Julian and was sent into Spanish exile by him, but he entered Roman service as *dux Phoenices* under Julian and Jovian, and fought for Valens against Procopius.<sup>138</sup> The Alamannic noble Mederich, brother of king Chnodomar and perhaps a king himself, had been initiated into the mysteries of Serapis while living as a hostage in Gaul and changed his son's name from "Agenarich" to "Serapio" accordingly.<sup>139</sup> Yet this Serapio, whatever he might owe to the impact of provincial Roman society on his father, was also one of the seven kings who assaulted Julian at Strasbourg. Lower down the social hierarchy, it was an Alamannic deserter from the Scutarii who informed the seven kings of Julian's manpower shortage just before that battle.<sup>140</sup>

## CONCLUSION

All these men passed back and forth between barbarian and Roman worlds. The ease with which they did so marks a major change from earlier periods and can be attributed to Constantine's relationship with the barbarian world, the outlines and precedents of which have occupied us in the foregoing pages. Constantine's reign began a process that had the profoundest consequences for the history of late antiquity. As the fourth century progressed, and more definitively throughout the fifth century, Roman provincials at all levels of society had to learn how to accommodate a growing number of non-Romans in their midst. Doing so posed a challenge to the old assumptions of ancient ethnography, which posited an almost ontological divide between Greek, Roman, and barbarian. Lived experience threatened, sometimes quite literally, the comfortable distinctions to which the classical world had long been accustomed. In the pages of Ammianus, himself a product of the Constantinian empire, we can see the first real attempt to record barbarian realities in a way not automatically dependent upon Roman stereotypes. Ammianus did not like barbarians, to be sure. But he recognized them as a fact of life in his world, susceptible of empirical description and with motives capable of analysis in a Roman fashion. It is perhaps not coincidental that Ammianus's pages offer us so many insights into the accommodation, if not the assimilation, of Roman and barbarian worlds: Alamanni beyond the *limes* living in Roman villas in a Roman fashion, imperial treaties made with barbarians in barbarian form, Julian raised up on his barbarian soldiers' shields by way of imperial acclamation.<sup>141</sup> None of these examples does more than hint at the changes that Roman society would feel in the decades following Adrianople. But they are part of the historical process that led to that imperial cataclysm.

Constantine's reign is pivotal here. He inherited the Tetrarchic system that had once and for all eliminated the cycle of frontier violence and usurpation that afflicted the third century. Constantine's accession to sole power did not much alter the basic patterns of frontier relations, but his conflicts with Maxentius and Licinius and the sheer scale of his success certainly encouraged the recruitment of men from beyond the frontiers into the imperial armies, men who over the next generation rose to positions of enormous power. That accommodation of barbarian ambitions within the empire can, ultimately, be read as the culmination of imperial responses to the brute fact of barbarian strength, a strength felt repeatedly, if unsystematically, since the later second century.

Constantine's reign, in its turn, offers us the first glimpse of new historical phenomena, phenomena that would, in time, create the postimperial world.

### FURTHER READING

Most of the best older work on the topic is in German, particularly L. Schmidt's *Geschichte der deutschen Stämme bis zum Ausgang der Völkerwanderung* (1938) and K. F. Stroheker's *Germanentum und Spätantike* (1965). In English, one may consult, on the Roman frontiers, C. R. Whittaker's *Frontiers of the Roman Empire* (1994) and H. Elton's *Frontiers of the Roman Empire* (1996a). In general, the political history of imperial relations with the northern barbarians is better served by the standard narrative histories than by the monographic literature on the barbarians themselves, with the signal exception of P. Heather's *Goths and Romans, 337–489* (1991), an exemplary political history. The articles by J. Drinkwater, cited in the notes, offer a stimulating alternative approach to the political history of the fourth-century Rhineland.

The best general overview of the archaeological evidence and barbarian social history is still M. Todd's *The Northern Barbarians* (2nd ed., 1987); he covers the same ground with less technical detail but better illustrations in *The Early Germans* (1992). Apart from these, different barbarian groups still tend to be treated individually: E. James's *The Franks* (1988) is better for the Merovingian period than earlier ones but is well illustrated; E. Zöllner's *Geschichte der Franken* (1970) is much the best narrative; on the Goths, E. A. Thompson's *The Visigoths in the Time of Ulfila* (1966) should not be read without reference to P. Rousseau, "Visigothic Migration and Settlement, 376–418: Some Excluded Hypotheses," *Historia* 41 (1992): 34–61; there are no reliable treatments of the Alamanni in English, but D. Geuenich's *Geschichte der Alemannen* (1997) is an exceptionally fine short introduction.

