

of the next spring; and having stationed the troops for the winter among the Carnutes, Andes, and Turones, with others that lay nearest to the scene of the recent operations, he set out for Italy. When the dispatches reporting these various victories reached Rome, a public thanksgiving of fifteen days was formally declared by the Senate, surpassing in extent anything ever yet voted to a successful general.

BOOK III

SECTION I. CHASTISEMENT OF ALPINE TRIBES

On leaving for Italy, Caesar had been detained with a matter of much difficulty and annoyance which had grown up in the southeastern corner of his Transalpine Province. The Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni are three mountain tribes inhabiting the district stretching southwards from the Allobroges and the line formed by Lake Geneva and the Rhone valley, to the highest summits of the Italian Alps. Through their territories runs an important trade route, upon which merchants had for long been subjected to grave personal risks, as well as the most extortionate tolls, and which therefore Caesar was now determined to have cleared. An expedition for the purpose was accordingly fitted out, consisting of one legion (the Twelfth) and a section of native cavalry, all under command of Servius Galba, who was given full discretion about wintering in the district. Galba, after fighting a number of successful actions, and storming and capturing many of their mountain fastnesses, succeeded in winning the submission of the entire neighborhood; hostages were given, and peace concluded. He then decided to stay through the winter, and with this object detached two of his battalions to hold the Nantuates, while with the remaining eight he took up his position in the principal village of the Veragri, named Octodurus (*Martigny*). This place lies in a sheltered valley, which after broadening out into a moderate plain, is then completely shut

in by masses of towering rock. A river cuts it in two halves, one of which Galba made over for their own use to the native population, the other he occupied with his infantry, entrenched behind lines of ditch and palisade.

Life in winter quarters was proceeding satisfactorily, and requisitions for corn had been issued to the neighborhood, when one morning the scouts reported to the commandant that during the night the natives had completely evacuated their section of the village, and that the overhanging heights were now thronged with dense masses of Seduni and Veragri. The truth was that the Gauls had suddenly determined to renew the war and to make a bold attempt to crush the legion. Of the several causes underlying this resolve, the chief of all was the self-evident weakness of the Roman force, which, originally but a single legion, had permanently parted with two out of its ten battalions; whilst the subsequent dispatch of various units on commissarial duty had still further depreciated it in the eyes of the inhabitants. But besides mere numerical inequality, they trusted much to the marked difference of natural position occupied by themselves and their opponents, and imagined that, by an impetuous descent from the heights under cover of a cloud of spears, they could render their opening charge perfectly irresistible. And apart altogether from military considerations, there was the passionate resentment at the violent removal of their children under the title of hostages; and lastly there was the widespread belief that in this occupation of the Alps the Romans were seeking, not only the adequate protection of the roads, but a permanent footing in their country, and its incorporation in the southern Province.

Upon Galba the rising came with crushing surprise. It found his fortifications and defenses still to a large extent unfinished, and for the winter stocks of corn and other stores dangerously inadequate; all fear of further complications from his mind. A council of war was hastily summoned, and at this the officers were asked for their opinions. That they were confronted with a situation perilous in the extreme, without either warning or suspicion, was evident; it was also evident, as they looked out on the line of heights, almost all of them

now bristling with armed men, that their communications with the outside world were cut, and that no help could be expected either of reinforcements or supplies. Under the circumstances, which were felt to be well-nigh desperate, more than one voice was raised in favor of abandoning stores and baggage, and of cutting their way out, sword in hand, by the roads along which they had come. To the majority, this plan commended itself only as a last resort; and meanwhile, they were of the opinion that they should await events, and continue to hold the camp.

A brief interval followed, barely sufficient for the making of the needful dispositions consequent on this decision, and then the attack opened. On the given signal, the enemy on every side dropped from the heights, and soon all four faces of the camp were lashed by a withering fire of stones and the light Gallic spears of the country. The assault, however, was gallantly met, and fighting with coolness and precision the garrison, as long as their strength lasted, with the advantage of position on their side, made every stroke tell: gaps in the line were instantly filled, and the pressure on weakened points at once relieved. But as the engagement wore on, the unequalness of the combat became painfully apparent. On the side of the assailants fresh men were constantly ready to step into the place of those temporarily exhausted: within the Roman camp, the slender numbers of the defense made all such expedients impracticable. Not only was it impossible for tired men to withdraw for a while from the fighting line, but even the wounded could not leave their places on the wall and seek shelter in the rear.

Amid such incessant fighting six hours and more had now passed. The men's strength had begun to fail, and even the reserves of ammunition threatened to give out. The fierceness of the attack showed no signs of waning, and the assailants, perceiving the resistance to be weakening, had already begun to tear down the stockade and to fill up the trenches. A little more, and the fate of the garrison must be decided, when the promptitude and foresight of two of the Roman officers found a way of escape. Publius Sextius Baculus, the senior centurion of the Twelfth legion, has already come before us as desperately wounded in the great battle with the Nervii. He,

together with Caius Volusenus, a man whose coolness of judgement was only equalled by his intrepid courage, approached the Roman commander and submitted to him that the only chance now left the Roman force was to cut its way out and to risk everything on one supreme effort. Upon this, Galba hastily summoned his centurions, and through them the troops were rapidly informed of the line of action to be pursued. By slightly relaxing their efforts, and by merely parrying the blows of their opponents, they were quietly to husband their strength until, on the given signal, a combined sortie would be made, after which every man's safety must depend on his own right arm.

These instructions the men carefully observed, and when, a few minutes later, all four gates of the camp were suddenly flung open, the Romans burst upon their astonished foe with a charge that carried everything before it and never allowed them to recover their presence of mind. A more complete reversal of the conditions it is difficult to conceive; and those who a moment before had imagined themselves hemmed in and cut down on all sides by the very garrison they had been so lately beleaguering, fully a third of the thirty thousand men and more, known to have gathered for the assault, soon lay lifeless on the field; while the rest, driven before the victorious legionaries, dared not even rally on reaching the surrounding heights. No vestige of the enemy anywhere remained, and the troops, after stripping the dead of their arms, returned at their leisure to the fortifications of camp. But to tempt fortune too often was not the desire of Galba. The contrast between his original motives for wintering in the district and the present actual results of that policy was sufficiently glaring; moreover, and this weighed with him most, his magazines and stores were now dangerously depleted. On the morrow of this battle, therefore, he first burned all the buildings of the place, and then set out to make a rapid march back to the Province. No opposition was encountered from the enemy on the march, and the country of the Nantuates having been safely reached, the now united legion continued its way on to the Allobroges, and there passed the remainder of the winter.

SECTION II. NAVAL WAR WITH THE VENETI

These operations successfully concluded, Caesar had good reason to regard the pacification of Gaul as complete. The power of the Belgae had been broken, the German invaders expelled, and even on the Alps Roman arms had been carried to victory over the Seduni. At the beginning of winter he had felt justified in extending his visits to Illyricum,¹ from a natural desire to inspect that portion of his government, when suddenly war once more broke out in Gaul. The causes of this were as follows. In making his military distributions for the winter, Caesar had stationed the Seventh legion, under Publius Crassus, a comparatively young officer, in the country of the Andes (*Angers*), nearest of all therefore to the Atlantic. The local supplies of corn here proving inadequate, its commander had dispatched to the neighboring tribes several of his officers to arrange for the improvement of the commissariat. Amongst these T. Terrasidius had gone to the Esubii (*Sees*), M. Trebius Gallus to the Curiosolthae (west of *Dinan*), and Q. Velanius, with T. Silius, to the Veneti (*L'Orient* to the *Vilaine*).

Of these three peoples, the last named exercise an unchallenged supremacy along all the seaboard of this corner of Gaul. Not only have they very strong mercantile fleets, with which they commonly trade with Britain, but in practical seamanship and knowledge of naval warfare they far surpass their rivals. The whole coast is here wild and storm-beaten; and as it is intersected with few harbors, all of which are in their hands, they have succeeded in bringing under them as tributaries the large majority of tribes who sail the seas in these quarters. Such was the people who now headed the movement against Rome, by seizing the persons of Silius and Velanius, under the impression that this would regain them their own hostages, lately given to Crassus, by forcing an exchange. Where the Veneti led the way other tribes were not slow to follow; and it being natural with Gauls to act without forethought or deliberation, it was not long before Trebius and Terrasidius were likewise seized. The three tribes then rapidly communicated with each other, and represented by their leading chiefs, swore to observe a common policy, and that, come what might, they would stand or fall together. Then widening

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their appeal to more distant tribes, they implored these to hold fast by that liberty which formed the precious heritage of their fathers, and not tamely to acquiesce in a state of servitude to Rome. With extraordinary quickness the entire seaboard was won to their cause, and an embassy representing the confederates was then dispatched to Crassus, informing him that, if he wanted to get back his officers, he must first surrender them their hostages.

The dispatch reporting these events reached Caesar many hundreds of miles from the scene of the disturbance: all he could do therefore for the present was to order a fleet of warships to be built on the Liger (*Loire*), which flows into the Ocean, galley crews to be trained in the southern Province, and sailors and helmsmen to be held in readiness. These preparations were pushed forward rapidly, and as soon as the season of the year allowed, he himself rejoined the army. His arrival did but deepen the apprehensions of the Veneti and their accomplices, which a just appreciation of the heinousness of their offense had already excited. Knowing that with all nations alike the name of envoy has always been regarded as sacred and inviolable, and that they had rudely seized and thrown such into prison, what, they asked themselves, could they possibly do under the circumstances but prepare for war on a scale commensurate with their danger? For such a war their principal reliance lay in their fleet, and every measure tending to the more perfect equipment of this weapon was now eagerly embraced. They were the more sanguine of success because of the great confidence reposed in the natural strength of their position. The land routes of their country were constantly intercepted by the sea, the navigation of its waters was, in the absence of local knowledge, most perilous, and on either element they felt tolerably certain that want of proper supplies would make any long campaign impossible for the Roman armies; whilst should all these expectations fail, there still remained their fleet, and the undoubted superiority which this afforded. The Romans, on the contrary, could hardly be said to possess a fleet, and knew nothing of the real factors that must determine any military operations in that country, viz. the shoals, harbors, and islands: and they would quickly learn that sailing on the boundless waste of the Atlantic was a very different thing

from what it was on the landlocked Mediterranean. Relying on these expectations, they proceeded to strengthen their towns, and to provision them from the country; at the same time as large a naval force as possible assembled off Venetia, this being the point at which Caesar would admittedly open the campaign. For the struggle now impending alliance was made with the Osismi, Lexovii, Namnetes, Ambiliati, Morini, Diablintes, and Menapii, and even from the opposite coast of Britain assistance was summoned.

The difficulties confronting military operations in such a country have been sufficiently set forth above; yet from many points of view the campaign appeared to Caesar advisable. The provocation offered by the arrest of distinguished Romans; the treacherous renewal of hostilities after the conclusion of peace, and rebellion after the surrender of hostages; the formidable coalition of so many hostile tribes that was now gathering—each of these reasons, though in itself adequate, was strengthened fourfold by the fear that to shrink from dealing with the present situation would encourage others in the belief that a similar licence was allowed themselves. The peculiar characteristics of the Gallic temperament were only too well known to Caesar—their restlessness and love of change, their quick susceptibility to any appeal to arms—and when to this was added the universal instinct of mankind, which makes them love liberty and loathe slavery, it seemed to him advisable, in order to prevent the further spread of the movement, to make a more general distribution of the Roman forces.

To this end a division of cavalry was dispatched to the Treveri? (*Trevus*) and the Rhine border, under Titus Labienus, with orders to maintain a strict watch on the Remi and other Belgic tribes, and to keep them to their allegiance; and, there being current a report that the Germans were being invited into the country by the Belgae, to stop any attempt by that people to force the passage of the river. Similarly, to hold the country of the south, a force of twelve battalions with strong cavalry supports was sent into Aquitania under P. Crassus; since the importance of preventing the dispatch of auxiliaries from those regions to Central Gaul, and the formation of a coalition between these two powerful groups of tribes, could hardly

be overestimated. Lastly, three legions were sent northward under Titurius Sabinus, to overawe the Venelli, Curiosolite, and Lexovii, and to isolate all that section from the main area of disturbance. The newly built fleet, reinforced by such vessels as the Pictones, Santoni, and other friendly tribes had, on receiving Caesar's commands, been able to contribute, was entrusted to D. Brutus, one of the younger officers; whose orders were to sail for the Venetian coasts as soon as ever circumstances made it possible. After that Caesar, with the land forces for the campaign, started for the same objective.

The enemy's towns were for the most part situated on sites almost inaccessible, such as the extreme points of long spits of land, or jutting promontories. On the landward side therefore, it was impossible to approach when once the flood-tide was in from the deep, a flow that takes place twice a day at twelve hours' interval; whilst to advance by ship was equally ineffective, because, on the succeeding ebb, the vessels were bound to be knocked to pieces on the shoals. Their investment therefore was on either element seriously retarded. Occasionally the Roman engineering works would so far triumph as to shut out the surrounding sea by gigantic moles and breakwaters, carried to the level of the town walls, making the garrison doubtful about maintaining their position. But in all such cases a large fleet of vessels stood ready to take off all that was of any value, and as their maritime resources were practically inexhaustible, it was easy to sail away to the adjoining towns, and there to await themselves once more of the same admirable system of defense. In repeating these tactics for the greater part of the summer, they were largely aided by the prolonged absence of the Roman fleet, due to bad weather;⁸ nor must it be forgotten that navigation in such a waste of open waters, where the tide runs like a mill-stream, and where harbors are few and far between, is beset with no ordinary difficulties.

On the other hand, their own ships had been specially designed and equipped to suit the conditions of the coast. Slightly flatter at the keel than those of the Romans, so as to take the shoals and falling tide with greater ease, they rose at their stem and stern sheer from the water-line, and were thus admirably adapted to withstand the heavy seas of stormy weather; and being built throughout of solid

oak, their hulls were proof against any amount of strain or buffeting by the elements. Inboard, the timbers athwartships were fully a foot deep, and were bolted home by iron rivets as stout as a man's thumb; the anchors were held by chain cables in place of hawsers, and their sails were raw hides or roughly tanned skins. This last device was possibly due to their want of flax, and consequent ignorance of how to work it, or (what is far more probable), to their conviction that, for riding out the heavy gales of the Atlantic, with its violent squalls of wind, as well as for steering vessels carrying so much dead weight, canvas is not the best material. In fighting ships of such a type, the Roman fleet possessed one and only one tactical advantage, viz. that of speed, produced by the powerful stroke of their oars: from every other point of view, the peculiar nature of the local conditions, as well as the constant heavy weather, told strongly in favor of their opponents. The effective employment of the ram was precluded by the massive nature of their timbers, and to throw a spear on to their decks was, owing to their immense height, a feat of no ordinary skill; whilst a similar difficulty affected every attempt to hook them by the grappling-irons. Nor did even this close the list of inequalities. In case of a sudden freshening of the wind, when they turned to run before the gale, the Venetian vessels not only made lighter of the storm, but could afterwards bring up in shoal water; and when left high and dry by the tide, were haunted by no fears of sunken reefs and rocks; all of which were a constant source of anxiety to their opponents.

That his present resources were inadequate for coping with so elusive an enemy was now clear to Caesar. Town after town had been carried by assault; yet as long as it was impossible to cut off retreat at the moment of capture, all these efforts were so much wasted labor, nor could any real damage be inflicted on the defense. Under such circumstances the only course was to await the arrival of the fleet. This at last made its appearance, and was no sooner sighted by the natives, than putting out to meet it, with some two hundred and twenty sail, they took up their position, ~~all~~ ready for instant action and all armed to the teeth. What tactics to adopt under these conditions was to Brutus and his officers, (the tribunes and centurions in charge of separate ships), a matter of much perplexity. The use of

the ram had proved quite ineffective, and the other chief method of attack, the movable turret, was hardly less so, for these when raised were still overtopped by the high poops of the Venetians, which not only made it difficult for the Romans to fire at so high an angle, but also caused the missiles of the Gauls to fall with greater impact on the decks. One device there was on the Roman side, specially designed beforehand, which proved of signal service. This was a kind of pointed hook let into the end of a long pole, much like the common weapon used in siege warfare to loosen the enemy's walls. With these the halyards connecting the yards and masts of the Venetian vessels were skillfully caught and drawn in; upon which the Roman galley was quickly put under way, thereby snapping the halyards with the sudden impetus of her movement. The halyards cut, the yards of necessity fell in a heap to the deck, and as the enemy relied almost exclusively on the sails and rigging of their ships, the loss of these at once left them helpless and disabled. The rest resolved itself into a hand to hand encounter, and here the Romans quickly asserted their superiority; for the action being fought out under the eyes of Caesar and all his army, who were posted on every hilltop and coign of vantage that offered a good view of the sea, no act of more than ordinary daring could pass unnoticed.