The ethnogenesis theory of H. Wolfram's Vienna school is readily available in his *History of the Goths* (1988), though his *Die Germanen* (2nd ed., 1995) and W. Pohl's *Die Germanen* (2000) are the most lucid expositions of the theory and demonstrate how little it has advanced since R. Wenskus published his much-cited and little-read *Stammesbildung und Verfassung* (1961). P. Geary offers an Americanization of Viennese doctrine in *Before France and Germany* (1987), bedeviled with factual errors, and in his "Barbarians and Ethnicity" in *Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Post-Classical World*, ed. G. W. Bowersock, P. Brown, and O. Grabar

(1999), 107–29. Several volumes in the European Science Foundation’s vast Transformation of the Roman World series include relevant contributions. See in particular W. Pohl and H. Reimitz, eds., *Strategies of Distinction: The Construction of Ethnic Communities, 300–800* (1998), and W. Pohl, ed., *Kingdoms of the Empire: The Integration of Barbarians in Late Antiquity* (1997). All of these works should be read in conjunction with the critical essays in A. Gillett, ed., *On Barbarian Identity: Critical Approaches to Ethnicity in the Early Middle Ages* (2002).

## NOTES

- 1 Cf. the rhetoric of Eus. *VC* 1.25.1.
- 2 The only two literary texts that have any claim to a “barbarian” perspective come from mid-sixth-century Constantinople (Jordanes) and very late seventh-century Italy (Paul the Deacon); their date alone makes them useless as testimony for barbarian history before contact with the Graeco-Roman world and its literary conventions, within which both works exist. For Jordanes as a fundamentally Byzantine, rather than Gothic, author, see Croke 1987 and Gillett 2000. On the limitations of his narrative as a source, see Heather 1989, 1991, 34–67.
- 3 Ethnogenesis theory is closely associated with Herwig Wolfram and his disciples at the Österreichische Institut für Geschichtsforschung, but its current popularity owes much to American apostles like Patrick Geary.
- 4 That description summarizes the *Lehre* of Wenskus 1961 and Wolfram 1988. The leading recent proponent of the school, Walter Pohl, claims in polemical contexts (e.g., Pohl 1998, 2002b) to have added subtlety and nuance to the theories of Wenskus and Wolfram, shearing them of their dogmatism, which might be plausible if the author’s various introductory studies (e.g., Pohl 2000, 2002a) did not follow their forebears in very doctrinaire fashion.
- 5 Demonstrated by Murray 2002.
- 6 For the philological argument, see Wenskus 1961, and for the extremes to which the approach can be taken, see Wolfram 1988, 25 n. 58.
- 7 Witness the sweeping synchronic deployment of late Roman, Tacitean, and hypothetical philological evidence in Wolfram 1997, 1–34, in the service of a timeless *Germanentum*. The postmodernism is supplied by, e.g., Pohl 1998, with its references to Barth and Bourdieu.
- 8 The ascription of ethnicity to artefacts is associated most of all with the early-twentieth-century archaeologist G. Kossina, whose *Siedlungsarchäologie* postulated that materially homogeneous archaeological cultures were coterminous with the ethnic groupings attested in our sources and with the language groups defined by philologists. The rigidity of Kossina’s approach has long been repudiated, but its legacy remains pervasive (e.g. Pohl 2000, 34; 2002b).
- 9 See especially Brather 2000 with extensive references to earlier literature; cf. Brather 2002 for a case study.
- 10 The statistical approach to the incidence of artefacts used by Siegmund 2000 can at least ensure that we do not mistakenly take the atypical as normal, though it cannot overcome the subjectivity of our selection criteria.



- 11 See, e.g., Heather and Matthews 1991, 51–101, which treats the Sîntana-de-Mureş/Černjachov culture as self-evidently Gothic. Heather 1998a, 489–91, is both more cautious and more plausible in its attempt to understand the mixed ethnicity of the area.
- 12 Haarnagel 1979.
- 13 Steuer 1992. They will certainly have reaped the profits of such large-scale industry as existed beyond the *limes*, the most impressive evidence for which are the ironworks in the Lysa Gora hills of Poland, and, to a lesser degree in Silesia and Bohemia as well; see Todd 1992, 133–4.
- 14 For a case study in Roman interventionism, see Pitts 1989.
- 15 *Cons. Const.* s.a. 261: *hostes multi inruerunt in Romania* (sic).
- 16 As recognized by Shaw 1999.
- 17 The standard narrative, Demougeot 1969–79, is structured around precisely this notion of continuous barbarian pressure on the frontiers. Wolfram 1988 turns scattered references to Goths into a grand narrative of Gothic conflict with the empire by ignoring precisely their disconnectedness. The first chapter of Goffart 1980 remains the best antidote to the overly rhetorical treatment of Romano-barbarian relations.
- 18 Recognized by Pohl 2000, 29.
- 19 Elton 1996b, 199–233.
- 20 AM 18.2.14.
- 21 See Lebedynsky 2001 on armaments.
- 22 The Goths are first attested in the 240s, the Alamanni perhaps as early as the reign of Caracalla (Dio Cass. 77.13), although this may well be the work of the later epitomator; see Geuenich 1997, 18. On the earliest authentic attestation of the Franks – the Gallic panegyric of 289 – see T. D. Barnes 1996b.
- 23 Demandt 1993 summarizes the *status questionis* of the 1970s on the large barbarian groups of the third century.
- 24 Greg. Tur. *Hist.* 2.9, drawn from the fifth-century Sulpicius Alexander, speaks of Bructeri, Chamavi, Amsivarii, and Chatti making up the Franks, to which one may add the (Ch)attuarii, identified as Franks by AM 20.10. There are no evidentiary grounds for regarding Frankish identity as particularly vested in *Kriegergruppen*, *pace* Pohl 2000, 34. Geuenich 1997, 9–18, is much the best summary of Alamannic origins. Siegmund 2000, 8–14, outlines recent controversy with bibliography.
- 25 Rightly recognized by Todd 1998, 483. The putative archaeological evidence is laid out at Bierbrauer 1992, 1994; Kazanski 1993.
- 26 Zos. 1.23; Eutr. 9.4; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 39; *Epit.* 29.3; Dexippus fr. 22 (FGH 2A100:465); Jord. *Get.* 103; AM 31.5.17. For the precise, disputed, date, see Potter 1990, 278–81. For a recent summary of third-century history, see Potter 2004, 217–98.
- 27 Zos. 1.27.1, 28.1. Zosimus mentions Scythians, Urogundi, and Borani. He uses the term “Scythians” indiscriminately for trans-Danubian barbarians, not exclusively for the Goths, as some modern scholars assume: see, e.g., 1.37.1, 42.1. The canonical letter of Gregory Thaumaturgos (PG 10:1020–48) preserves an eyewitness account of the raids into Asia Minor. It is translated at Heather and Matthews 1991, 1–11.
- 28 Zos. 1.29.1; *Epit.* 31.2; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 31–2; Eutr. 9.5–7.

- 29 Contra, Wolfram 1988, 53–5. Zos. 1.31–2, 34–6, which draws largely on the eyewitness account of Dexippus, is the most complete testimony. On the Rhine campaign, see Zos. 1.29.2, 37, with Paschoud 1971, 150–1 on a date of 254. On the Rhine and Gallienus's victory title of 258, *Germanicus Max V*, see Zos. 1.37. On victory titles and their contribution to imperial history, see Kneissl 1969 and the important methodological strictures of T. D. Barnes 1982, 17–29.
- 30 In the same way, Gallienus's campaigns against Marcomanni and Roxolani, and their settlement within the imperial frontiers, were associated with the suppression of Ingenuus (r. 260); cf. Zos. 1.38–9. For Postumus's victory, see the recently discovered victory altar from Augsburg in Bakker 1993a, 1993b.
- 31 Eutr. 9.7–8; Jer. *Chron.* s.a. 221, followed by Oros. 7.22; cf. Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 33.3, who calls them Franks. See also Zos. 1.30.2 and T. D. Barnes 1996b on the supposed Franks.
- 32 Zos. 1.42–3, 45–6; Eutr. 9.11.
- 33 For Claudius's death, see Eutr. 9.11; Zos. 1.46. For invasions at the start of Aurelian's reign, see Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 34; *Epit.* 35; Zos. 1.48–9; Dexippus fr. 7 (FGH 2A100:460–1); cf. Watson 1999. The relationship of Iuthungi to the larger Alamannic group is disputed – AM 17.6.1 maintains that the Iuthungi were a subdivision of the Alamanni, but late fourth-century evidence need not hold true for the third century. Postumus's victory altar speaks of *barbaros Semnonum sive Iouthungorum*. For the problem, see Geuenich 1997, 37–40.
- 34 AM 31.5.17. The dead Gothic king is attested only in the almost worthless *Historia Augusta* (Aur. 22.2).
- 35 Some of them were settled in Roman territory; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 39; *SHA Aur.* 30.4.
- 36 For Tacitus, see Zos. 1.63–4; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 37; *SHA Prob.* 10. For Probus, see Zos. 1.68; Eutr. 9.17. *SHA Prob.* 12.3–4 is embellishment.
- 37 T. D. Barnes 1996b, 16; Zos. 1.71.2; *Pan. Lat.* 8(5).18.3.
- 38 Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 38.1. On the death of Probus and succession of Carus, see Eutr. 9.17; *Epit.* 37.1; *SHA Prob.* 21–2; Zos. 1.71; Joh. Ant. fr. 160 (FHG 4:600).
- 39 Eutr. 9.18; *SHA Car.* 8. But note that the *ludi Sarmatici* attested in *SHA Car.* 19.3, and probably the great Sarmatian victory at 9.4, are nowhere else on record and may well be invented.
- 40 *Pan. Lat.* 10(2).4.2; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 39.19; Eutr. 9.20.3.
- 41 He celebrated a victory; *Pan. Lat.* 10(2).6.2.
- 42 *Pan. Lat.* 10(2).10.3, 11.4, 11(3).7.2, 8(5).21.1.
- 43 *Pan. Lat.* 8(5).2.1.
- 44 In 289 and 291, *Pan. Lat.* 11(3).17.
- 45 *Pan. Lat.* 8(5).5.8–9, 8.1, 9.3, 21.1, 6(7).5.3.
- 46 *Pan. Lat.* 8(5).13.3.
- 47 Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 39; *Cons. Const.* s.a. 294, 295; *Pan. Lat.* 8(5).5.1; AM 28.1.5.
- 48 *Cons. Const.* s.a. 299. Vague references to Carpi, Iuthungi, and Quadi at *Pan. Lat.* 8(5).18.5, and 10.4 presumably refer to these campaigns.
- 49 *Pan. Lat.* 6(7).6.2.
- 50 *Epit.* 41.3.
- 51 *Pan. Lat.* 6(7).10.12, 4(10).16.4, 7(6).4.2.
- 52 For the Sarmatian campaign, see T. D. Barnes 1981, 299 n. 15. For the Carpi, see T. D. Barnes 1981, 300 n. 20.