Having torn away the yards in the manner described, the Roman galleys by twos and threes closed in upon single Venetian ships, and the troops, with a fierce rush, poured over their sides. The new tactics carried dismay into the heart of the enemy. Ship after ship was carried by storm, and all efforts to stop the progress of their opponents seemed futile. At length they turned and fled, the whole of the vast flotilla scudding before the wind. But at this moment the breeze suddenly died away, leaving such a dead calm behind it that the ships remained motionless on the water. Nothing could have been more opportune for completing the work of victory. One by one they were rowed down, boarded, and captured; and it was only the friendly intervention of night that allowed a few survivors to make the shore, after a fight that had raged from nine in the morning till sunset.

This battle was decisive of the campaign against the Veneti and the rest of the maritime tribes. On board the fleet had been not only

the flower of their manhood, but practically everyone of riper years whose ability or rank constituted him a natural leader of the nation. The fleet itself likewise represented the full measure of their naval capacity, and its loss was thus irreparable. Left to themselves, the survivors found no further means either of retreat or of defense, and accordingly decided to surrender. In apportioning their punishment, Caesar was determined to teach the natives to respect in future the sacred rights of envoys, and having had the whole of their tribal council publicly beheaded, sold the rest of the inhabitants as slaves.

SECTION III. THREE SUBSIDIARY CAMPAIGNS

Contemporaneously with these events among the Veneti, the Roman force sent to operate in the north under Q. Tiurius Sabinus had arrived at its destination among the Venelli. The ruling chief of this people, a man named Viridovix, had been appointed generalissimo of all the insurgents of the district, and had now succeeded in raising a powerful army from the separate contingents furnished by each tribe. Within the last few days he had been joined by other allies, viz. the Eburonian Aulerci and the Lexovii, who after massacring their councils, because these refused to countenance the war, had shut their gates against the Roman general, and declared themselves on the side of Viridovix. There also flocked to his standard all the desperadoes and freelances throughout Gaul, whom lust of plunder and a passion for fighting had drawn from their farms and other occupations. Sabinus, after choosing a site for his camp in every respect admirable, sat down to await events. Two miles on his front lay the rebel leader encamped, and morning after morning he moved out in force to challenge his antagonist to a contest. But the latter adhered closely to his lines, incurring thereby not only the contempt of his barbarian foe, but even some hostile criticism from his own men; and so strong did the impression of his timidity grow, that the enemy actually had the effrontery to march straight up to the Roman lines. Sabinus' reason for this conduct was a deep sense of responsibility; for where the numerical preponderance of the enemy was so overwhelming, it did not seem to him, in the absence of the commander-in-chief, to be the duty of a subordinate to fight a pitched

battle unless the conditions were favorable or some unusually happy chance presented itself.

Having waited, however, till the belief in his cowardice was firmly rooted, he proceeded to turn it to advantage. Choosing for his purpose a crafty Gaul from among his auxiliaries, and explaining to him the object that he had in view, he induced him by the offer of a handsome bribe to make his way to the enemy. Welcomed there as a deserter, the Gaul proceeded to give a telling picture of the tremendous difficulties encountered by Caesar in his struggle with the Veneti. That very night, he asserted, Sabinus intended secretly to evacuate his camp, in order to march to the relief of his Chief. Loud cheers greeted this statement, and on all sides the opinion was expressed that so golden an opportunity should not be let slip, but that an immediate advance must be made to the camp. This resolve was in reality the effect of several coincident causes. The previous vacillation of Sabinus, now confirmed by the report of the supposed deserter; their increasing shortness of supplies due to defective foresight, the expectations raised by the Venetian war—all these had their weight, but above all was the common weakness of human nature which readily believes what accords with its hopes. Fired by these incentives, they now resolutely declined to let Viridovix and the other leaders quit the council before leave had been granted to arm for an assault upon the Roman camp; and having secured their point, as if victory were an accomplished fact, they rapidly collected bundles of faggots and brushwood with which to fill up the Roman trenches, and then, wild with elation, set off in the direction of the camp.

Situated on lofty ground, this could only be reached by a long and gradual ascent of something like a mile. Up this they charged in hot haste, anxious to give the Romans as little time as possible for recovering from their surprise, and for seizing their arms, and on arriving at the top were consequently much distressed. As Sabinus' men were only too eager for the fray, after brief ~~excitation~~ ^{excitation} he gave the signal to engage. Finding that the enemy were much hampered by the loads they were carrying, he suddenly ordered two of the gates to be flung open and a charge to be delivered. The result surpassed

all expectation. So irresistible was the combined effect produced by the strong position of the assailants, the unreadiness and physical exhaustion of the enemy, the disciplined courage of the legionaries schooled by the experience of past encounters, that even before they closed the Gauls broke and fled. Disorganized and bewildered, they continued to be pressed with undiminished strength by the victors till large numbers had fallen, and the cavalry then taking up the pursuit left but a tiny handful finally to make good their escape. Thus Caesar and Sabinus each had the satisfaction of hearing of the other's victory at one and the same moment; the immediate result of both being the total collapse of the rebellion, and a general surrender to Titurius of all the revolted tribes. For high-spirited as the Gauls may be and ready to rush into war, yet experience shows that their mettle is of the softer kind, and if tried by the furnace of affliction offers but a very weak resistance.

Concurrently, or nearly so, with these events, the Roman expedition to the south under P. Crassus, which formed part of the same general scheme of operations, had made consistent progress. Aquitania, whether regarded from the point of view of area or of population, may, as already stated, be considered one of the three chief divisions of Gaul. In its past history, as it now occurred to Crassus, there was contained more than one disaster to Roman arms. A few years ago it had seen the rout of a Roman army and the fall in battle of its commander Lucius Valerius Præconinus; whilst earlier still the Proconsul L. Mallius had been forced to abandon his baggage, and to fly with his defeated troops. With such precedents to warn him, Crassus saw plainly that no ordinary circumspection on his part would be required. Great pains were therefore taken to safeguard his supplies; auxiliary foot were raised and his cavalry strengthened; whilst from Tolosa (*Toulouse*) and from Narbo (*Narbonne*), both districts of the neighboring Roman province, large numbers of the colonial reserve, the finest troops imaginable, were expressly summoned for the campaign. His preparations completed, he crossed the frontier at some point in the territories of the Sontiates (*Sos*), who, on hearing of the approaching expedition, had collected strong military forces, principally cavalry, for which they were specially famous; and as the

Roman column advanced through their country, fell upon it while on the march. The first attack was delivered by the cavalry only, and was easily repulsed; afterwards, on the Romans taking up the pursuit, their infantry divisions, till now cunningly concealed in a glen, stood suddenly disclosed, and rising to attack their scattered opponents once more restored the battle.

A long and stubborn action followed, under circumstances that were well calculated to bring out the highest qualities of either combatant. The Sontiates were inspired by memories of bygone victories, as well as by the knowledge that on their gallantry that day rested the hopes of all Aquitania: the Romans on their side were no less eager to show the world what they could accomplish under their brilliant young leader, far away from their commander-in-chief and the other legions. Crippled by wounds, the enemy at last turned and fled, and in the pursuit that followed lost heavily. Endeavoring after this to capture their principal town upon his march, Crassus was obliged, owing to the stout resistance offered, to halt and proceed by regular siege. The garrison fought most bravely, sortie and mining being both tried on various occasions (the latter with a skill peculiar to the Aquitani-ans, owing to the numerous copper workings in their country); but Roman vigilance foiled every stratagem, and feeling the hopelessness of the struggle, the Sontiates at length sent out word to Crassus begging to be allowed to surrender. This was granted, and in compliance with the terms dictated the delivery of arms forthwith proceeded.

Suddenly, whilst everybody's attention was diverted by this business, from another quarter of the town a treacherous attempt at escape was made by the enemy. Among the Sontiates there exists a sort of military order, known as Soldurii, whose members live under vows of perpetual friendship. Each pair of friends shares in common all the material goods of life, and should either of such companions come to a violent end, the other is bound either to incur the same fate by his side, or afterwards to perish by his own hand; nor is any case on record where the survivor has refused to die when he, to whose friendship he had been solemnly dedicated, has been killed. With six hundred of this band, the commander of the town, named Adiatunus, now attempted to force his way out; but the alarm being quickly

given, troops were hurried up to the threatened point, and after desperate fighting, the whole party was flung back again upon the town. Notwithstanding this act of treachery, Adiatunus was allowed to surrender on precisely the same terms by Crassus.

The disarmament effected and the hostages in safe custody, Crassus next advanced upon the Vocates and Tarusates. Such rapid advance came with startling alarm upon the natives. That within a few days of his arrival before the place the Roman general should have captured a stronghold, whose natural defenses were not more conspicuous than those of art, was a feat that filled them with dismay. Far and wide throughout the country the call was sent to rally to the national cause, and tribe after tribe began to give and to take hostages and to assemble its armed bands. Envoys even traveled beyond the Pyrenees, to the Spanish tribes bordering on Aquitania, begging the loan of auxiliaries and trained leaders for the war; upon whose arrival, with not merely large additions to their forces, but with what was even more, the prestige that attaches to great names, they prepared for a regular campaign against the Romans. For their generals they elected those who had served under Q. Sertorius during all those years of his residence amongst them, and who in consequence enjoyed a reputation for ripe military experience. Adopting Roman methods, these at once began to seize all the strategic points of the country, to fortify their camps, and to cut the communications of their opponents. Such methods were not slow to win success, and Crassus soon found that whilst his own meagre forces rendered any further subdivision difficult, the enemy roamed at will about the country, lay astride the roads, always left in camp a sufficient garrison, seriously menaced his convoys of provisions and stores, and to crown all, were daily receiving fresh accessions of strength. The position calling for decisive measures, without further delay he laid the matter before his officers, and finding their support unanimous, settled on the morrow to give decisive battle.

At dawn he moved out in force and, formed in two lines, with his auxiliaries massed at the center, stood waiting the intentions of the enemy. These, though they had no misgivings about a contest, and felt assured that superiority of numbers and ancient pride in noble

deeds of arms would give them the victory over the weak forces of their opponents, yet thought that they saw a still surer road to success. To block the roads and cut the communications of the Romans would bring about a bloodless victory; or if through lack of provisions the enemy decided to evacuate the country, they could then attack whilst the legionaries were in heavy order of march, weighted down with their haversacks, and with little stomach for a fight. This policy being endorsed by their Spanish generals, the only answer made to the Roman challenge was to keep strictly behind their lines. Crassus was not slow to seize on the full significance of this decision. The vacillation of purpose which it disclosed reacted on its authors, and the enemy's confidence in their own prowess was shaken just in proportion as the fighting spirit of the Romans rose. On all sides was heard the opinion that the proper course was now to assume the offensive without delay, and to march upon the camp. Accordingly, with a few words of encouragement to his men, who were but too eager for the fray, Crassus set his army in motion straight for the hostile camp.

Arrived before it, some of the legionaries quickly began filling up the trenches, while others with a raking fire of hand-missiles endeavored to sweep the defenders from their place on the rampart and fortifications. In this work the auxiliaries played a useful part. Not trusting them much for purposes of actual fighting, Crassus had assigned them the duty of carrying ammunition and of bringing up sods for the ditches to the regulars; and in this way they succeeded in giving both the appearance and the impression of combatants. The enemy, however, were worthy foemen and betrayed no sign of flinching, while their spears coming from the higher position fell with deadly effect upon the assailants. The battle was still undecided when news of a possible diversion in the rear reached the ears of the Roman general. His cavalry, having by this time ridden round the camp, returned with the report that in the neighborhood of the postern gate the defenses were not quite so elaborate, and might be easily approached.

On this Crassus called round him his various squadron leaders, and after carefully explaining his intention, urged each to excite the daring of his troopers by the promise of handsome rewards. Acting

on these instructions, they then first returned to the Roman camp, where they picked up the garrison battalions whose strength was still unimpaired by the toil of battle; and then making a wide detour, so as to avoid detection from the camp opposite, reached the weak spot in the enemy's defenses, alluded to above, whilst the eyes and attention of all were still riveted on the struggle raging at the front. There, tearing away the stockade before any indication of their approach had been noted by the enemy, or these had awakened to the full measure of their peril, they quickly established themselves on the inner side. A few moments later, and the roar of battle coming from that quarter fell on the expectant ears of the stormers at the front; and at the sound, as so often happens where victory is in sight, strength and dash were renewed, and the attack pressed home with fiercer energy. Surrounded on all sides, the enemy now gave up the day as lost, and in a wild rush for life began leaping over the defenses. But across the perfectly level plains the cavalry pursued with deadly effect; and when at last the men rode back to camp far on in the night, they had left alive barely one fourth of the fifty thousand tribesmen known to have assembled from Aquitania and the country of the Cantabri (*Northwest Spain*).

The tidings of this disastrous battle was at once followed by the surrender of the vast majority of tribes; and hostages from the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Pitanii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibuzates, and Coccosates were now given up to Crassus. The sole exceptions were a few tribes from the outlying portions of the country, who considered that the near approach of winter made it safe to refuse compliance.

The whole of Gaul was now quiet, the only tribes still in the field being the Morini and Menapii; neither of whom had as yet shown any disposition to accept terms of peace from the Roman governor. Although therefore the season was almost over, Caesar determined to make yet one more expedition this year, under the belief that a campaign against these two tribes could be rapidly carried through. On entering their country, however, with the Roman forces, he found that they had adopted a method of warfare wholly at variance with the previous practice of the Gauls. Perceiving that

the attempt to fight the Romans in the open had invariably brought disaster upon even the strongest tribes, they had decided to make full use of their natural advantages; and with this object had buried themselves and all their belongings in the heart of those immense tracts of forest and fen that characterize this district. The Roman army had arrived on the outskirts of these forests, and had begun entrenching for the night, no sign being yet anywhere seen of the enemy, when just as the men had scattered for their work, suddenly from all sides of the wood a furious charge was made upon the astonished troops. The latter flew to arms, and, the attack having been beaten off, drove them back into the wood with heavy loss: though in attempting to follow them into the intricacies of the forest, they suffered certain casualties of their own.

The next few days were spent in cutting a wedge through this dense woodland. To protect his men from being suddenly assailed in flank, when for the time the sword had been laid aside for the axe, Caesar directed that the timber, as fast as it was felled, should be stacked in two parallel rows facing the enemy, thus forming a steep rampart on either side. The work proceeded with amazing rapidity, and in a few days a sufficient avenue had been cleared to enable the troops to seize some of the enemy's cattle and the hindmost portion of the baggage, though they themselves ever receded towards the thicker parts of the bush. At this stage operations had to be suspended, bad weather and continual rain making it impossible to keep the troops any longer under canvas. Having therefore wasted all the cultivated lands and burnt every village and homestead within reach, Caesar returned with the army, which was then distributed for the winter among the Auleri, Lexovii, and other tribes lately in rebellion.

BOOK IV

SECTION I. THE USIPETES AND TENCTERI

In the winter which followed, sometime after the Consuls for the New Year (C. Cn. Pompeius and M. Crassus) had taken office, Gaul was once more afflicted with an irruption of German tribes. Two of these, the Usipetes and Tencteri, crossed the Rhine with an immense following at a point a little above its junction with the sea. The invasion was caused by pressure from behind, the two tribes having for a long period been subjected to a galling persecution at the hands of the Suebi, who made the tillage of their lands impossible. In territorial extent, as well as in natural aptitude for war, the Suebi are among the first of German tribes. Common report credits them with the possession of one hundred cantons, each of which furnishes an annual contingent of one thousand armed warriors. Year by year these cross the frontiers for war, while the rest of their manhood stays at home in order to raise the necessary food both for themselves and their comrades abroad, until they in their turn go forth to battle, and the others return to civil life. In this way they contrive to maintain unimpaired both the cultivation of their lands and also the adequate training of the nation for war. Yet there is a curious want of permanence in all their relations to the soil. Not only is private ownership unknown amongst them, but even in their communal holdings they are forbidden to remain longer than a single year in the same district. On the other hand, they are not greatly

dependent on the raising of corn, their staple food consisting of milk and the flesh of herds, whilst hunting also is a very favorite pursuit. Indeed their wonderful physique is mainly attributable to this pastime, as it necessitates a rough diet, constant hard exercise, and an unframed freedom of life (from boyhood they are taught no habits of obedience, and never think of practicing the least degree of self-restraint) resulting in that immense bodily strength and proportion of limb and muscle that are truly astounding. So hardy is their condition, that though the climate is one of the most rigorous, they are accustomed to wear nothing but a few skins, the scanty covering of which leaves a large part of the body exposed, and they habitually bathe in their rivers.