- 53 *Pan. Lat.* 7(6).4.2, 6(7).10.2; Lact. *DMP* 29.3; Eus. *VC* 1.25.
- 54 *Pan. Lat.* 6(7).10.1.
- 55 See Hoffmann 1969–70, 1:130–45, for the troops, and A. Alföldi 1959 for the iconography.
- 56 *ILS* 660 (June 27, 310).
- 57 E.g., *Pan Lat.* 9(5).18, 11(2).15.3, 8(5).10.1, 18.3.
- 58 *Aur. Vict. Caes.* 24. See also the attitude of Eusebius, n. 1 above.
- 59 *Zos.* 2.34.1–2, drawn from the presumably similar attacks of Eunapius. The passage is quoted above at Chapter 14 n. 91 in this volume.
- 60 Cf. Stroheker 1965, 15–17.
- 61 *Ed. de pretiis* praef. ll. 19–26.
- 62 Lact. *DMP* 12.12; Eus. *HE* 8.5.1.
- 63 See esp. Drinkwater 1996, 1997.
- 64 *Pan. Lat.* 6(7).2.1. See Chapter 3 at n. 39 in this volume.
- 65 On Constantine, see *Pan. Lat.* 12(9).21.5, for the years 313/14. On Licinius, see *ILS* 696, 8942, by 315.
- 66 *Pan. Lat.* 4(10).17.2; *Optat. Porf. Carm.* 10.24; *RIC* 7 Trier 237–41.
- 67 *Optat. Porf. Carm.* 6; *Zos.* 2.21. *Origo* 21 describes the victory as Gothic, but the numismatic and epigraphic evidence is decisive. Contrast Chapter 3 n. 93 in this volume.
- 68 *RIC* 7 Lyons 209–24; *AE* 1934, 158; *CIL* 1<sup>2</sup>: 2335. For the appropriate date, see Lippold 1992, 377.
- 69 *Origo* 27, accepting the emendation of Valesius, which may be supported by *Jord. Get.* 111. The Frank Bonitus was the father of Constantius's general Silvanus; cf. *AM* 15.5.33.
- 70 *SHA Marc.* 21.7.
- 71 *Zos.* 1.24–25.
- 72 In general for barbarian recruitment in this period, see Bang 1906; Schenk von Stauffenberg 1947, 16–34; Waas 1965, 5–9.
- 73 *Zos.* 2.15.1, with Hoffmann 1969–70, 1:140.
- 74 *Jul. Caes.* 329a. See Hoffmann 1969–70, 1:141–308, for fourth-century developments.
- 75 *Aur. Vict. Caes.* 41; *Epit.* 14.3; *Chron. Pasch.* p. 527; *Zos.* 2.34; commemorated on coins at *RIC* 7 Rome 298. For the *ripa Gothica*, see *Origo* 35. See Tudor 1965 for Sucidava. See also the bridgehead at Daphne, *Procop. Aed.* 4.7.7; *RIC* 7 Constantinople 36–8 (cf. Coin 20 in this volume).
- 76 *Zos.* 2.31.3, with Paschoud 1971b, 229, for the date of the battle with the Taifali.
- 77 *Cons. Const.* s.a. 332.
- 78 Eus. *VC* 4.5; *Origo* 31; *Aur. Vict. Caes.* 41; *Eutr.* 10.7. *Origo* 32 may attest a campaign against the Sarmatians undertaken immediately after the Gothic victory, but the reference might also allude to the well-known campaign of 334.
- 79 *Jul. Or.* 1.9.
- 80 *Eun. Hist. fr.* 37 (Blockley); *Zos.* 4.10; *AM* 26.10.3.
- 81 Our sources speak in resolutely generic terms of Goths and Scythians (or the antiquarian *Getae* of *Jul. Or.* 1.9). On the other hand, many scholars (e.g., Brockmeier 1987) regularly identify the Goths of 332 as Visigoths (a name not attested until the sixth century) or Tervingi by reference to a Gothic group prominent in Ammianus

- Marcellinus's narrative of the 360s and 370s. The only evidentiary basis for connecting the Goths of 332 with those of 376–8 and after is the Byzantine history of Jordanes. His *Getica* 142 implies that the Tervingian *iudex* Athanaric was, in 381, the direct inheritor of the terms of the peace of 332, but Heather 1989 has expertly demonstrated the complex fictions behind Jordanes' royal genealogies, and there are no grounds for preferring his late testimony to that of our less precise, but almost certainly more accurate, fourth-century sources.
- 82 Correctly recognized in Lippold 1992, 382, much the best treatment of the peace, but see now the moderate reading of Lenski 2002b, 122–7. Heather 1991, 97–107, usefully clears away the hypothetical superstructures of E. A. Thompson 1966 and Wolfram 1988, but even he assumes too much Gothic unity unattested in the sources.
- 83 *VC* 4.5.2. Clear Roman superiority is recognized by Brockmeier 1987 and Lippold 1992.
- 84 The late report of Jordanes (*Get.* 112) states that 40,000 Gothic troops were sent to Constantine as the result of a treaty. But a contemporary observer who had reason to know, Eusebius (*VC* 4.5), is vague on Gothic military service, even though he could be very specific on such matters when there was reason to be (as at 4.6 on the Sarmatians).
- 85 Contra, Brockmeier 1987. Schmidt 1938, 224, already recognized the inherent limitations of the evidence and is followed by Lippold 1992, 382, with full references to the bewildering number of pseudo-technical treatments that have proliferated over the years. For a cautious assessment of fourth-century treaties, see Lenski 2002b, 341–3.
- 86 E.g., Barceló 1981, 154; Chrysos 1973, 55; Brockmeier 1987, *passim*. Heather 1991, 111–14, is a surer guide.
- 87 Chrysos 1973.
- 88 On the contrary, Eus. *VC* 4.5 shows the Goths not receiving a federate's salary but rather offering tribute.
- 89 Demonstrated by Lippold 1992, 384–5. The evidence is *Lib. Or.* 59.89 (348); *AM* 20.8.1 (360), 23.2.7 (363).
- 90 T. D. Barnes 1981, 258, argues that conversion was a part of the price of peace, and Chrysos 1973 that bishops were sent to the Goths after 332. However, Eus. *VC* 4.5, which states that Constantine subdued the barbarians under the sign of the cross, does not demonstrate religious stipulations in the treaty, while no specifics can be read into *VC* 4.14.1, where all nations are said to be steered by the single helmsman Constantine. The evidence of Eusebius on this point is surely to be preferred to the fifth-century *Soc.* 1.18.8 and *Soz.* 1.8.8 and 2.6.1, where legendary accretions are to be suspected.
- 91 See Brockmeier 1987.
- 92 It comes from just two sources, *Philost.* 2.5 and a letter of Ulfila's disciple Auxentius, transmitted from the so-called Arian scholia to the Council of Aquileia in 381, for which see Gryson 1980. There is a translation into English in Heather and Matthews 1991, 134–53.
- 93 The arguments for the earlier date are laid out in T. D. Barnes 1990, for the later in Heather and Matthews 1991, 142–3. The latter is marginally more convincing, but the evidence does very much suggest consecration at a church council, hence 341 at Antioch rather than Heather and Matthews's 340.