As to their intercourse with the outside world, traders are admitted amongst them more to provide a market for the disposal of the spoils of war, than for any need they feel for the use of foreign wares. Even the excellent horses of the Gauls, which form their special pride, and on the rearing of which they will spend enormous sums, the Germans do not take the trouble to import, but prefer their own small, coarse, country-bred animals, which by constant usage they can render capable of the hardest work. In cavalry engagements they will often suddenly dismount and fight on foot, and during this time the animals are trained to stand perfectly still, until at the right moment their riders rapidly rejoin them. Nothing in their code of honor is a deeper disgrace, or a more certain sign of sloth, than the use of a saddle; and against cavalry so mounted they will not hesitate to charge, whatever be the disparity of numbers. Another import strictly forbidden by them is wine. This, they consider, saps the vigor and energies of a man, and ultimately destroys his manhood.

On the political side of their character we find a similar spirit of exclusiveness and love of isolation. To have a vast desert of unpopulated lands lying round their frontiers is to them a subject of much complacency, since in it they discern a striking tribute to their own invincibility from a large number of defeated rivals. On one side of the Suebi, indeed, there is said to exist a tract of not less than 600 miles of untenanted lands. Along the opposite side, however, the Ubii march with their frontiers. Time was when this people formed, according to

the German standard, a strong and prosperous community, and they have attained to a civilization that is in some respects superior, not only to that commonly found in a similar state of society, but even to others outside it. This is explained by their nearness to the Rhine, and their consequent easy intercourse with traders, and by the fact that through having the Gauls for their neighbors they have succeeded in assimilating much of the Gallic refinement. At the point we have now reached persistent efforts had been made by the Suebi to dispossess this troublesome neighbor of their lands, and war after war had been waged between them; but though they had failed in their principal object, owing to the strength and vitality exhibited by their opponents, they had yet succeeded in imposing on them a tribute, and in leaving them shorn of much of their original power and greatness.

A similar treatment had been meted out to the Usipetes and Tencteri, the two tribes mentioned at the beginning of this section. For many years they had offered a stout resistance to their persecutors, but in the end their eviction had been accomplished; and after wandering homeless about Germany for a space of three years, they had finally reached the Rhine. The particular point of the river which they struck was occupied by the Menapii, whose settlements, with cultivated lands, homesteads, and villages, lay on either bank. The approach of so formidable a host naturally produced grave alarm among these inhabitants, and, evacuating their homes on the farther side, they fell back to the western bank of the river, which they then closely picketed in hope of stopping the passage of the Germans. To accomplish this end the emigrants tried every conceivable device. The attempt to cross by force failed for want of boats; every endeavor to snatch a surreptitious crossing was foiled by the watchful Menapian posts, until, nothing being left to them but artifice, they pretended to have abandoned their migratory movement and to be returning home, and took a three days' march into the interior. Then, suddenly wheeling round, they covered the whole of that distance on horseback in a single night, and falling on the hapless Menapii, who, when informed by their scouts of their departure, had confidently returned to their settlements across the Rhine, they slaughtered these without resistance, and then seized upon their

boats. Quickly making the passage before word could be brought to the main body of the Menapii on the western bank, they dispossessed these of their houses and then supported themselves at their expense for the remainder of the winter.

On receipt of this news Caesar at once recognized the real measure of his gravity. He had learned by experience to distrust the restless spirit of the Gauls; and in dealing with a people who are only too ready for adventure, and as a rule only too anxious to upset the established order of things, he was determined to take no risks. Most characteristic of this weakness is their habit of stopping travellers on the road, and, in spite of protest, of closely questioning them on any facts or rumors concerning any event of passing interest each may have gathered on the way. The same thing is done to traders on reaching a town; the crowd surrounding them and compelling them to give a clear and full account, both of the district they have come from and of the news they found current in it. On the strength of this intelligence, or rather hearsay, they will frequently take decisions of the highest moment; decisions that, in the very nature of things, are bound to be regretted almost as soon as taken, since not only do they make themselves the victims of idle gossip, but their informants usually shape their answers to the known wishes of their questioners.

Remembering this national propensity of the Gauls, Caesar felt the supreme importance of at once forestalling any possible extension of the disturbance; and for this purpose anticipated slightly his usual time for returning to the army. There he found his fears corroborated: certain Gallic tribes were already in communication with the Germans, inviting them to leave the neighborhood of the Rhine, and guaranteeing in advance any demands or stipulations they might make. The expectations raised by these overtures had led the immigrants to enlarge the area of their depredations, and they had now reached the country of the Eburones and Condrusi, both states dependent on the Treveri (*Treves*). Summoning the leading chiefs of Gaul to meet him at his camp, Caesar purposely disclaimed all knowledge of the facts discovered, and strove instead to recall them to a sense of calm and confidence; and having ordered fresh contingents of cavalry, he prepared for war with the invaders.

Arrangements for supplies being completed, and a picked body of Gallic horse having been selected, he started for the district commonly reported to be the whereabouts of the Germans. Within a few days' march of their encampment, envoys arrived bearing a formal declaration of policy. After denying that they were in this case the aggressors, they expressed themselves as perfectly ready to accept war with Rome, if driven to that alternative; for it was, they said, a point of honor among Germans, resting on long tradition, to take up at once any challenge offered them without a thought of compromise. But though that was the case, they would like to make one remark. Their presence in the country was quite unintentional, as they had been driven from their proper homes; but they might still prove useful allies to Rome, if Rome desired their friendship; and to gain that, she had only to give them lands or allow them to remain on those already won for themselves by the sword. The only superiors they acknowledged were the Suebi, with whom, as they naively put it, not even the gods in heaven could hope to contend. Any other race of mortals would find them invincible.

To these remarks Caesar made what seemed an appropriate rejoinder, and finished by a clear statement of the terms on which alone friendship could be recognized with Rome. At all costs they were told they must quit the country, for, as he reminded them, it was scarcely consistent that those who had failed to guard their own possessions should now keep those of others: and as to untenanted lands, there was nothing in Gaul, in anyway adequate for such a host, that could be assigned them without inflicting grave injustice. But they might, if they liked, he added, settle among the Ubi, whose ambassadors then happened to be in camp, having come to complain of Suebian violence and to petition Roman aid, to whom therefore he would give the necessary orders.

The German delegates promised to report his terms to their people, and to return with answer in three days' time: meanwhile they begged Caesar not to advance any further with his army. Caesar replied that this request also he was obliged to decline. The fact was, he had discovered that a large proportion of their cavalry had a few days before been sent across the Mosa (*Meuse*) to plunder and seek

provisions from the Ambivarii; and he more than suspected that their desire to procrastinate did but conceal their anxiety to await the return of this force.

This river Mosa (*Meuse*) takes its rise in that part of the Vosges which falls within the dominion of the Lingones (*Langres*). It is subsequently joined by an offshoot of the Rhine called the Vacalus, with which it forms the island of the Batavi, after which it rejoins the Rhine not more than eighty miles from the ocean. The Rhine, on the other hand, rises among the Lepontii, an Alpine tribe. Embracing in its course a wide stretch of country, it sweeps with turbulent current past the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrics, Triboci, and Treveri (*Trieres*). On nearing the ocean, it branches into several distinct streams, forming many large islands, a number of which are inhabited by people not far removed from savagery, including some who are popularly supposed to live upon fish and the eggs of birds, and it finally empties itself into the Ocean by a number of detached mouths.

Not more than a dozen miles separated the Roman army from the enemy when, in accordance with the agreement, the German representatives again made their appearance, and meeting Caesar actually upon the march, implored him once more not to proceed further. On failing to secure their point, they next begged him to send on an order to the cavalry that preceded the column, not to engage in a battle, and at the same time to allow themselves to send a mission of their own to the Ubii. Provided that people would, through its Senate and chiefs, give a solemn assurance of good faith, they were perfectly ready, they said, to accept the arrangement proposed by the Roman governor. To carry out these measures they requested an armistice of three days. Though firmly convinced that in all this their real object was, as before, simply to gain time, and by a three days' respite secure the return of their absent horsemen, Caesar yet gave them a promise not to advance further that day than another four miles, required for reaching water, and bade them meet him on the morrow at that point in as numerous a body as possible, when he would be able to learn the nature of their proposals. Meanwhile dispatch riders were sent on to the Roman officers in command of the cavalry, the full strength

of which had preceded the column, ordering them on no account to provoke hostilities, but if attacked, to remain on the defensive until Caesar himself arrived nearer with the main army.

No sooner, however, did the enemy see the Roman cavalry approaching than thoughts of treachery began to stir their minds. It was a force numbering fully five thousand, whilst theirs, owing to the continued absence of the raiding party across the Meuse, was barely above eight hundred. On the other hand, the Romans were not in the least expecting any attack. They had seen the German envoys lately take their departure, and that day, as they knew, was one of armistice, specially concluded at their own desire. Suddenly, without warning, their eight hundred men fell upon the Roman brigade, and quickly threw it into confusion. Meeting with resistance, they leapt to the ground in their usual manner, and after hamstringing the horses and throwing many of their riders to the ground, they drove the rest before them in such a wild tumult of terror, that it was only arrested on coming into view of the main column of march. Seventy-four troopers fell in this engagement, including that brave soldier-piso the Aquitanian, a scion of a noble house, grandson of a chief who had once borne a kingly title, and by the Roman Senate had been honored with the name of "Friend." In going to the assistance of a brother whose retreat had been cut off by the enemy, he had, after rescuing him, had his own horse wounded, which had brought him to the ground: when, fighting with the utmost gallantry as long as he had strength, he had at last become surrounded, and finally fell beneath the exhaustion of his numerous wounds. Meanwhile his brother had escaped from the action and was some distance on ahead, when seeing what had happened, he set spurs to his horse, and hurling himself upon the enemy's ranks, so met his end.

After fighting of this kind, there could be no further reception of ambassadors or talk of terms: those who could practice such base deception as first to ask for peace and then openly commence war, had certainly put themselves outside the pale of negotiations. On the other hand, to delay to strike until the enemy's forces had grown in strength by the return of the absent horsemen, was assuredly the height of folly; whilst there was always the instability of Gallic

temperament to be reckoned with, and the moral certainty that by this one action alone the Germans had enormously enhanced their reputation in the eyes of the Gauls. To give them time to hatch new schemes of disaffection would of all possible proceedings be the most impolitic; and with his mind made up, Caesar laid the matter before his general officers and paymaster. But at this point the march of events most opportunely intervened to prevent any delay in bringing on the decisive battle. Early on the morrow there appeared in the Roman lines a crowded deputation from the Germans, embracing everyone of their chiefs and elder men, once more bent on trying their favorite arts of duplicity and cunning. They had come in the first place to apologize, as they put it, for the regrettable incident of the day before, when, in violation of the arrangements entered into at their own request, they had started hostilities; and secondly, by means of lies, to extort any concession which they could on the matter of an armistice. With no small gratification that his enemies had thus put themselves in his power, Caesar gave the order for their arrest, and then moved out from camp. The cavalry, which it seemed probable would still be much shaken by their recent encounter, was ordered to follow instead of preceding the column.

In three lines, the army rapidly covered a distance of eight miles, and the German laager was reached before any suspicion of the truth had flashed across their minds. The consternation produced was complete. The swift advance of the Romans, and their own leaders' absence, by removing all chance either of formulating a plan of action or of arming for battle, left them hopelessly bewildered as to the best course to adopt, whether to sally out and meet the enemy, or to stay and defend the camp, or to abandon themselves to flight. Their panic soon betrayed itself to those outside by the noise and confusion heard within, and maddened by the recollection of the preceding day's treachery, the Roman legionaries burst over the entrenchments. Here the few who were able to rush to arms offered a short resistance among the wagons and baggage trains; but the great masses of women and children (the migration and passage of the Rhine having been a national one) fled in all directions, followed by the cavalry hot in pursuit. Hearing the cries in their rear and seeing the slaughter of their

people, those who were still fighting now threw down their arms, and, abandoning ensigns and standards, rushed madly out of camp. On reaching the confluence of the Meuse and Rhine the fugitives gave up all hope of escape; and large numbers having already been killed, the survivors, flinging themselves into the river, quickly disappeared beneath the waters, some from terror, others from exhaustion, and the rest from the strength of the current. On the Roman side not a man was killed and but very few wounded, and when they returned to camp it was with conscious relief from the dread of a great war with an enemy not less than 430,000 strong. The arrested leaders, though offered the opportunity by Caesar to go their way, were too much afraid of the terrible vengeance awaiting them from those Gauls whose lands they had ravaged to take it, and preferred to stay where they were. These were given their personal liberty.

This fresh German war over, the conviction forced itself upon Caesar's mind that for various reasons, political and military, he was now bound to undertake the passage of the Rhine. Of these reasons the most unimpeachable was the present lighthearted manner in which the Germans were continually invading Gaul, and the consequent need there was of reminding them that their own possessions did not enjoy any special immunity from attack, but that on occasion a Roman army could and would cross the great river. In the second place, complications had arisen with one of the Transrhenean tribes, viz. the Sugambri. It will be remembered that a considerable section of the mounted tribesmen of the Usipetes and Tencteri had been away on a plundering foray for corn across the Meuse, and were not therefore able to take part in the recent battle. On the rout of its comrades, this contingent had recrossed the Rhine, and sought and obtained shelter with the Sugambri; and on Caesar's sending to demand their surrender, on the ground that they had levied war against himself and Gaul, that tribe haughtily replied that Roman dominion ceased with the Rhine, and that if he considered it an unjustifiable act for Germans to invade Gaul, he must also admit that on their side of the Rhine he could claim no authority or power. Lastly, there was the important question of the Ubii, who of all the tribes beyond the Rhine had alone sent delegates to the Roman general, or had expressed a desire

for friendship by delivering hostages. At this very moment they were urgently beseeching help against the continued encroachments of the Suebi; or, if the exigencies of public policy rendered that course impracticable, they requested that the Roman army would merely show itself across the Rhine, since that would be sufficient protection and allow them to breathe freely for the future. So profound an impression, they declared, had this army made upon even the most distant German tribes, and so deep was the respect entertained for its twin exploits of the overthrow of Ariovistus and the recent campaign, that their safety was amply assured by the mere knowledge that they possessed the friendship of Rome. These representations were accompanied by a promise to find a large fleet of transports for the army's passage.

But though for the reasons enumerated above he was now resolved to cross the Rhine, Caesar was nevertheless strongly of the opinion that to do this by means of boats would neither be unattended by risk, nor worthy of his own or his country's dignity. The task on the other hand of bridging a river, of the width, depth, and rapidity of the Rhine, was no light one; and yet it must either be successfully grappled with, or else the army not be transported at all. The type of bridge he finally adopted was as follows. First of all, wooden posts, a foot and a half in diameter, sharpened a little from the end, and measured to the depth of the stream, were coupled in pairs at a distance of two feet. These were then placed in position by mechanical contrivance, and driven down into the bed of the river by rams, being set not like ordinary piles, directly perpendicular with the water, but tilted over at an angle in the direction of the current. This done, a similar set of posts, parallel to the first, but sloping against the force and rush of the tide, was carried across the stream forty feet farther down. Across each corresponding pair stout planks were next stretched, which, being of a width of two feet, exactly fitted the space between the separate posts, the whole framework being kept in position by a pair of under-braces running from either side. As these last crossed diagonally, and had free play at the point of section, the strain of the natural forces at work upon the structure proved so nicely adjusted, that the greater the impact of water against the posts the tighter

they were clinched and held together. These large planks were then connected by lighter boards running transversely down the bridge, which in turn were overlaid with poles and fascines to form the floor. To protect the bridge when finished, two breastworks were appended. On the side down stream, a row of piles was driven out at an angle from either shore, forming at the center a sort of buttress, which being linked to the main fabric of the bridge, was able to break the force of the current; while on the upper side the same formation was adopted at a little space above the bridge, whereby, in case the natives should launch trunks of trees or boats down the river for the purpose of wrecking the work, a stout buffer was interposed sufficient to break their shock and to prevent any real damage to the bridge.

Within ten days of the time at which the first timber reached their hands, the engineers had finished the work, and the army passed to the farther shore. Strong detachments having been left to guard both ends of the bridge, the main force at once began to advance towards the district of the Sugambri. As it proceeded, delegates came in from numbers of different tribes, asking for peace and friendship, and being welcomed by Caesar in cordial terms, were bidden to furnish hostages. The Sugambri were found to have made all preparations for flight from the very first commencement of the bridge; and at the instance of the Usipetes and Tencteri, whom they still harbored, they had now evacuated their country, and, carrying with them all their property, had buried themselves in the heart of their vast forests.

It remained, therefore, only to do the work of devastation, and for this a few days were spent in burning the farms and villages and in rooting up the crops. After that, Caesar retreated upon the Ubii, to whom assurances were then given of Roman protection in their unequal struggle with the Suebi. But that people also was found to have departed. On the first intimation of the building of the bridge, conveyed through their scouts, they had summoned one of their usual councils to discuss the situation, and on its decision the order was sent broadcast through their territories to evacuate all towns, to send their women and children and worldly goods to the depths of the forest, and to assemble at an appointed rendezvous all adult males capable of bearing arms. The site they had chosen lay

somewhere near the center of the entire Suebic district, and here they were determined to await the Roman advance and to fight a decisive battle. The reception of this news materially modified the plans of Caesar. In spite of their escape, the real objects proposed to himself in the passage of the Rhine had now been attained. The German tribes had been thoroughly frightened, a reckoning had been made with the Sugambri, and the Ubi had been extricated from their state of siege. Eighteen days in all had been spent on the German side of the river, a period sufficient to satisfy the demands both of honor and of policy, and having regained the Gallic shore he broke down the bridge.

SECTION II. FIRST EXPEDITION TO BRITAIN

Though only a little of the summer still remained, and winter arrives early in Gaul on account of its northern latitude, yet there was one further expedition this year which Caesar was anxious to make, and that was an invasion of Britain. In nearly all his campaigns so far with the Gauls, that island, he had cause to know, had secretly abetted the enemies of Rome by the dispatch of auxiliaries. Even therefore should the season of the year preclude any extensive hostilities, much might still be gained by a mere visit to the island, such as would allow him to investigate its inhabitants, and to carry out a rough survey of its formation, harbors, and general lines of approach; matters on almost all of which the Gauls were strangely ignorant. This ignorance is accounted for by two reasons. In the first place, what communication there is with the island is, generally speaking, confined to traders; and in the second, even their knowledge is restricted to the coast, and those regions that lie opposite to the two divisions of Gaul. Although, therefore, he summoned to himself most of the traders of the district, Caesar yet found it impossible to discover either the size and extent of the island, the names and characters of the tribes inhabiting it, their military state and organization, or the harbors suitable for the reception of a large fleet of bigger vessels.

To collect such information before embarking on his project, he determined to send one of his own officers in a warship; and as well qualified for the task he selected Caius Volusenus, who was

instructed to make his survey and to return immediately once it was finished. With all his available forces he then moved northwards towards the district of the Morini, from whose shores lay the shortest passage over to Britain; and at this point of the coast transports were ordered to assemble from all the nearest maritime states, together with the fleet that had been built the year before for service against the Veneti. Meanwhile news of his intentions had got abroad, and by traders had been conveyed to the Britons, causing many of these to send envoys with a promise to give hostages to Caesar and to acknowledge the suzerainty of Rome. After hearing what they had to say, Caesar liberally encouraged and exhorted them to abide by the decision they had arrived at, and then sent them back to their homes. With them was also sent a certain distinguished Gaul named Commius, a chief of the Atrebrates (*Atrebat*), whom after the conquest of that people, Caesar had appointed as their king, and had always found to be a man of high courage and capacity, perfectly loyal, so far as he could judge, to himself, and exercising by his actions very great authority in those quarters of the island. His orders were now to visit whatever states he could, and to impress upon the natives the advisability of trusting Rome, whose general was soon about to appear in person. Meanwhile Volusenus had, as far as circumstances permitted, where he was afraid either to land or to trust himself to the natives, made a careful reconnaissance of the whole district, and on the fifth day returned to Caesar with the results of his observations.

During the delay necessitated in these parts by the work of collecting transports, envoys arrived from the large majority of Morini to explain the attitude of that people throughout the past. Representing themselves as rude and untutored, and strangers to the great qualities of Rome, and as having for that reason lightly taken up arms against her, they declared their present willingness to accept any orders from Caesar's hands. Such voluntary surrender on their part at such a time was more than opportune. Caesar had no desire to leave a troublesome enemy in his rear; the season disallowed of any organized campaign against them; and on any ground, trivial obstacles of this nature were not to be weighed with the far more

important matter of Britain. He therefore imposed upon them a heavy toll of hostages, and on their delivery the tribe was formally admitted to the protection of Rome. Some eighty vessels were at length assembled at the port of embarkation, sufficient, as he calculated, for the transport of two legions: these were accompanied by a certain number of men-of-war, the command of which was entrusted to his paymaster, the senior members of his staff, and other officers of higher rank. Eighteen other transports which had failed to make the rendezvous, and now lay wind-bound at a point some eight miles further off, were allotted to the cavalry. The residue of the army was left under the command of the two generals, Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, with orders to proceed, the one against the Menapii, and the other against those districts of the Morini which had not yet sent in hostages. The port was left garrisoned by what was considered a sufficient force under P. Sulpicius Rufus.

These dispositions completed, as soon as the wind was fair, he set sail shortly after midnight, leaving instructions that the cavalry should proceed to the other port further up channel and there embark and follow in his wake. In the execution of these orders a certain amount of delay occurred; whereas Caesar with the first flotilla made the shores of Britain early the next morning, about nine or ten o'clock, to find on his approach that the whole line of hills was crowned with the armed forces of the enemy. The place was one of peculiar strength, since there was so little space between the sea and the rising wall of rock, that the shore was easily commanded by any spear thrown from above. To land in such a position was clearly impossible, and he therefore anchored, to wait for the arrival of the other transports. Meanwhile he summoned a meeting of generals and commanding officers on the flagship, and after placing before them the report of Volusenus, carefully explained his own instructions. Reminding them that in all warfare the first duty of an officer was prompt and ready obedience to orders, he showed the special applicability of this maxim to operations afloat, where events necessarily followed one another in rapid succession. After this, they withdrew to their respective quarters; and wind and tide now both being favorable, the signal was made to weigh anchor, and the fleet, standing out along the

shore, moved forward for a space of about seven miles, until, finding an open expanse of flat coast, it once more brought up.

The Roman plan had been instinctively divined by the natives, and having sent on their horsemen and charioteers (the arm on which they chiefly rely in battle), with the rest of their forces they also followed along the shore, prepared to dispute the landing. This was for many reasons an operation of much difficulty. Their large draught prevented the transports from riding in anything but deep water, so that the troops had to jump overboard without any knowledge of the bottom, with their hands full, and with their heavy accoutrements weighing them down: in this condition they had then to keep their footing in the surf, and at the same time to carry on a battle with the enemy. They, on the other hand, could either keep the dry shore, or else advance a little into the water, and from there, with every limb free, and perfectly familiar with the ground under them, could boldly pour in their raking volleys, and rapidly manoeuvre their admirably trained horses. In face of such obstacles, and exposed to a form of fighting so bewilderingly new to their experience, the men showed signs of alarm, and the dash and spirit so conspicuous in all their land engagements were now to a large extent lacking.

In this situation, Caesar had recourse to his warships. The long galley was a sight not so familiar to native eyes as was the rounded merchantman, and moreover it could be more easily handled. The order was given to these to draw off a little from the transports, and then by a swift movement under oars, to take up a position on the unshielded flank of the Britons, and from that point to pour in a hot fire of sling-stones, arrows, and artillery shot, until the enemy was dislodged and driven from his place of vantage. The diversion proved of great service to the landing parties. The strange appearance of the ships, the imposing motion of the oars, and the wonderful kind of artillery which they carried, so powerfully affected the imagination of the islanders that they first halted, and then for a little space fell back. As the Romans still hesitated, owing chiefly to the great depth of water, the eagle-bearer of the Tenth legion, with a fervent appeal to the gods that what he was about to do might turn out for the good of the regiment, shouted to his comrades to jump overboard unless

they wished to see the eagle in the hands of the enemy. "I, at any rate," he exclaimed, "shall not be found wanting in my duty to my country and general." With these words, he flung himself out of the ship, and, eagle in hand, made straight for the enemy. This act roused the legionaries from their stupor, and calling on one another not to permit so ineffaceable a disgrace, as one man they leapt into the sea. The other ships quickly caught the infection, and soon the entire expeditionary force was pressing forward to meet the enemy.

The battle was fiercely contested on either side. The Romans found it impossible either to keep any formation, to secure a firm foothold, or to advance by companies; since every man, no matter from what ship he came, at once formed up round the first standard he encountered, to the no little confusion of all concerned. The enemy, on the other hand, knew every shallow, and watching from the shore, seized every opportunity that offered itself. If single men were noticed leaving a ship, they would dash in with their horses and fiercely attack them whilst they were still battling with all the difficulties of landing. Isolated groups would be surrounded with larger numbers of their own, whilst all along its unguarded flank the main body would be swept with a murderous crossfire of iron missiles. Perceiving the success attending these tactics, Caesar ordered the boats belonging to the men-of-war, with the small scout-ships attached to the fleet, to be manned with legionaries; and to go to the assistance of any who were observed to be in difficulties. Once firm on dry land, with all ranks pressing on behind, the troops quickly charged and routed the enemy, but could not pursue them far, since the cavalry of the army had failed to keep its course at sea and to make the island. In this single respect Caesar's proverbial good fortune had played him false.

Vanquished in battle, the enemy, as soon as they were sufficiently recovered from their flight, immediately thought of peace; and envoys with promises of hostages and submission to Caesar's orders now appeared. Accompanying them was the Atrebatian king Com-mius, who, it will be remembered, had been sent into Britain by Caesar to herald his approach. After disembarking, he had, in his rôle of ambassador, been about to deliver the terms of his message.

when he was rudely seized and thrown into prison; and it was only after the decision of the battle that they decided to send him back. In suing for peace, they threw the blame for this outrage upon the ignorance of the populace, and on that ground begged for quarter. In his reply, Caesar justly complained of the inconsistency of first sending across to the Continent uninvited to ask for peace, and then without any provocation making war; but attributing it to want of proper knowledge, promised to overlook it, and then ordered hostages. Some of these they surrendered outright; the rest they declared they must fetch from the more distant regions of the country, but would deliver in a few days. Meanwhile they directed their followers to return to their work upon the land, and their leading chiefs from all parts began waiting on Caesar, anxious to put both themselves and their people at his disposal.

As a result of these measures peace seemed firmly secured, when, on the fourth day after the arrival in Britain,¹ the eighteen transports carrying the cavalry, and already mentioned more than once, put out to sea before a gentle breeze from the upper harbor. On their nearing the coast of Britain and coming into sight of the Roman camp, there suddenly arose so fierce a storm that not one could keep its course; but whilst some were driven back to their port of sailing, others were blown down channel to the more westerly parts of the island, at imminent risk to their own safety. Here they anchored and endeavored to ride out the gale; but, swept by the big seas, with night fast coming on, they were forced once more to stand out from shore, and to run across for the opposite side.

That night it happened also to be full moon, a day which always brings with it the highest tides on shores washed by the Ocean, though of the fact the Romans were ignorant. Wind and wave were thus united in the work of destruction. The Roman galleys which had acted as escort to the expeditionary force, and which had afterwards been beached, were quickly swamped by the rising tide; while at the same time the transports lying off shore at anchor were exposed to the full fury of the hurricane, without any possibility on the part of the troops either of working them into a place of safety or of rendering them any aid. Morning showed a long line of wrecks, and even

those which had escaped were totally unfit for navigation, being stripped of masts, anchors, and other tackle; and as a consequence (under the circumstances only natural), a profound gloom settled over the entire army. Other visible means of making the return voyage there were none; not a single appliance was available for repairing the shattered ships; and, most disquieting thought of all, nothing had been done towards securing winter supplies on the British side of the Channel, since it was universally agreed that the better course was to winter in Gaul.

The effects of this disaster were presently seen in a marked change of attitude on the part of the natives. Those of their chiefs who had waited on Caesar after the decision of the battle, suddenly waking to the fact that the Romans were without either cavalry, transports, or provisions, and, to judge by the insignificant size of their camp (all the smaller because the legions had crossed without heavy baggage), that their numbers were in nowise formidable, jumped to the conclusion, after talking the matter over together, that their best chance lay in once more taking up arms and in starving out the invaders. Could this be systematically done till winter, and the present expedition be either crushed or cooped up within the island, then beyond a doubt no other attempt to land on their shores with a view to conquest would ever be made. Secret pledges were then given and taken, and gradually withdrawing themselves from camp, they covertly began to call off their followers from the land.

These treacherous designs were for the present undetected by Caesar, though recent occurrences all pointed to their likelihood, and the fate of the fleet, along with an ominous suspension in the delivery of hostages, made him suspect the truth. He was accordingly resolved to provide against all possible emergencies. The camp was daily replenished with corn from the surrounding fields, and the repair of his damaged ships was effected by taking the timber and copper of all the worst of the wrecks and using it upon those that were more or less sound, as well as by fetching over from the Continent materials and other accessories for the work. In the task now set them, so great was the ardor displayed by the troops, that, with a total sacrifice of twelve, the other vessels were soon made

tolerably seaworthy. It was during these operations that, as usual, one of the two legions, on this occasion the Seventh, was sent out to gather corn. No suspicion of hostile movements had as yet arisen, and the countryside was still peopled by its inhabitants, several of whom still continued even visiting the camp, when suddenly the outposts stationed before the gates reported to Caesar that a cloud of dust, greater than occasion warranted, could be distinctly seen in the direction previously taken by the legion. At once suspecting what had occurred, viz. that some new plot had broken out among the natives, Caesar ordered the battalions forming the pickets to proceed with himself to the point of danger, two others to relieve these, and the rest to arm and follow with all speed. After marching a considerable distance from camp, it became possible to make out that the Romans were being desperately put to it by the enemy, that they were barely holding their own, and that the legion was fighting in a cramped position, exposed on all sides to a torrent of spears. What had happened was that the enemy, on observing that in every district but one the crops had now been reaped, had not unnaturally anticipated the route to be followed by the legion, and had overnight secretly occupied the woods. Waiting then till the men had become scattered, as, with arms laid aside for the sickle, they were busily engaged with their harvest, they had suddenly attacked, and after killing a certain number, had thrown the rest into dire confusion, through partial loss of formation, and had finally surrounded the whole party with their cavalry and chariots.

The chariot-fighting of the Britons is of the following description. Beginning with a wild gallop down the whole field of battle, to the accompaniment of dense volleys of missiles, they generally succeed in this part of the action in creating disorder among the opposing ranks simply by the terrifying aspect of the horses and the loud rattle of the wheels; then, after worming themselves between the squadrons of the enemy's cavalry, they leap from their cars and fight on foot. Meanwhile the drivers gradually draw clear of the press, and take up a position a little outside the battle, such as will give a ready line of retreat to their fighting men, should these be overpowered by numbers. As a fighting force, they thus combine in themselves the steadiness of infantry

with the mobility of cavalry; and so accomplished do they become by constant practice and manoeuvring, that on broken and precipitous ground, even when in full career, they can keep perfect control over their horses, pull them in at a moment's notice or turn their heads, run out along the pole, stand astride the yoke, or regain the car, with a nimbleness and dexterity most astonishing.

Warfare so novel in its methods had sorely tried the discipline of the troops, when Caesar, at a moment than which none could have been more opportune, brought timely relief: the enemy at once began to pause in their attack, and the legionaries to recover confidence. For anything more than this—for taking the offensive, and fighting a pitched battle—the Roman commander did not consider the circumstances to be propitious; and so, after maintaining his own position for sometime in face of the enemy, he returned with his troops to camp. Meanwhile those of the natives who still remained out upon their lands had taken the opportunity presented by this incident, when everyone's attention was fully engaged on the Roman side, to slip quietly away. There followed a period of incessant rain, and consequently enforced inactivity on either side, during which the Romans kept their camp, and the enemy abstained from attacking it. The latter, however employed the interval to send round all the country a full description of the weakness of the Roman force, and a spirited call to seize the opportunity now offered, by expelling the Romans from their entrenchments, of amassing loot and of winning for themselves a lasting freedom. As a result of this appeal large forces of foot and horse were quickly raised, who now advanced upon the camp.