- 94 The region of settlement is guaranteed by the letter of Auxentius. The more specific reference to Nicopolis (ad Istrum) at Jord. *Get.* 267 is likely.
- 95 Convincingly set forth by Heather and Matthews 1991, 139–41.
- 96 Soz. 6.37.
- 97 *Cons. Const.* s.a. 334; *Origo* 32.
- 98 Eus. *VC* 4.6; *Origo* 31. Interpretations of this event are particularly illustrative of the flaws of modern ethnogenesis theory, which, as per Wolfram 1988, 62, requires reading a conflict described exclusively in class or social terms as an ethnic conflict.
- 99 Jul. *Caes.* 329. For the Dacian question, see Brockmeier 1987, 91–3.
- 100 Eus. *VC* 4.7, which represents eyewitness testimony.
- 101 T. D. Barnes 1981, 262, with references.
- 102 *Cons. Const.* s.a. 341, 342. For the dish, see *AE* 1999, 1123.
- 103 AM 15.8.5–8.
- 104 AM 16.5.17. The tradition of Constantius encouraging the Alamannic invaders to attack Magnentius is found at Lib. *Or.* 18.33; Zos. 2.53; Soc. 3.1. It is accepted with reservations by Drinkwater 1997.
- 105 AM 14.10.1.
- 106 Against Lentienses and other Alamanni, cf. AM 15.5.
- 107 AM 15.6. Drinkwater 1994 argues very persuasively that Silvanus never actually usurped the imperial title.
- 108 AM 15.8. Drinkwater 1997 argues that the Frankish capture of Cologne was the result of its virtual abandonment by Roman troops because of the confused chain of command in Gaul after Silvanus's murder.
- 109 AM 16.2–3.
- 110 AM 16.11 for the campaigns of early 357.
- 111 AM 17.1.1–11.
- 112 AM 17.10.5–8.
- 113 AM 18.2.1–15.
- 114 AM 16.10.20.
- 115 AM 17.12–13; Aur. *Vict. Caes.* 42.
- 116 AM 19.11.1–16. Lenski 2002b, 350, contends plausibly if unprovably that such tension-filled episodes were quite normal in the process of barbarian settlements.
- 117 AM 20.10.1–2.
- 118 *ILS* 8945; cf. Arce 1984, 109, no. 98. The inscription dates from the emperor's third consulate, of 360, which provides the *terminus ante quem*.
- 119 AM 21.3–4.
- 120 Though the scale of the threat to the Rhine has been plausibly questioned by Drinkwater 1997.
- 121 The Greek *Life of Saba* is translated into English at Heather and Matthews 1991, 109–17.
- 122 Heather 1986; Lenski 1995.
- 123 AM 20.8.1.
- 124 AM 17.13.19.
- 125 For the units in the *Notitia*, see Stroheker 1965, 34. Obviously when the *Notitia* was redacted (on which, see Kulikowski 2000 and Brennan 1995), these units need no longer have had the slightest connection to the Rhineland. For barbarian objections to long-distance service, see AM 20.4.4.
- 126 AM 22.7.8, 23.2.7; Zos. 3.25.6.

- 127 Waas 1965 remains the best overview.
- 128 In general, see Stroheker 1965, 31–53. For Agilo, see Waas 1965, 81–2, with evidence.
- 129 AM 14.11.11. He is first attested in 351; Waas 1965, 122–3.
- 130 For Carausius, see Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 39.20, with Casey 1994, 46–9. References to Magnentius’s parentage are collected at *PLRE* 1 Fl. Magnus Magnentius.
- 131 Malarich was tribune of the Gentiles (AM 15.5.6); Mallobaudes *tribunus Scholae Armaturarum* (AM 14.11.21); Laniogaisus a *tribunus* otherwise unspecified (AM 15.5.16). In general, see Stroheker 1965.
- 132 Viz., the *magister equitum* Nevitta and the chief of the Protectores, *Dagalaifus* (AM 21.8), plus the prefects, including Agilo, named at AM 22.3.
- 133 Full references for Victor at *PLRE* 1 Victor 4. For Nevitta, see AM 21.10, 21.12, with Waas 1965, 117–19.
- 134 Viz., Scudilo, Agilo, and Latinus. That Ammianus was himself personally hostile to Alamanni, as suggested by Stroheker 1965, 31, is not borne out by his text.
- 135 For Silvanus as a Roman, see Stroheker 1965, 19–21; Waas 1965, 34–5.
- 136 AM 16.2.7.
- 137 AM 30.3.7.
- 138 References at Waas 1965, 128–30.
- 139 AM 16.12.25.
- 140 AM 16.12.2.
- 141 AM 20.4.17.



FIGURE 29. Sardonyx cameo of Constantine(?) mounted, trampling conquered barbarians, Narodni Muzej, Belgrade. Photo by T. Čvjetičanin, reproduced with permission.

COINS





COIN 1. Ob. IMP CONSTANTINVS PF AVG: Constantine three-quarters facing, with a helmet bearing a Chi-Rho emblem, holding a horse by the bridle and a shield emblazoned with the Roman wolf suckling Romulus and Remus, silver medallion (*RIC* 7 Ticinum 36). Copyright Hirmer Verlag, Munich.

COIN 2. Rev. SARMATIA DEVICTA: Victory holding palm branch and trophy, spurning captive on the ground, bronze follis (*RIC* 7 London 289). Copyright The British Museum.

COIN 3. Rev. SENATVS: Togate figure standing, holding globe and scepter, 4.5 solidus gold medallion (*RIC* 7 Rome 272). Copyright Narodni Muzej, Belgrade.