Although fully aware that the experience of the past few days would only repeat itself, and that the enemy at the moment of defeat would by the quickness of his heels escape all real punishment, yet, having now been joined by the thirty troopers brought over, as already recorded, on his mission by Commius the Atrebatian, Caesar resolved to accept battle, and marshalled his two legions a little way in front of his own camp. The opening of the action quickly demonstrated the inability of the enemy to stand before a Roman charge, and turning their backs to flee, they were pursued by the Romans as

far as their unaided powers of running would take them. Numbers having been killed, and the farms of all the district laid in ashes, the troops returned triumphantly to quarters.

Before the day had closed, envoys appeared from the enemy prepared to discuss terms. In his reply, Caesar doubled the number of hostages previously imposed; and as the equinox was close at hand and he was reluctant in the present untrustworthy condition of his ships to put off the time of sailing to the winter months, he ordered these to be brought over to him in Gaul. Waiting only for a fair wind, he then set sail shortly after midnight, and had the satisfaction of seeing everyone of his vessels safely make the opposite coast; the sole exception being two of the transports which, failing to reach the same harbors as the rest, were carried a trifle further down channel.

The troops from these two, some three hundred in all, had effected their landing and were making the best of their way to head-quarters, when they were suddenly confronted by a party of hostile Morini. Though left by Caesar, when starting for Britain, in a state of comparative quiet, yet the temptation to plunder now proved too strong for this wild people, and surrounding the little detachment at first with only a moderate force, they ordered it, if it wished to escape destruction, to lay down its arms. At this threat the Romans formed up into a hollow square, prepared to defend themselves, and soon the noise of battle brought together some six thousand other tribesmen. As soon as the news reached Caesar, he at once dispatched the full strength of his cavalry to their assistance. They meanwhile, with the utmost gallantry, had stood at bay for four long hours, and at the cost to themselves of a few wounded had killed large numbers of the enemy. At last the Roman cavalry appeared in sight, and then the assailants, rapidly throwing away their arms, abandoned themselves to flight, in which a heavy toll was taken by the pursuers. The day following, Caesar sent T. Labienus, his chief of staff, with the two legions largely returned from Britain, with orders to chastise those of the Morini who had been guilty of so flagrant an act of rebellion; and as these no longer had the same retreat open to them as in the previous summer, owing to the dry state of the marshes, almost the entire party fell into his hands. The similar expedition against the

Menapii under Q. Titurius and L. Cotta had not been quite so successful; but after devastating the country, destroying the crops, and burning all homesteads, it found that the enemy had hidden themselves in impenetrable forests, and therefore returned to Caesar. The winter camps for the year were then determined on, all of them lying within the Belgic frontiers. As to the hostages ordered from Britain, two tribes alone fulfilled their obligations: the rest ignored the command. Thus ended the year's campaign, on a full account of which being received at Rome through the Governor's dispatches, a public thanksgiving of twenty days was ordered by the Senate.

BOOK V

SECTION I. SECOND EXPEDITION TO BRITAIN

The consuls for the New Year, L. Domitius and Appius Claudius, had already taken office when Caesar, following his usual custom, quitted the army's winter camps for his visit to North Italy. Before leaving, he ordered the generals commanding the separate legions to see that as large a fleet of transports as possible was built during the winter, and that the necessary repairs to the old ships were also carried out. The new vessels were to be of a special design, which he now explained. A slight reduction was made from that customary in the Mediterranean in the amount of freeboard allowed: this was done to ensure quickness in loading, as well as for convenience in beaching; experience having proved the seas in the British Channel, owing to the frequent changes of tide, to be smaller than those elsewhere. On the other hand, since it would be necessary to carry very heavy cargoes, including large numbers of horses and mules, a somewhat wider beam was given them than that ordinarily used by the Romans on other seas. With regard to the means of propulsion, all vessels, without exception, were to be equally well fitted for rowing and for sailing, for which conversion their nearness to the water-line gave no little facility. The various stores required for the proper equipment of the fleet were ordered to be brought overland from Spain.

Having finished his judicial duties in Italy, Caesar was called away to his province of Illyricum, where the frontier was reported to be

suffering from bands of marauding *Pirustae*. On his arrival, he called out the local levies, appointing a place for their concentration; upon which the governing authorities of the tribe immediately sent word to disclaim all public responsibility for the raids, and to announce their readiness to make every reparation in their power. These explanations he thought proper to accept, and having ordered hostages to be delivered by a certain day, told them plainly that their failure to comply with these terms would at once bring down upon them a punitive expedition. His orders were scrupulously obeyed and the hostages surrendered by the time prescribed; after which arbitrators were appointed to assess the damages between the two states, and to determine the amount of fine.

This question satisfactorily disposed of, and the assize business of the province finished, Caesar returned to Northern Italy, and from thence rejoined the army in Belgic Gaul. A tour of inspection of the various camps showed that the men had not been idle. In spite of an almost complete dearth of proper appliances for the task, about six hundred vessels of the type described, together with twenty-eight ships of war, had been built by all but superhuman effort, and at the time of his arrival were within a few days of being launched. After a warm tribute of praise to the troops for their devotion, and after the officers who had directed the operations, Caesar explained his instructions, and ordered the whole *Flottilla* to assemble at the port called *Itius*, proved by experience to be the best for the passage to Britain, from which it is distant some twenty-eight miles.¹ For the work of transportation an adequate force was then left behind, and meanwhile, with four legions, in light marching order, and hundred cavalry, he himself proceeded to the country of the *Trevi* (*Treves*). For such an expedition the reasons were partly their constant neglect to attend the annual councils of the Gauls, and to recognize his authority, partly the report lately current that intrigues were proceeding between them and the Germans east of the Rhine. The cavalry possessed by this people surpasses that of all others in Gaul.² To it also they can add a large force of infantry; and, as they were torn between two rival factions under two chiefs named

Indutiomarus and *Cingetorix*, each of whom claimed the headship of the tribe. The news of the coming Roman invasion made it necessary for each to adopt a definite attitude. *Cingetorix* at once came to put himself in Caesar's hands, and after a strong declaration of loyalty on behalf of himself and his immediate followers, and a promise given to adhere faithfully to the side of Rome, proceeded to describe accurately the present political condition of his country.

Indutiomarus, on the other hand, lost no time in preparing for hostilities: horse and foot were rapidly collected, and all under military age were sent away for protection to the great forest of *Ardennes*, which runs as a huge barrier from the Rhine right across the country of the *Treviri* to the frontiers of the *Remi* (*Rhems*). But his followers of the *Treviri* to the frontiers of the *Remi* (*Rhems*). But his followers melted away before his eyes. Several of the chiefs, partly out of regard for *Cingetorix*, partly through increasing fear at the steady advance of the Romans, now left him and came to make private terms with Caesar, since, as they expressed it, they were not allowed to save their country from disaster. Such widespread disaffection threatened to leave him in unpleasant isolation, and before long *Indutiomarus* also sent in his submission. His envoys explained that it was only a deep concern for his people's loyalty that had hitherto prevented him quitting the center of affairs in order to pay his respects to Caesar, since he naturally feared that in the absence of all the principal men of the country the commons might be moved to embark on some fatal policy. The result was he now held the country firmly in his grasp, and with Caesar's permission, therefore, he would do himself the honor of visiting the Roman commander in his camp, and would there submit both his own and his country's future to the friendly judgement of his superior.

The true meaning of such language was not lost upon Caesar, who thoroughly understood the reason that had caused his change of attitude; but not wishing to spend the summer among the *Treviri*, when all was ready for his British expedition, he contented himself with ordering *Indutiomarus* to appear before him and to bring with him two hundred hostages. All these, including a son and the whole of his nearer kindred, who were specially named in the terms imposed, were duly delivered, and the chieftain was himself then sympathetically

out only too correct. Summoned to surrender, Dumnorix prepared for resistance and threw himself into an attitude of defense, appealing all the while to his companions not to forget their pledge, and crying out again and again that he was a free man and a citizen of a free country. Acting on their instructions, the horsemen then surrounded and cut him down, whereupon the whole of the Aeduan cavalry returned quietly to Caesar.

This episode concluded, the work of embarkation could once more proceed. Three legions with two thousand cavalry were left on the Continent under Labienus, whose orders were to keep open the harbors, to maintain supplies for the expeditionary force, to watch the events in Gaul, and generally to take such measures of defense on his own responsibility as time and occasion might demand. Then Caesar himself set sail at sunset, and before a gentle southwest breeze stood out into the Channel. About midnight the wind dropped, and the vessels being unable any longer to keep a course, were carried rather too far down by the tide; so that when day broke, the coast of Britain could be made out on the port bow, steadily receding from them. On the tide turning again, and taking the ships with it, oars were got out and a great effort was made to strike the island at the point which last year's experience had shown to be the best for landing. In this undertaking it is impossible to praise the heavy and cumbrous ships of the troops, who, seated at the oar in their heavy and cumbrous ships of burden, without once taking a spell of rest, succeeded in holding their own for speed with the trained crews of the long-pointed sloops of war. The coast was finally reached by the whole fleet near the hour of noon, no sign of an enemy being anywhere visible, the reason for which was discovered afterwards from prisoners. Armed forces, it seemed, had at first assembled in considerable strength to oppose the landing; but the sight of the vast flotilla (which, counting last year's ships, and those added by individuals for private use, reached a number well over nine hundred, all visible at a single glance), had filled them with dismay, and quitting the shore, they had now secreted themselves in a strong position further up the country.

As soon as the army was landed, and a site chosen for a camp, Caesar, ascertaining from prisoners the precise whereabouts of the enemy, a little after midnight set out in search of them. Over the naval station he placed a garrison of ten battalions with three hundred cavalry, and, in leaving the neighborhood of the sea, felt the less anxiety about his ships, because the anchorage where they were riding was an open and sandy bay. The officer appointed to the maritime station was Q. Atrius. After a night march of some twelve miles, the enemy's forces were discovered; and these, now advancing with cavalry and chariots to the banks of a certain river, endeavored from this point of vantage to bar the passage of the Romans, and to force them to an engagement. Routed by the Roman cavalry, they next fell back to the protection of their woods, among which they had secured a most formidable position, of immense natural and artificial strength, and from all appearances built on some earlier occasion for use in one of their native wars, since every approach to it was strongly guarded by masses of felled trees. From the wood their skirmishers kept up a running fight, with the object of preventing the troops from passing the line of fortifications. Thereupon the Seventh legion, locking their shields above their heads, whereby to take cover, quickly raised a bank against the outside wall of the stockade, and swarming over, carried the place at the sword's point, and at the cost to themselves of a small number of wounded drove the enemy from the woods. Further pursuit was forbidden by Caesar; the country before him was all unknown, it was late in the day, and he wished to leave sufficient time for the proper entrenchment of a camp.

But on the following morning the pursuit was taken up in earnest, and organizing three flying columns, each composed of infantry and horse, he sent them after the fugitives. The advance had proceeded some distance, and the troops were already in touch with the rearmost bodies of the enemy, when dispatches overtook them from Q. Atrius, bearing news of great gravity. In a terrific storm along the coast on the previous night, nearly the whole of the transports had been torn from their moorings and driven on shore: anchors and hawsers had failed to hold, and crews and captains had found it impossible to cope

with the fury of the gale. The result of the vessels being thus violently dashed ashore had been a disaster of the very first magnitude.

Upon this intelligence, Caesar at once ordered the recall of all arms, and bidding the troops remain on their present ground, returned himself to his ships. Personal investigation confirmed in most respects the report of the messengers; some forty vessels were found to have gone to pieces, the rest might conceivably, by an enormous expenditure of labor, be put into repair. To the work of reconstruction each legion now gave up its section of engineers, others being also summoned from the Continent; while written instructions were sent to Labienus to build all the vessels that he could with the legions on his side of the Channel. On considering the naval problem as a whole, Caesar arrived at the conclusion that, in spite of the immense toil involved in such an undertaking, the most satisfactory solution was to haul up every one of the ships on to dry land, and then to incorporate them with the main camp in a single system of defenses. These operations took up about ten days, and during this time not even the night watches brought any cessation of work to the tired troops. At length all the vessels were beached and safely housed within a naval camp of unassailable strength; after which, leaving the same composite force as before in garrison, Caesar again set out to the point from which he had returned. There he found that during his absence the enemy had been largely reinforced from various parts of the island, and that by universal consent they had appointed as their commander-in-chief, with supreme control of the war, a king named Cassivelaunus, whose territories were separated from the maritime districts of the south by a river called the Tamesis (*Thames*), situated about seventy-five miles from the sea. Between him and his neighbors there had existed in the past a state of perpetual war; but the common menace of Roman invasion had temporarily healed all local feuds, and he was now installed by the British as the acknowledged chief and champion of his country.

And here a word or two on the island of Britain and its people may not be out of place. Its inland parts are inhabited by a race pronounced by their own tradition to be aboriginal; whereas the population of the south along the coast are Belgic immigrants, who

at first crossing for the sake of war and plunder, afterwards remained to settle and till the soil, and are still known in the large majority of cases by their earlier tribal names. The island is densely populated, and everywhere houses meet the eye, very similar in type to those of Gaul, while flocks and herds abound. The coinage of the country is usually copper, but gold also is current, and bar-iron, weighed in definite quantities, is likewise used as a substitute for money. The two principal metals produced in the island are tin in the midlands, and iron along the coast, although of the latter the supply is extremely small: copper, on the other hand, they have to import. Of timber, apart from the fir and beech, the species found are just those of Gaul. Of their animals, they have a conscientious scruple against eating either the hare, domestic fowl, or goose, though all of these are kept for amusement or as pets. The climate is more temperate than that of Gaul, and the frosts not so severe.

The island is triangular in form, and on one of its sides looks out upon Gaul. This side is terminated eastwards by the corner of Cantium (*Kent*), the usual place of landing for ships from the Continent, and at the further end by a point that turns towards the south. The length of this side is about 460 miles. The second or western side leans more towards Spain, and off it is situated the island of Hibernia (*Ireland*), generally supposed to be about half the size of Britain, and separated from it by a sea-passage equal to that from Britain to Gaul. Halfway across this channel lies an island called Mona (*Mau*), in addition to which, if report speaks true, there are other small islands near the coast, about which certain writers have alleged that for thirty days round the winter solstice there is unbroken night. Though we ourselves inquired carefully into the matter, we could glean no information; and the only evidence we can adduce is that according to the accurate measurements of the water-clock the nights there were seen to be shorter than on the Continent.³ The length of this western side, to borrow again the reckonings of the same authorities, is 640 miles. The third side faces north, and is without any adjacent land: its extreme point may perhaps be said to face towards Germany, and its length is computed at 735 miles. We thus get a grand circumference for the whole island of 1,835 miles.

Of the inhabitants, those of Cantium (*Ken*), an entirely maritime district, are far the most advanced, and the type of civilization here prevalent differs little from that of Gaul. With most of the more inland tribes, the cultivation of corn disappears, and a pastoral form of life succeeds, flesh and milk forming the principal diet, and skins of animals the dress. On the other hand, the Britons all agree in dyeing their body with woad, a substance that yields a bluish pigment, and in battle greatly increases the wildness of their look. Their hair is worn extremely long, and with the exception of the head and upper lip the entire body is shaved. In their domestic life they practice a form of community of wives, ten or twelve combining in groups, especially brothers with brothers and fathers with sons. The children born of such wedlock are then reckoned to belong to that member of the partnership who was the first to receive the mother as a bride into the household.

Whilst still on the march, the cavalry with the Roman column was exposed to constant fierce attacks from the horse and chariots of the enemy. Beaten at all points, however, these were at last driven back into the hills and woods with heavy loss, until the Romans, by a too incautious pursuit, suffered some casualties. There followed a lull, during which nothing was seen of the enemy; but on the troops proceeding with careless confidence to the construction of a camp, they suddenly burst out of hiding once more, and charging down upon the outposts stationed before the camp, engaged these in a fierce hand-to-hand encounter. Caesar at once ordered up two battalions to their relief; but though these were the first in their respective legions,¹ happening at the time to be posted but a small distance apart, the unwonted form of attack so completely shook their nerve, that the enemy, with a boldness than which nothing could have been finer, drove right through the center of the mass, and then wheeling round, made good their retreat. Among those who fell that day was Q. Laberius Durus, a young commissioned officer attached to one of the legions. Only with the arrival of further reinforcements was the enemy at last driven from the field.

To those watching the engagement, which took place in full view of everyone, before the gates of the camp, it was sufficiently clear

that in fighting of this kind the Roman infantryman, with his heavily weighted armor, was no proper match for so nimble a foe as the British. If they retreated, he could not follow; if they attacked, he dared not break the strict formation of his line. The dangers attending a cavalry combat were no less serious; for more often than not the enemy would purposely yield ground, and having drawn their opponents away to a distance from the legions, would suddenly leap from their chariots and engage their pursuers on foot in what was now a very unequal contest. While such tactics were being adopted by the enemy's mounted force, the peril attending a pursuit was just as formidable as that of a retreat. When it is also remembered that they never fought in close, but always in open order, with considerable distances between the ranks, and had detachments posted in reserve with which by a system of constant reliefs tired men could instantly be replaced by others who were fresh, the difficulties of contending with such a foe will be readily understood.

On the next day the enemy kept the hills, merely showing themselves in small groups at a long distance from camp, and making demonstrations against the cavalry, though with far less determination than the day before. But towards noon, on a force consisting of three legions and all the mounted troops leaving camp in search of fodder, under the general C. Trebonius, they suddenly swept down from every side upon the foragers, and even ventured up to the standards, prepared to cross swords with the legions. The latter delivered a spirited charge, before which they broke and fled, hotly pursued by the infantry. After this the cavalry, with the confidence born of the near support of the legions whom they could see close behind, took up the pursuit. The retreat was turned into a rout, in which the slaughter was great, and no opportunity was given to the fugitives either of rallying their shattered ranks, or of stopping to practice their favorite device of dismounting from their cars. The immediate result of this defeat was the dispersal homewards of the various local levies that had flocked to the campaign; nor did the enemy ~~after~~ this ever again venture to oppose the Romans openly in the field.

Their change of tactics was not unknown to Caesar, who now continued his advance towards the Thames, with the object of

penetrating the country of Cassivelaunus at the single point where this river is just fordable on foot. On reaching it, large bodies of the enemy were observed in position on the opposite bank, which moreover was strongly fortified by a bristling array of pointed stakes fringing all the riverside, and by others of a similar kind let perpendicularly into the bed of the river and hidden beneath the stream. These facts were disclosed by prisoners and deserters: and acting on their information, Caesar ordered the cavalry to lead, and the legions to follow immediately behind. Though up to their necks in water, the troops went across with irresistible dash and spirit; and the enemy never once standing to await the combined charge of infantry and horse, quickly deserted the banks and sought shelter in a general flight.

Finding it useless to meet the Romans in a pitched battle, Cassivelaunus, as already indicated, after dismissing the greater bulk of his forces, and retaining merely some four thousand chariot-men, determined in future to confine himself to guerrilla warfare. For this purpose he would hang tenaciously upon the Roman line of march; and having previously driven off from the cultivated lands to the surrounding forest all the cattle and inhabitants of the district through which he knew the army must pass, he would ensconce himself a little off the main road in any piece of broken and wooded ground. Then, as the Roman cavalry spread themselves more freely over the country for purposes of waste and plunder, this silent retreat would suddenly become alive with swarms of chariots racing down every path and by-fight when widely scattered. The constant menace of such attack narrowly restricted the area of cavalry operations, and the only course left to Caesar was to forbid all distant expeditions from the column; though, in doing this, he of course reduced the damage that could be inflicted on the enemy, by means of fire and pillage, to the measure of the stamina and powers of marching possessed by the heavy infantry of the time.

Meanwhile there came an offer to surrender from the tribe called the Trinobantes (*Essex*), probably the strongest of all in that part of the island. A young representative of their nobility, a chief

named Mandubracius, whose father had once held the throne among his own people, but had met a violent death at the hands of Cassivelaunus, the son only escaping by taking to flight, had already joined Caesar in Gaul, and put himself unreservedly under his protection. Their envoys, while pledging the tribe's obedience to any demands that might be made, begged Caesar to intervene on behalf of Mandubracius against the violence of Cassivelaunus, and to send him back to them as their accepted lord and ruler. Caesar replied by first demanding forty hostages and corn sufficient for his army: Mandubracius he sent back as desired. These orders they promptly obeyed, rendering the full tale of hostages, and delivering the corn in camp.

Their example was quickly followed by others, for on observing that the Trinobantes were adequately protected, and scrupulously guarded against all ill usage by the troops, the Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bithroci, and Cassi sent in similar offers to surrender. In doing so, they informed Caesar that not far from his present position lay the capital of Cassivelaunus, a natural stronghold of the surrounding forest and swamps, into which large numbers both of cattle and men had already flocked. Though called a "town," it was so only in the British acceptance of the term, by which it meant no more than a central rallying-point from hostile incursion, formed of some inaccessible piece of woodland that has been fortified by a high rampart and ditch. To this place, therefore, the march of the legions was now directed. It was found to be a position of extraordinary natural and artificial strength, but none the less preparations were at once made for assaulting it at two separate points. The enemy, though they clung to their cover for some little time, did not venture to await the final charge, but broke away by another quarter of the town. Inside large quantities of cattle were found, and in the pursuit that followed many of the islanders were killed and captured.

During these operations inland Cassivelaunus had made a desperate effort to create a diversion in the Roman rear, by means of a rising in Cantium (*Kent*). This district, it will be remembered, lies near the sea, and was at this time ruled by four petty kings, named

Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segovax. To these, therefore, instructions were now sent from the British headquarters to summon all their forces, and flinging themselves without warning upon the naval station of the Romans, to carry it by assault. The garrison, however, were quite ready for the attack, and as the enemy approached, issued from their lines; and after inflicting on them heavy slaughter and capturing a leader named Lugotorix, a prince of royal blood, effected their retirement without loss to camp. It was now plain to Cassivelaunus that resistance had reached its limit. His last attempt had ended in failure, he had been repeatedly worsted in battle, his lands were all ravaged, and now, to crown all, his chief supporters were beginning to fall off. Having enlisted, therefore, the friendly offices of the Atrebatian king Commius, he sent his ambassadors to Caesar to treat for peace. To the Roman commander his surrender was not inopportune. The season was far advanced, and what remained of it could easily be frittered away without decisive results; while the constant liability of Gaul to sudden outbreaks had already led to the decision to winter on the Continent. After imposing hostages, therefore, and fixing the amount of tribute which Britain was to pay annually to Rome, Caesar closed the negotiations by solemnly warning Cassivelaunus to abstain from all unprovoked attack against either Mandubracius or the Trinobantes.

On surrender of the hostages, the army retraced its steps to the sea, there to find the transports all fully repaired. But as soon as these were launched, it became clear that their number was scarcely adequate to the work of transportation: not only had several foundered in the gale, but the numbers of the Romans had meanwhile considerably increased through the many prisoners they had taken. Under the circumstances Caesar determined to take back the army in two voyages instead of one. And here it may be remarked that on neither of the two British expeditions, either this year or last, was a single vessel ever lost out of the entire fleet whilst carrying troops on board, though the trips made across channel were so numerous: whereas, on the other hand, in making the return passage from the Continent when empty, only a very small number succeeded in gaining the coast, whether of those which now took over the first batch of

the troops, or sixty others subsequently built under the care of Labienus, nearly all of which were driven back by stress of weather. And so, having vainly for several days waited their appearance, Caesar at last resolved to bow to the inevitable; and rather than risk being made a prisoner in the island, when the æquinox should have suspended for the winter all further navigation, determined to overcrowd his remaining boats. Fortunately there followed a season of exceptionally fine weather, and setting sail soon after 9 p.m. by the first of the dawn he had made the opposite coast, and eventually brought everyone of his troopships safely to land.

As soon as these were safely docked, he called a national council of the Gauls at Samarobriua (*Amiens*), and then proceeded to make his military dispositions for the winter. Owing to the continued drought there had been this year a considerable failure of the harvest throughout Gaul, and he was therefore compelled to depart from his usual custom, and to parcel out the legions over a more extended area. Of these one was sent to the Morini under command of C. Fabius, a general of division; a second accompanied Q. Cicero to the district of the Nervii; a third L. Roscius took to the Esubii; a fourth went with T. Labienus to the Remi (*Rheims*), with orders to winter on the frontiers of the Treveri (*Trier*); whilst, lastly, three more were stationed in central Belgium under command respectively of M. Crassus, the Paymaster, and the generals L. Munatius Plancus and C. Trebonius. A single legion, recently raised in Italy north of the Po, together with other details amounting in all to five battalions, was sent to the Eburones, at that time governed by two chiefs named Ambiorix and Carvolicus, whose territories lay for the most part between the Meuse and the Rhine. This last force was under command of two general officers, Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta. Such was the distribution of his army, which in Caesar's judgement best remedied the existing scarcity of corn; a distribution that, apart from L. Roscius' force, which had gone to a part of the country where peace and order had been fully established, placed all the camps roughly upon a circle, whose diameter at any point was well under 100 miles. The Roman commander also determined not to quit Gaul, until he knew that each of these corps

had reached its destination, and was securely entrenched behind its fortified lines.

At this point an incident happened necessitating a slight modification of these arrangements. Among the Carnutes (*Otelans*) was a highly aristocratic chief of the name of Tasgetius, a member of what had once been the ruling house. A man of striking courage and of whole-hearted devotion to Roman interests, Caesar had found his services throughout these campaigns invaluable, and for reward had restored him to his ancestral throne. In this, the third year of his reign, at the instigation of his numerous enemies who had left the country, a plot was formed against him which ended in his murder. On the crime being reported to Caesar, he at once saw that the fact that many were concerned in it might easily result in the public defection of the tribe; and he accordingly ordered L. Plancus to move rapidly from Belgium with his legion upon the Carnutes, and to pass the winter in their country, and at the same time to seize the persons of those whom he found guilty of the murder, and to send them under escort to himself. Whilst this was being done, dispatches announcing his safe arrival in winter quarters and the fortification of his camp.

SECTION II. ATTACK ON THE WINTER CAMPS

About a fortnight after the troops had gone into cantonments, the first symptoms of revolt were seen in a sudden outbreak among the Eburones, headed by their two chiefs Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. They had journeyed to their southern frontiers with the express object of waiting upon Cotta and Sabinus, and had actually brought the stipulated corn into camp. Then, listening to secret overtures from the embittered Treveran leader, Indutiomarus, they called together their tribesmen, and having surprised and overpowered a Roman fatigue party which was out gathering wood, swept on, a now formidable force, toward the Roman station, to carry ~~it~~ ^{an} assault. In this, however, they were foiled. The garrison, rushing to arms, quickly manned the walls, and launching the Spanish horse at one point of the lines, completely routed the cavalry opposed

to them, whereupon the enemy, despairing of success, drew off from the encounter. With characteristic change of front, they then called loudly for someone from the Roman side to come out to parley. They had, they said, important proposals to make in the interests of either party, which, they hoped, would do much towards settling the differences between them.

Upon this two persons left the Roman lines, C. Arpincius, a Roman knight and personal friend of Sabinus, and a certain Spaniard named Q. Junius, whom Caesar had frequently employed as his agent in his past dealings with Ambiorix. In their presence Ambiorix then made the following statement. Beginning with a defense of his own position, he acknowledged the undoubted debt of gratitude which he owed to Caesar for his great services to him in the past, mentioning especially his liberation from the tribute formerly paid to his powerful neighbors the Aduatici, and the restoration of his son and nephew, whom that people had exacted as hostages and afterwards kept in imprisonment. In the recent assault on the camp, according to his own account, his share had been forced upon him by his fellow countrymen, directly against his own wishes and better judgement: for, according to the law of their constitution, king and commons formed two equally balanced authorities in the state. What then, he might be asked, had driven his people to take up arms against Rome? It was simply their powerlessness to withstand the great national upheaval that had so suddenly shaken the country. Did the Romans doubt this explanation, let them consider the insignificant position held by his own tribe among Gallic peoples, and they would acquit him of the simplicity of supposing that, single-handed, it was a match for the might and majesty of Rome. The real situation was something very different. The whole of Gaul was united in a single determined purpose; and on that day a simultaneous attack was to be made on everyone of Caesar's winter quarters, in order to preclude any possibility of mutual assistance among the legions. In such circumstances it was surely too much to ask from Gauls that they should reject the appeal of brother Gauls, when the object of the movement was well known to be the recovery of their independence? "But," he continued,

... the claims of patriotism are now satisfied, and I have next to consider my duty as Caesar's grateful friend. Convey my warning to Titurius—nay, implore him as one who has been my honored guest—to act in this emergency like a wise man in the best interests of himself and his troops. A large body of German mercenaries has crossed the Rhine; and in two days will be here. You Romans have now to decide whether or not you will evacuate your present camp, and, before the surrounding tribes can hear of it, make your way either to Cicero or to Labienus, one of whom is some fifty miles away, the other a little more. For my part, I promise and solemnly pledge my word of honor to grant you a safe passage through my territories; for in doing so I not only benefit my country, which is thereby relieved of the great burden which your presence in it entails, but also require the past kindnesses of Caesar to myself.

At the close of this speech he took his departure, and Arpinetius and Junius returned to report what they had heard to the commanding officers. They, not unnaturally perhaps, had lost under the suddenness of the emergency something of the power of collected judgement; and though the words were those of an enemy, yet they thought them worthy of consideration, especially as it sounded ridiculous that a tribe so undistinguished and unimportant as the Eburones should dare to provoke an armed conflict with Rome, unless supported from without. Accordingly they brought the matter before a council of war, and there a fierce discussion of views took place. L. Aurunculeius and the vast majority both of commissioned and non-commissioned officers of senior rank held strongly that nothing hasty should be done, and that under no circumstances could it possibly be their duty to evacuate their allotted winter quarters, without express orders from Caesar. They maintained that, behind entrenchments such as theirs they could defy even Germans, no matter what their numbers; and in proof of this contention pointed to their gallant repulse of the enemy's first attack, which had involved those who made it in no little loss.

They were not at present pressed for stores, and before very long help would doubtless arrive both from Caesar and the camp that lay nearest. Nothing, they argued finally, could be a greater confession of weakness or a more undeniable ground of disgrace, than to allow themselves to be dictated to on questions of vital policy by the unsolicited suggestions of a foe.

In opposition to this, Sabinus loudly protested that it would then be too late to act, when the enemy's forces had swollen by their juncture with the Germans, or when disaster of some kind had overtaken the neighboring camp. It was, he insisted, emphatically a question of making up their minds at once. His own conviction was that Caesar had left Gaul for Italy; for on no other hypothesis than the Commander-in-chief's absence, would either the Carantes have hatched their plot against Tasgetius, or the Eburones have had the effrontery to march upon a Roman camp. To the taunt that he looked to the enemy for his advisers, he opposed the evidence of facts; and reminded his hearers that the Rhine was after all not so far away, that the Germans had long nursed bitter resentment against the Romans for the death of Ariovistus as well as for subsequent defeats, and that Gaul was at that moment burning to avenge the repeated humiliations she had suffered, humiliations which had brought her into the wide dominions of Rome, and had caused her to lose forever her old proud title to military fame. Finally, he asked if anyone honestly believed that Ambiorix, had the facts not been as he stated, would have acted towards the Romans in so extraordinary a manner. "My own plan," he then concluded,

... has the merit of meeting both alternatives. If things are no worse than we hope, then there will be no danger in proceeding to the next legion; if, on the other hand, there is this understanding between Gaul and the German tribes, then our only chance lies in instant action. To the plans of Coma and others who differ from me, I can see no satisfactory conclusion. If they escape present danger, they leave us the grim prospect of a protracted siege, and in the end starvation.

After a fierce discussion on either side, as Cotta and the leading centurions still persisted in their opposition, Sabinus at length took the votes. "Decide it as you will," he remarked; and then raising his voice so as to be audible to a large part of the troops,

You need not imagine that to a soldier like myself death has any special terrors. The men here will understand, and (this to Cotta) in case of disaster will hold you responsible; since but for your perverseness, by the day after tomorrow, they might even now form a junction with the next division, and with it face the common lot of war, instead of being left in this heartless fashion to perish far away from comrades, either by sword or famine.

On the breaking up of the council, both officers were besieged by an eager throng of excited soldiery, earnestly begging them not to imperil the situation by a foolish insistence each on his own opinion. "With agreement and harmony of view, it mattered nothing whether they went or stayed—either course was equally practicable; dissension, on the other hand, must extinguish even the last ray of hope." The dispute dragged on its weary length till midnight, and then Cotta at last yielding the point, Sabinus' view carried the day. The word was passed that at dawn the march would begin. What remained of the night, instead of being wisely spent in sleep, was allowed to be wasted by the troops in anxious deliberation on what portion of his little property each could carry away with him, and what part of the camp furniture he must leave behind. No step, in short, was omitted on that fatal night, by which the further retention of the camp became a positive danger, whilst at the same time the actual peril of the troops was increased by the weariness induced by a night-long vigil. With the first streak of day the work of evacuation began. To judge by appearances, it might have been supposed that Ambiorix, on whose advice they were acting, was not the foe, but the staunchest friend of their country: the length of column and the amount of baggage taken were alike tragic in their significance.