COIN 4. Rev. INVICTVS CONSTANTINVS MAX AVG: Constantine and Sol Comes jugate, 9 solidus gold medallion of Ticinum. Copyright Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris.

COIN 5. Ob. DIOCLETIANVS AVGVSTVS: Diocletian laureate, gold aureus (*RIC* 6 Antioch 1). W. Jaffee Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder.

COIN 6. Rev. IOVI CONS CAES: Jupiter standing nude holding staff and thunderbolt, gold aureus (*RIC* 6 Antioch 10). W. Jaffee Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder.



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- COIN 7. Ob. MAXIMIANVS PF AVG: Maximian laureate, and Rev. HERCVLI VICTORI: Hercules holding lion skin, leaning on club, gold aureus (*RIC* 6 Nicomedia 3). W. Jaffee Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder.
- COIN 8. Ob. CONSTANTIVS NOB CAES: Constantius I laureate, gold aureus (*RIC* 6 Antioch 8). W. Jaffee Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder.
- COIN 9. Rev. VIRTVS MILITVM: Four emperors sacrificing over a tripod before a fortification (*RIC* 6 Trier 102a). W. Jaffee Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder.
- COIN 10. Ob. MAXENTIVS PF AVG: Maxentius facing, bare headed, gold aureus (*RIC* 7 Ostia 3). Copyright The British Museum.
- COIN 11. Rev. SALVS REI PVBLICAE: The empress Fausta standing, holding two babes in her arms, gold solidus (*RIC* 7 Ticinum 182). Copyright Hirmer Verlag, Munich.
- COIN 12. Ob. LICINIVS AVG OB D V FILII SVI: Licinius facing, bare headed, gold aureus (*RIC* 7 Nicomedia 41). Copyright The British Museum.
- COIN 13. Rev. VOTIS XXX MVLTIS XXXX: Inscribed within wreath, silver siliqua (*RIC* 8 Sirmium 66). W. Jaffee Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder.
- COIN 14. Rev. VIRT EXERC: X-shaped pattern with Sol standing above, holding globe, bronze follis (*RIC* 7 Thessalonica 71). Copyright The British Museum.
- COIN 15. Rev. SOLI INVICT COM DN: Sol radiate, standing, holding globe with victoriola in left hand, bronze follis (*RIC* 7 Rome 48). Copyright The British Museum.
- COIN 16. Ob. DD NN CONSTANTINVS ET LICINIVS AVGG: Confronted busts of Licinius and Constantine holding a statuette of Fortuna, bronze follis (*RIC* 7 Nicomedia 39). Copyright The Ashmolean Museum, Oxford.
- COIN 17. Ob. FL CL CONSTANTINVS PF AVG: Constantine II rosette diademed, gold solidus (*RIC* 8 Siscia 26). W. Jaffee Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder.
- COIN 18. Ob. DN CONSTANTIVS PF AVG: Constantius II pearl diademed, silver siliqua. W. Jaffee Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder.
- COIN 19. Ob. FLAVIA HELENA AVGVSTA: Empress Helena with elaborate headdress, bronze medallion (*RIC* 7 Rome 250). Copyright The British Museum.
- COIN 20. Rev. CONSTANTIANA DAPHNE: Victory standing on *cippus* beside trophy, spurning captive on the ground, bronze follis (*RIC* 7 Constantinople 32). Copyright The British Museum.
- COIN 21. Ob. CONSTANS AVGVSTVS: Constans pearl diademed, gold solidus (*RIC* 8 Trier 129). W. Jaffee Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder.
- COIN 22. Rev. No legend: Constantine veiled, rides a chariot heavenward with the hand of God reaching down to him, bronze follis (*RIC* 8 Alexandria 4). Copyright The British Museum.