Meanwhile the noise and other signs of wakefulness in the Roman lines had apprised the enemy of the decision to march; and in a cunningly concealed spot among the woods some two miles further on, they formed their ambushade, and in two divisions waited the arrival of their enemy. The place they had selected was a deep gorge, into which the greater part of the column had no sooner plunged than, suddenly disclosing their presence at either end, one party pressed hard upon the Roman rear, while the other strove to prevent their van from climbing clear at the opposite end. No position could well have been worse in which to fight a battle.

It was then the hour that proclaimed the man. Titurius, like one taken altogether by surprise, could everywhere be seen hurrying wildly up and down, striving to deploy his companies into line; yet acting all the while in a weak and nerveless manner that inevitably betrayed his complete bewilderment—the sure penalty of those who put off deliberation to the moment of action. Cotta, on the other hand, who had fully expected some such occurrence on the road, and had therefore condemned the idea of evacuation, now became the heart and soul of the defense: his calm and encouraging demeanor and the brilliant example he set in battle alike proclaimed him a born leader of men and a gallant soldier. Owing to the unwieldy length of the column, it soon became evident that no real control could be exercised over the progress of the action, or the needful measures taken in the various quarters of the field by the officers in charge; and the order was therefore passed along to cut off the wagons and to form all ranks into a hollow square. For such an order at such a time there is perhaps much to be said: in this particular instance it had disastrous consequences. Rightly or wrongly regarding it as an open confession of impotence and despair, the legionaries at once began losing heart, and the enemy to attack with redoubled energy; whilst another inevitable consequence was a general breaking of the ranks, in a wild scramble to recover what each man most valued among the baggage. On all sides the air was rent with shouts and cries of disappointment.

On the other hand, the self-control exhibited by the Gauls was astonishing. Acting on their leaders' instructions, not a man amongst

them left his place in the line; but concentrating every effort upon victory, they rested content with the knowledge that the plunder was as good as theirs, and that everything abandoned by the Romans must inevitably revert to them. In courage and in reckless determination to fight they were also worthy foemen.¹ Their opponents, meanwhile, deserted though they were by Fortune and by one of their own generals, were fighting as men fight who know they have themselves alone to look to, and at every charge delivered by a battalion the pathway back to the square was marked by rows of the enemy's dead. Such punishment caused Ambiorix to order his followers to avoid close fighting, and raking the Romans at longer range with volleys of spears, at once to retreat whenever the latter left their lines for a charge. The reason for this, as he explained to them, was that their own light armor and soundness of wind and limb rendered them practically invulnerable, and as their antagonists fell back to the standards, they could once more follow them up.

These directions they obeyed to the letter, and whenever after this any battalion sallied out from the square to come to grips with the enemy, they would scatter before it like chaff before a blast of wind. Every such attempt also necessarily exposed the unshielded side of the battalion, a disadvantage of which the enemy were not slow to avail themselves, and to enfilade it with a withering fire of spears; and when again it retreated to its old position in the line, it was to find itself hemmed in, not only on its front by those who had a moment ago scattered before it, but also by converging masses on either flank. Supposing, on the other hand, they decided to stand their ground and to remain on the defensive, then the brave man was every whit as defenseless as the coward; and in their close and serrated order it was difficult to parry the spears of so dense a multitude. Tormented by these and countless other troubles, with many of their number already sorely wounded, the little Roman band, in spite of all, still made good its defense; and though the fight had raged from early dawn to one o'clock of a winter's afternoon, yet through all those hours not one act was committed on their side of which any of them had cause to feel ashamed. At this point there occurred three disasters which in the event proved irreparable. In

the first place T. Balventius, a non-commissioned officer who the year before had led the senior company of his legion, and whose personal courage was not more conspicuous than his commanding influence over his comrades, was rendered *hors de combat* by a javelin that transfixed both his thighs. Then Q. Lucanius, another sergeant of the same company, in attempting to go to the rescue of his son, who had become surrounded, was killed whilst fighting most gallantly; and lastly, the general, L. Cotta, was struck full in the face by a sling, as with words of cheery confidence he moved in and out among the battalions, an example and an inspiration to all.

These threefold losses so deeply affected the spirits of Sabinus, now left in sole command, that recognizing Ambiorix in the background rallying his men to the attack, he sent out under a flag of truce his interpreter, Gn. Pompeius, with a formal appeal for quarter both for himself and his troops. Thus accosted, the Gaul replied that while he had no objection to discussing terms with the Roman general, the ultimate fate of the Roman rank and file must rest with his people; who, however, he hoped would not prove unmerciful. As to Sabinus himself, he had nothing to fear, and for his safety he pledged his word of honor. Titurius then consulted with his wounded colleague, and suggested that, with his approval, both should leave the battle and repair in company to the presence of Ambiorix for the purpose of a conference; there, as he hoped, terms favorable alike to themselves and the troops might be arranged. To this Cotta simply replied (and nothing would turn him from his purpose) that to an enemy with arms in his hands he would never consent to go.

Sabinus therefore collected what officers were immediately near him, and together with the senior centurions, ordered them to follow him. As they approached Ambiorix, a peremptory order greeted the party to throw down their arms. This order Sabinus obeyed, and directed his companions to do the same. The discussion of terms then proceeded, and in the meanwhile, as the wily chief purposely spun out his presentation of the case, the Roman general was stealthily surrounded and cut down from behind. Then with a shout of triumph at their bloody deed, they raised the hideous war-cry of their nation, and flinging themselves upon the Romans, carried confusion

and dismay into the ranks. Here it was that L. Cotta fell, still wielding a sword, and here the great majority of the troops met their end. The rest fought their way back to the deserted camp; conspicuous amongst them being the eagle-bearer of the legion, L. Petrosidius, who, finding himself surrounded by a dense swarm of foes, first flung the colors over the rampart, and then, fighting with calm heroism, turned to meet death outside the fortress. Within the lines, the little band of survivors just managed to keep off their assailants till nightfall: then, under cover of darkness, as all hope of saving themselves was now gone, each man died by his own hand. A few stragglers finally made their way from the battle through the pathless tracks of the forests, till, reaching the camp of Labienus, they informed that commander of all that had occurred.

Determined now to fly at higher game, and flushed with his first success, Ambiorix straightway started with his horsemen for the neighboring kingdom of the Aduatuci, riding night and day across the country, and instructing his infantry to follow immediately behind. The story he had to tell served to rouse that people to rebellion, and by the next day he had reached the Nervii. Calling on these to seize the opportunity now offered them of shaking off forever the yoke of bondage, and of wreaking on the hated Romans vengeance for all that they had suffered, he pointed out that already two of the enemy's most distinguished generals had been slain, and a large part of their army annihilated; and that to make a sudden descent upon the legion in winter quarters with Cicero, and to crush it at a blow, was a task well within their powers, in which they might rely on his hearty cooperation. Needless to add that in the Nervii also he found ready listeners.

Instructions were accordingly posted at once to the Ceatrones, Grudii, Levaci, Pleumoxii, and Geidummi—all of them tribes acknowledging Nervian sway—to raise the largest contingents each could furnish; and then before any word of Titurius' death could reach the ears of Cicero, they suddenly made their appearance before his camp. Here too a similar though unavoidable fate overtook a small party of legionaries, who having gone at the time to the forest in order to cut firewood and timber for the stockade, were now snapped up by the

swift descent of the enemy's horse. Fresh from this first taste of blood, the three confederate tribes, Eburones, Nervii, and Aduatuci, forming with all their subject and client states a most formidable array, then opened their attack upon the legion. The Romans flew to arms and quickly lined the walls; but the enemy, who looked throughout for the success of their movement to a few lightning-like strokes, and felt that victory here would render them invincible hereafter, pressed home the attack with such impetuous fury that the strain of this first day proved wellnigh unendurable.

Dispatches were at once sent off by Cicero to Caesar; but though large bribes were offered to any successful carrier, the roads were all found to be so completely in the hands of the enemy that every messenger was stopped. The night was spent in strengthening the defenses; and from the stocks of timber fortunately accumulated in camp for engineering purposes, the troops, by almost superhuman efforts, actually succeeded in raising no less than 120 towers along the rampart, whilst at the same time all defects discoverable in the earthworks were carefully made good. Morning showed the enemy strongly reinforced; the attack on the camp was again renewed, and a bold attempt was now made to fill the ditch. The garrison met their assailants by the methods of the day before, and this struggle was repeated with little variation day after day; for several days in succession. Through all this period the night work imposed upon the troops was incessant, and neither sick nor wounded could get an hour of sleep. The preparations against the morning's attack had to be finished before dawn, and the night was occupied in manufacturing piles of sharpened stakes to serve as artillery bolts, and large quantities of heavy siege javelins; in fitting the towers with floors, and protecting them by breastworks and parapets formed from hurdles of wattle, firmly plaited on. Though in an extremely indifferent state of health at the time, Cicero yet set a splendid example to his men, refusing even at night to allow himself any rest; and ultimately he had to be forcibly restrained by their earnest remonstrances from overtaxing his strength.

The Nervian leaders now tried the effect of artifice, and those of their number whose personal intimacy with Cicero justified them in

approaching him by word of mouth, expressed their wish to negotiate. Leave being granted them, they repeated in so many words the story that Ambiorix had already played off upon Titurius, viz. that the present armed rising extended throughout Gaul, that the Germans had passed the Rhine, that Caesar and all the other winter camps were at that moment under investment. To this tissue of lies they appended the one fact of Sabinus' death; and in proof of this statement proudly displayed Ambiorix to their foes. Then expatiating on the folly of relying on those whose own position was by this time all but desperate, they impressed upon the Roman officer that both towards Cicero and the Romans generally their feelings were perfectly friendly except on the single question of the winter camps, and these they did not desire to see made a permanent institution. "As far as we are concerned, therefore," they concluded, "you may safely evacuate your present quarters, and without fear of molestation proceed to any part of the country that you like." To these proposals Cicero's sole rejoinder was that Rome was not accustomed to accept conditions from an armed foe. If, however, they chose to disband their armed forces, he promised his hearty cooperation in addressing an appeal to Caesar, and assured them that, as far as his opinion went, they would find that Caesar, with his well-known sense of justice, would reject no reasonable demands.

The result of this disappointment was that the Nervii proceeded to carry out a regular circumvallation of the Roman camp, erecting for the purpose a continuous earthwork nine feet high, lined by a ditch fifteen feet wide. The military skill required for so considerable a work had been gathered by their increasing familiarity with Roman methods throughout the previous years, as well as from the instruction of certain prisoners originally captured from the Roman army, and still secretly detained in their midst. Of iron implements, however, necessary for the task, they were quite destitute, and they could now be seen cutting out the sods with their swords and carrying away the loads of earth in their hands and military cloaks. Their action afforded an excellent indication of their numbers; as in a space of less than three hours they had constructed walls of circumvallation three miles in circumference, which they afterwards followed up by building

on succeeding days movable towers proportioned to the height of the Roman ramparts, powerful hooks for disintegrating the stockade, and battery-sheds under which to advance—all of them devices learnt from the prisoners alluded to above.

The seventh day of the siege was ushered in by a violent hurricane; and the enemy, seizing the occasion, opened fire upon the long lines of soldiers' huts, which after the usual Gallic fashion had been roofed with thatch, with white-hot balls of moulded clay, discharged from slings, and with hand-grenades that were formed by highly heated spears. The huts quickly caught alight, and fanned by the strong wind, the fire soon spread its way throughout the camp. With screams of exultation at the success of their plot, and feeling now sure of victory, the Gauls next pushed up their towers and battering-sheds, and fixing ladders, began to scale the ramparts. But the Roman infantry, steady and cool as if on parade, though scorched by the flames which everywhere roared behind them, while on their front the spears flew in clouds, and knowing all the while that the regimental baggage and all their own belongings were fast being consumed, stood grimly to their task; not a man amongst them left his post, scarcely a man so much as turned his head; but in all alike the hour served only to call forth the deepest springs of resolution and the loftiest embodiment of courage. Though to the garrison the most critical of all the siege, yet to the enemy this day proved unexpectedly disastrous, and on no other was their list of killed and wounded quite so heavy. This was owing to the tremendous crush immediately below the ramparts, where those in front found it impossible to escape for the pressure from behind. It happened that at one point during the fight, one of the movable siege-towers had so far advanced as actually to touch the fortifications; and as at the time there was a lull in the fierceness of the fire, the centurions commanding the third cohort, which was here posted, drew back from their place in the line, and calling off their men, beckoned and shouted to the enemy to step across if they dared. Nobody was found bold enough to accept this challenge, and the Romans opening a murderous crossfire of stones upon their assailants, drove them from their position, and then set fire to the tower.

Among the non-commissioned officers of this legion were two men named T. Pullo and L. Vorenus. More gallant soldiers it would be difficult to find; and in the case of either a distinguished career was about to be crowned by promotion to the first battalion of the regiment. Between the two there had throughout been a constant and bitter rivalry on the question of precedence, and year after year a fierce competition had taken place for priority of rank. When the fight round the trenches had reached its height, one of these two men, viz. Pullo, gave the following challenge to his rival: "Come, Vorenus, it's all or nothing. If you've got your eye on that captaincy, let's put it to the test. Today shall settle all differences between us." So saying, he calmly strode outside the earthworks, and selecting the point where the enemy's ranks were thickest, dashed forward straight upon it. Vorenus was not the man to hang back after such a challenge, and dreading the public opinion of his regiment, was soon hard upon the other. Nicely calculating his distance, Pullo delivered his javelin with full force at the enemy, and striking one who was dashing out to meet him ahead of the others, brought him to the ground. Stunned by the blow, the wounded man was covered by his comrades' shields, who with one accord then turned their spears upon their bold assailant, cutting off his retreat. Pullo next had his own shield rent by a spear, and the spearhead most unluckily sticking fast in his belt, shifted his scabbard and sorely interfered with him as he strove to draw the blade; thus giving the enemy time to close in upon him whilst still struggling with his difficulties. At this critical moment his old antagonist, running up to his relief, drew off upon himself the attention of the enemy, who were firmly convinced that Pullo had been killed on the spot by the spear. Making brilliant play with his sword, Vorenus in a fierce hand-to-hand encounter had already cut down one of his numerous opponents, and was steadily driving the others before him, when, in his eagerness to press home the attack, his foot caught in a sudden depression of the ground and he came heavily down. He was quickly surrounded by the enemy, but in his turn was rescued from his perilous position by Pullo; and the two men, after accounting for numbers of the enemy, and covering themselves with glory, fell back unscathed to the fortifications of the

camp, fighting side by side. Thus, in endeavoring to terminate their dispute upon the field of battle, each of the two rivals, by successive turns of Fortune's wheel, was made the means of helping and rescuing the other; and the question, which of the two was the better man, had perforce to remain unsettled.

Everyday now increased the strain and suffering of the siege. The gravest cause for anxiety was the rapidly lengthening list of wounded, which threw the burden of defense upon a constantly diminishing section of the garrison; and though with the rise of the danger messengers with dispatches were sent off with greater and greater frequency to Caesar, many of these were caught outright, and in full view of the Roman camp were tortured to death. At last a more successful means was found. Within the fortress was a certain distinguished Nervian named Vertico, who having deserted to Cicero at the earliest stage of the siege, had since proved to that commander his undoubted trustworthiness. This man, by a lavish promise of reward and the hope of emancipation, induced one of his slaves to carry a letter through to Caesar. Tied up inside a spear, it was conveyed without the lines, and the bearer, passing unsuspected as a Gaul among Gauls, safely conveyed it to its destination. In this manner Caesar learned for the first time the critical condition of Cicero and his legion.

The message reached him within an hour of sunset. A mounted courier was at once dispatched to his paymaster Crassus, whose camp lay among the Bellovaci (*Beauvais*), twenty-five miles from headquarters, ordering the legion there to march at midnight and to join him with all speed. Crassus left upon the word. A similar summons was sent off to the general C. Fabius, directing him to move with his legion down to the country of the Atrebares (*Arras*), through which the relief expedition was bound to pass. Lastly, a written communication was addressed to Labienus, commanding that officer to proceed with the legion under him to the frontiers of the Nervii, if on a general review of the situation he deemed it practicable. His remaining divisions, as lying a little too far distant, he decided not to wait for. Cavalry to the number of about four hundred sabers were drafted in from the nearest camps.