- COIN 23. Ob. DN IVLIANVS NOB CAES: Julian bare headed, gold solidus (*RIC* 8 Antioch 163). W. Jaffee Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder.
- COIN 24. Rev. GLORIA EXERCITVS: Two soldiers standing, holding spear and shield, between them two standards, bronze follis (*RIC* 7 Antioch 86). University of Colorado, Boulder.
- COIN 25. Rev. FEL TEMP REPARATIO: Helmeted soldier bearing shield spears a horseman, bronze (*RIC* 8 Constantinople 109). University of Colorado, Boulder.
- COIN 26. Ob. CONSTANTINVS NOB C: Constantine square jawed, brow furrowed, with close cropped beard and hair, gold aureus (*RIC* 6 Rome 141). Copyright Hirmer Verlag, Munich.
- COIN 27. Ob. CONSTANTINVS PF AVG: Constantine facing right, diademed, gold solidus (*RIC* 7 Trier 21). Copyright The British Museum.
- COIN 28. Ob. CONSTANTINVS PF AVG: Constantine nimbate, facing, gold solidus (*RIC* 7 Ticinum 41). Copyright The Ashmolean Museum, Oxford.
- COIN 29. Ob. No legend: Constantine with plain diadem, looking upwards, 1.5 solidus gold medallion (*RIC* 7 Siscia 206). Copyright The British Museum.
- COIN 30. Ob. CONSTANTINVS MAX AVG: Constantine rosette diademed, gold solidus (*RIC* 7 Thessalonica 174). W. Jaffee Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder.
- COIN 31. Rev. SPES PVBLIC: Labarum crowned by Chi-Rho piercing a serpent, bronze follis (*RIC* 7 Constantinople 19). Copyright The British Museum.
- COIN 32. Rev. ALAMANNIA DEVICTA: Victory holding trophy and palm branch, spurning captive on the ground, bronze follis (*RIC* 7 Sirmium 49). Copyright The British Museum.
- COIN 33. Rev. GLORIA SAECVLI VIRTVS CAESS: Constantine seated holding scepter, offering globe with phoenix to Caesar, a panther at his feet, bronze medallion (*RIC* 7 Rome 279). W. Jaffee Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder.
- COIN 34. Rev. FELICITAS PVBLICA: Euphrates personified reclining, silver siliqua (*RIC* 7 Constantinople 100). Copyright Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris.

MAPS



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|-------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. Aquileia                   | 18. Eburacum (York)       | 34. Ravenna                          |
| 2. Aquincum (Budapest)        | 19. Emona                 | 35. Romuliana (Gamzigrad)            |
| 3. Arelate (Arles)            | 20. Fanum                 | 36. Salona/Split                     |
| 4. Argentoratum (Strasbourg)  | 21. Grand (Vosges)        | 37. Saxa Rubra                       |
| 5. Augusta Taurinorum (Turin) | 22. Lugdunum (Lyon)       | 38. Segusio (Susa)                   |
| 6. Augustodunum (Autun)       | 23. Massalia (Marseilles) | 39. Sirmium                          |
| 7. Bononia (Bologna)          | 24. Mediomatrici (Metz)?  | 40. Siscia                           |
| 8. Bononia (Boulogne)         | 25. Milan (Mediolanum)    | 41. Sitifis                          |
| 9. Brigantio (Briançon)       | 26. Misenum               | 42. Ticinum                          |
| 10. Brigantium (Bregenz)      | 27. Moguntiacum (Mainz)   | 43. Tres Tabernae<br>(south of Rome) |
| 11. Burdigalia (Bordeaux)     | 28. Mursa                 | 44. Trier (Augusta Treverorum)       |
| 12. Capua                     | 29. Naissus               | 45. Verona                           |
| 13. Carnuntum                 | 30. Naples (Neapolis)     | 46. Vienne                           |
| 14. Carthage                  | 31. Nemausus (Nîmes)      | 47. Viminacium                       |
| 15. Cibalae                   | 32. Ostia                 |                                      |
| 16. Cirta/Constantina         | 33. Placentia (Piacenza)  |                                      |
| 17. Colonia (Cologne)         |                           |                                      |

MAP 1. The Western Empire

MAPS



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|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Adrianople (Edirne)       | 18. Damascus             | 35. Nicomedia        |
| 2. Aegae                     | 19. Dionysias            | 36. Nisibis          |
| 3. Alexandria                | 20. Drepanum/Helenopolis | 37. Oenoanda         |
| 4. Amida                     | 21. Edessa               | 38. Oescus           |
| 5. Ancyra (Ankara)           | 22. Elaeus               | 39. Orcistus         |
| 6. Antioch                   | 23. Gaza                 | 40. Oxyrhynchus      |
| 7. Aphaca                    | 24. Heliopolis           | 41. Palmyra          |
| 8. Aphrodisias               | 25. Hierapolis           | 42. Panopolis        |
| 9. Beroea (Stara Zagora)     | 26. Jerusalem            | 43. Pessinus         |
| 10. Bethlehem                | 27. Lampsacus            | 44. Philippopolis    |
| 11. Byzantium/Constantinople | 28. Maiozamalcha         | 45. Ptolemais        |
| 12. Caesarea (Palestine)     | 29. Maiuma/Constantia    | 46. Scythopolis      |
| 13. Callipolis               | 30. Mamre                | 47. Singara          |
| 14. Chrysopolis              | 31. Memphis              | 48. Tarsus           |
| 15. Constantiana Daphne      | 32. Mobene (Qasr Bshir)  | 49. Transmarisca     |
| 16. Coptos                   | 33. Namāra               | 50. Tropaium Traiani |
| 17. Cotyaeum                 | 34. Nicaea               | 51. Tyre             |

MAP 2. The Eastern Empire