About half-past nine the following morning Caesar's advanced scouts reported Crassus to be in sight, and before the close of that day he had marched twenty miles. Crassus he left at Samarobriua (*Amiens*). In that town were the bulk of the army's baggage, the hostages of the various Gallic tribes, important state papers, and immense stocks of grain accumulated for winter consumption by the troops: a garrison was therefore absolutely necessary, and for this duty Crassus, with the legion under him, was best detailed. Proceeding on his march he was joined by Fabius and his legion, with no great amount of delay. Labienus' position was more difficult. He had recently learnt of the fate of Sabinus and his battalions; the Treveri were swarming in his neighborhood; and to leave his present quarters under circumstances which so strongly savored of flight might well render him powerless to ward off the attack of an enemy known to be flushed with victory. In his written reply to Caesar, therefore, he explained to his commander how serious must be any immediate movement of his troops; and after giving a full account of the late disaster among the Eburones, finished by stating that the entire forces of the Treveri, horse and foot, had encamped on a site only three miles distant from himself.

Although this decision ended his hopes of three legions, leaving him with only two, Caesar yet approved of his subordinate's action, and now had to trust to speed, and speed alone, for saving the situation. Rapid marching brought him to the frontiers of the situation where prisoners informed him of the true position of affairs outside the camp of Cicero, and of the deadly nature of his peril. In order to open communications with the beleaguered garrison, he prevailed on one of the native horse, by the offer of a handsome reward, to go with a letter to Cicero; and in order to guard against the revelation of military secrets to the enemy in the unfortunate event of capture, should he fail to get close up, to tie it to the leather handstrap of a javelin and to throw it in this manner over the trenches. It contained the simple statement that Caesar had started with the legions, and might be expected to arrive shortly; and ended with an earnest appeal to his lieutenant to show himself the true soldier that hitherto he had

always been. Fearful of the risk he ran, the Gaul threw the javelin as directed; but by an unlucky chance it impinged itself on one of the wooden turrets of the camp, and in this position was for two days left unnoticed. On the third it was seen by one of the legionaries, taken down, and carried to Cicero. Having carefully perused its contents, the Roman commandant publicly read it out to the assembled troops, and his words sent all ranks beside themselves with joy. A little later, and the sight of distant smoke, rising in vengeance over the burning country, told that the legions were indeed upon their way.

Informed by their scouts of the new condition of affairs, the Gauls at once raised the siege of Cicero, and in full strength hastened to fling themselves upon Caesar. Their numbers may have been anything short of sixty thousand fighting men. Following on their withdrawal, Cicero again applied to the Nervian chief Verico, who has already once been mentioned in a similar connexion, for the loan of a Gallic slave as letter-carrier to Caesar. The need of care and circumspection upon the road was duly impressed upon the man; and the letter informed the commander-in-chief that the enemy had dispersed from before the camp, and that the full strength of their host was now doubling back upon himself. This letter was delivered in Caesar's camp about midnight, and its contents were at once laid before his assembled officers, who were then warned to hold themselves in readiness for the coming fight. With the first streak of dawn on the following day camp was struck, and after a march of three or four miles, the enemy's masses were observed crowning the farther slopes of a valley intersected at its bottom by a stream. Against a position so formidable, it would have been highly dangerous with so puny a force to engage in action: and, the knowledge that Cicero was now relieved justifying to some extent an abatement of speed, Caesar decided to form an encampment, and was soon firmly entrenched on the most convenient site discoverable. The new camp, which had only to accommodate something under seven thousand men, without heavy baggage, would under no circumstances have been of imposing size; but with the object of bringing it into supreme contempt in the mind of the foe, Caesar directed the roadways across it to be so contracted as to reduce to the utmost the total dimensions of the

ground. Meanwhile his scouts were searching the country in all directions to find the most suitable route across the valley.

Apart from a few petty cavalry skirmishes for the possession of water, the day passed without event, each side having its own reinforcements, and pending their arrival preferred to make no movement; whilst with Caesar two considerations at present counseled inactivity. His main hope was that the enemy, through his feigning fear, might be inveigled across to his own side of the valley, where he might fight on favorable terms, resting on his fortifications; failing that, he would at least gain time for a careful study of the roads, and so be enabled to make the passage of the river and valley with less danger than it now involved. In this expectation he was not disappointed. At dawn on the next day the enemy's horsemen passed the stream, and advancing towards his position, were soon engaged with the Roman mounted troops. These had orders to retire before the threatened attack, and to fall back upon camp; at the same time the legionaries were instructed to raise the height of the rampart all the way round, to block up all gates, and in the execution of these orders to throw over their movements an appearance of such excessive haste as would raise a presumption of abject fear.

These numerous decoys succeeded in their object, and transferring their forces to the farther side, the Gauls now formed for battle on ground well below the level of their opponents. On perceiving, however, that even upon these terms the Romans, instead of fighting, only evacuated their ramparts, they advanced within still closer range, and on all four sides began contemptuously tossing their spears over into camp. Their heralds were thereupon ordered to go the round of the Roman lines, and publicly to announce that any Roman or Gaul who chose to come over to their side before nine o'clock that morning might freely do so; after that hour the invitation would be withdrawn. So truculent did their bearing grow, that, thinking it impracticable to rush the gates ~~through~~ though they appeared from outside to be stoutly blocked, were in reality only piled up with a single layer of turves, some began actually to wrench away the materials forming the rampart, whilst others started to fill

the ditch. Then at last, Caesar gave the word. Issuing from all four gates, the legionaries, with the cavalry following hot in pursuit, quickly routed their assailants; and meeting with not even a semblance of a stand, inflicted heavy slaughter, finishing by stripping all the dead of their arms.

Where swamps and forests so abounded, and where, from the nature of the case, no additional punishment could be inflicted, further pursuit must necessarily have been hazardous: the recall was therefore sounded, and on the same day the relief expedition, without having lost a single man, marched into Cicero's camp. As he passed the siege-towers, the covered ways for the sappers, the imposing lines of fortification erected by the enemy, Caesar's admiration was unbounded; and when the war-worn regiment was at length paraded for inspection, and less than ten per cent of its effective strength was found to remain unwounded, no more eloquent testimony could have been forthcoming, alike of the appalling danger and of the heroic courage that had marked the siege. In recognition of his great services, Cicero and the legion were then publicly thanked by the commander-in-chief; after which a few words were addressed personally to each of those centurions and officers whose gallant behavior had been specially singled out by their general. The news of the disaster to Sabinus and Cotta was now confirmed by prisoners, and it became necessary to apprise the troops. Before the assembled forces, therefore, Caesar on the next day gave a full account of what had occurred; and while sympathizing with the men in the great blow that had fallen on the army, gave every reason for a confident outlook on the future. The disaster, he pointed out, had been due solely to the ill judgment and recklessness of the officer in charge, and regarded as a check to Roman arms, had, through the auspicious overruling of Providence and their own valor, already been fully retrieved. In the light of subsequent success, therefore, they might view with calmness the errors of the past; and the thought of the short-lived triumph of their foe should sensibly ~~relieve~~ their natural feeling of regret.

Meanwhile across the intervening country of the Remi (*Rhêmes*) the news of Caesar's victory was speeding on its way to Labienus. Very nearly sixty miles separated his position from that of Cicero, which,

it will be noticed, Caesar only reached after one o'clock in the afternoon; yet so marvelous was the rate of traveling, that before midnight the shouts announcing the intelligence and the congratulations of the Remi upon the event, could be heard outside the gates. Though a general assault on the Roman lines had been planned by Indutiomarus to take place on the morrow, yet the night saw him in full retreat, and subsequently the whole Treveran muster melted away to their homes. The pressure of immediate danger being thus removed, Caesar had leisure to remodel his dispositions for the winter. Fabius he sent back with his single legion to his old quarters among the Morini; the other three he concentrated in three separate camps in the immediate neighborhood of Samarobriua (*Amiens*), his own headquarters; whilst, Gaul, he determined to remain with his army throughout the winter. The need for his continued presence was indeed paramount. The loss to Roman prestige inflicted by the massacre of Sabinus and his state, as the story reached its ears, leaped instantly to thoughts of war; everywhere across the country secret agents were moving from tribe to tribe, actively discussing future plans, and eagerly seeking a convenient center from which to raise the standard of revolt: night revealed the Gauls met in solemn conclave at lonely districts of the countryside. For Caesar the winter was, with rare exceptions, a period of unrelieved anxiety; during which reports of Gallic plots and Gallic risings became of almost daily experience. Amongst these was the intelligence forwarded by L. Roscius, commanding the Third legion, that large bands of what are known as the Armorican tribes had lately gathered for an assault upon his camp, but that when no more than eight miles distant, the news of Caesar's victorious march had caused such a sudden dispersal of their forces, that they seemed like a defeated army flying from the field of battle.

In spite of all, however, Caesar succeeded by a wise and judicious choice of methods in preserving at least an outward semblance of loyalty over a large proportion of the country. Summoning to headquarters the prominent members of each tribe, he either, according to the circumstances, administered a severe fright by telling them

plainly that their plans were all well known to himself, or, addressing them in friendly words, urged them to persevere in the course of duty. Not the least flagrant case was that of the Senones (*Sens*), quite one of the most powerful tribes, whose influence over the Gallic world is second to none. Their present ruler was a prince named Cavarinus, a nominee of Caesar's and a member of their ancient royal house, whose brother, Moriasgus, had been on the throne at the time of Caesar's advent into Gaul. A public attempt to assassinate him only miscarried through his discovery of the plot; and on his taking to flight, he was pursued to the frontiers by his intended murderers, who then formally pronounced his banishment from both kingdom and home: and though they had the grace to send explanations of their conduct to Caesar, yet an order from him to assemble at his camp the whole of their tribal council was contumaciously ignored. The same tendency to defy authority was visible elsewhere. With the sole exception of the Aedui and Remi, both of which states were the constant recipients of distinguished marks of favor at Caesar's hands—the one because of their ancient and unbroken loyalty to Rome, the other for their more recent services in the Gallic wars—there was hardly a tribe this winter throughout the length and breadth of the wide territories of Gaul that did not fall under deserved suspicion; so strongly, it appeared, was the native mind impressed by the fact that someone had at last been found bold enough to take up arms, and so strikingly had it altered the attitude of all. That such should have been the case was perhaps not wonderful. Many courses doubtless cooperated to produce the change: but not the least potent was the deep-seated sense of indignation that a race, whose warrior spirit was ranked first among all the nations of the world, should have so far belied its previous history as to sink without a struggle beneath the conquering arm of Rome.

Meanwhile the disbanded Treveri under their leader Indutiomarus had not been idle, and had allowed no part of that winter to go by without making every effort to stir up the Germans beyond the Rhine. In addition to the ordinary money bribe, the tribes were further incited by deliberate misrepresentations of the strength of the Roman forces. A large proportion of these was said to be already annihilated,

leaving only an insignificant fraction still to be accounted for. These arguments, however, proved signally unavailing: not a state could be induced to cross the Rhine, and the invariable answer to all appeals was that two attempts had already been made, one in the campaign under Ariovistus, the other at the migration of the Tencteri, and that they were not at present disposed to risk a third. Undeterred by this rebuff, Indutiomarus continued his preparations as before: armed bands were busily raised and drilled, horses bought from neighboring states, and to attract the outlaws and desperadoes from all the remotest corners of Gaul, the most alluring terms were held out. By such methods he rapidly made himself the cynosure of all eyes in the Gallic world of his day, and envoys bent on obtaining his friendship and assistance, either in a public or a private capacity, flocked from all quarters to his court.

His projects indeed seemed to be now in a fair way towards consummation. He himself was evidently regarded as a leader: a firm basis of disaffection had, thanks to a common participation in past guilt, been laid in Central Gaul among the Senones (*Seni*) and the Carnutes (*Orleans*): in Belgium the Nervii and Adulatici were preparing to make war on Rome; and clearly he had only to show himself outside his frontiers for volunteers to crowd to his standard. Under such favorable circumstances he determined to take a step which, to all intents and purposes, is the Gallic equivalent of a formal declaration of war, and to summon what is known as an "Armed Council." At every such council the adult males of a population are bound by a universal obligation to appear with weapons in their hands; and so strictly is this duty enforced, that the last comer invariably pays the penalty with his life, and is executed with every refinement of cruelty before the eyes of the assembled host. At this council the first business of Indutiomarus was to attack the Romans through their protégé, Gingetorix, his own son-in-law and head of the rival political faction, who, it will be remembered, had openly espoused the cause of Caesar, with whom he had since remained. He was now condemned as the avowed enemy of his country, and his property declared confiscated to the state. That done, he formally announced to the assembly the invitations received from the Senones, Carnutes,

and other states of Central Gaul; proclaimed his intention to proceed and thither through the territories of the Remi, plundering these as he went, and lastly, as a preliminary step to these measures, his resolve to carry by storm the neighboring camp of Labienus. The proceedings closed with a careful enunciation of his orders.

To Labienus the prospect of attack was in no sense disconcerting. Safely entrenched behind a position, which both in natural and artificial strength was practically impregnable, he had no fears either for his own or his legion's safety: his sole anxiety was lest he should lose some chance of dealing a really decisive blow at his enemy. Apprised, therefore, of the speech just delivered at the tribal gathering by Indutiomarus, which Gingetorix and his friends duly reported, he at once sent off agents to the surrounding tribes, summoning them to supply him with drafts of cavalry, to assemble all together upon a fixed day. Meanwhile cavalry demonstrations on the part of the enemy became almost of daily occurrence, and spreading his forces immediately below the Roman camp, Indutiomarus would now make a nice observation of the strength of the position, now would endeavor to get a word with the garrison, now once again would try to overawe them by imposing appearances, on most of which occasions his horsemen would ride up and deliberately shoot their spears into the lines. In answer to this challenge Labienus resolutely kept his troops behind their earthworks, and by every device in his power fostered the belief in his own timidity.

The contemptuous bearing of the enemy in approaching the camp became day by day more marked, until upon one particular night the cavalry reinforcements sent for by the Roman commander from the various Gallic states were quietly admitted within the lines: after which so strict was the watch kept upon all ranks, that by no sort of contrivance could intimation or report of their arrival be conveyed outside to the Treveri. On the morrow Indutiomarus again paid his customary visit, and spending the larger part of the day in the neighborhood of the camp, his horsemen amused themselves by throwing spears over the rampart and by challenging the Romans in the foulest language to come out and fight. No answer being vouchsafed on the part of the garrison, the enemy towards the close of the

afternoon rode leisurely back, observing no sort of formation, but broken up into groups. Then from two separate gates Labienus suddenly launched the whole of his brigade. Accurately foreseeing the panic and wild confusion that this would cause among the enemy, and determined if possible to prevent their ringleader from escaping in the general mêlée, he had given strict orders to all his men to make Indutiomarus the one object of their attack, and that no one was to strike a single other blow until he had seen the Gallic leader dead before him: at the same time liberal rewards were offered to the party who killed him, and several infantry battalions were pushed up to support the cavalry. It was a case of Fortune smiling approval on human prescience: for the rebel chief, singled out in this manner for universal pursuit, was caught in the very act of fording a river, cut down, and his head brought back to camp. Returning from the pursuit, the victorious troopers gave chase to various other parties of fugitives, several of whom they succeeded in accounting for. The sudden downfall of their leader at once reacted on the other centers of rebellion; and the bands of Nervii and Eburones who had lately taken the field against the Romans now melted rapidly away, leaving Caesar to enjoy a period of comparative tranquility throughout Gaul.

BOOK VI

SECTION I. PUNITIVE EXPEDITIONS IN THE NORTHEAST

The situation, however, presented still many disquieting features, and indications of a yet wider movement of revolt were not wanting. With the object, therefore, of strengthening the military forces at his disposal, Caesar commissioned three officers, M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, to raise further levies in the Italian portion of his government; and also made a special request to the proconsul, Cn. Pompeius (who for reasons of state still remained after his year of office in the neighborhood of the capital, with full civil and military authority) that he would order those recruits in North Italy who had been recently sworn for service under himself when consul, immediately to join the colors and to proceed as reinforcements to the army of Gaul.¹ In acting thus he had an eye also to the importance of impressing for the future upon the Gallic imagination a vivid idea of the inexhaustible resources of Italy, and of showing that the wastage suffered in war she could not only rapidly make good, but could even, if called upon, replace her first by still larger military establishments. On public and on personal grounds alike Pompeius acceded to this request; and being well served by his officers in their conduct of the levy, Caesar had, before the close of winter, ~~three~~ new legions all fully organized and conducted to their destination. Thus, by exactly doubling the number of battalions that had perished with Sabinus, he gave convincing proof, both by the extent and rapid concentration